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ABSTRACT 
This research paper describes and discusses, from a feminist perspective, the sexual 
harassment provisions of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (and the Labour Relations Act 
1987) and analyses the cases in which those provisions have been applied by the employment 
institutions. The main thesis of this paper is that gender bias has affected the application of 
those provisions and has undermined the effectiveness of sexual harassment law. The paper 
begins with a brief description of the feminist framework within which the sexual harassment 
provisions of the Employment Contracts Act are later analysed and notes the differences 
between traditional methods of legal decision making and feminist legal method. In Part II of 
the paper the writer describes how sexual harassment harms women and how the law 
recognises that harm as a legal injury . The writer also summarises some of the social and 
legal myths about women and sexual behaviour, and notes that women's and men's 
perspectives about sex are different. 
Part III of the paper describes the development of sexual harassment law as part of New 
Zealand employment law and summarises the positive aspects of those provisions with 
reference to the objects of sexual harassment law, the law in some other jurisdictions, and the 
sex discrimination provisions contained in the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. The 
writer concludes that, from a feminist perspective, the sexual harassment provisions in the 
Employment Contracts Act are the best in the world. Part IV of the paper develops the thesis 
that the effectiveness of these provisions has been undermined by gender bias in the 
application of those provisions in particular cases. This thesis is developed through an 
analysis of the way in which gender bias has influenced the exercise of legal discretion by 
decision makers in sexual harassment cases. The discretionary tools analysed include the 
granting of remedies, application of the rules of evidence, interpretation of particular words 
and phrases in the legislation, and the importation of irrelevant factors into the decision 
making process. 
The paper concludes with some suggestions for legal and other reforms. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, notes and acknowledgements, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 30,000 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
The reality is that this powerful beast is used to perpetuate a sense of inequality, to keep women in their place 
notwithstanding our increasing presence in the workplace. What we have yet to explore about harassment is vast. 
What we have yet to explore is what will enable us to slay the beast. 1 
Anita Hill 
This research paper presents a feminist perspective on the developing law of sexual 
harassment within the context of employment law.2 The following analysis of sexual 
harassment cases dealt with by the employment institutions3 reveals that the gender bias of 
decision makers4 has resulted in decisions which perpetuate male power and privilege, 
disregard the interests of women, and threaten to undermine the objects of the legislation 
which makes sexual harassment unlawful. 
The writer's feminist perspective places sexual harassment in a framework where 
discrimination against women in society is deep-seated, pervasive and continual (but 
ultimately able to be eradicated). It places sexual harassment, the legal claim, in a legal 
system which both reflects and creates discrimination against women in society. It recalls our 
legal herstory, a slow progression from compulsory discrimination against women to, in New 
Zealand at least, the removal of almost all discriminatory laws, and the introduction of limited 
protection against discrimination on the grounds of sex. In late twentieth century New 
Zealand it is possible to forget the role which the law in general, and the common law in 
particular, have played and still play as instruments through which inequality is perpetuated. 
To understand how gender bias works, it is appropriate to remind ourselves of the historical 
framework of the legal oppression of women. As each individual decision maker brings his or 
1 A F Hill "Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast" (1992) 65 S Cal LR 1445, 1448. 
2 This paper does not discuss the law of sexual harassment in the context of human rights or other areas of 
law. F Joychild A Critique of the Law of Sexual Harassment in Aotearoa - New Zealand (Unpublished paper 
presented to the 1993 Women's Law Conference, Wellington, 22 - 23 May 1993) (hereafter Joychild) and R 
M Robertson " 'What is Not Part of the Job': An Assessment of the Equal Opporrunities Tribunal's Handling 
of Sex Discrimination in Employment" (Unpublished LLB(Hons) research paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1992) 25 - 41 discuss sexual harassment as part of the law of sex discrimination in New Zealand. 
3 The term "institutions" is used in Part VI of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ("ECA") as a generic term 
to describe the Employment Court ("the Court") and the Employment Tribunal ("the Tribunal") established 
under ss 103 and 77 of that Act. The writer has used the term "employment institutions" (in the absence of 
any more elegant alternative) to describe not only the Court and the Tribunal but also the range of courts, 
tribunals and services established by previous labour legislation, including the Court of Arbitration (Industrial 
Concilation and Arbitration Act 1954), the Industrial Court and Industrial Mediation Service (Industrial 
Relations Act 1973), the Arbitration Court and Industrial Conciliation and Mediation Services (Industrial 
Relations Amendment Act 1977) and the Labour Court and Mediation Service (Labour Relations Act 1987). 
4 In this research paper the term "decision makers" denotes persons with statutory responsibility for 
adjudicating on, or otherwise making binding determinations about, sexual harassment. The term "judges" is 
too narrow, since it does not include Tribunal members. 
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her own individual history to the decision making process, so the legal system brings the 
collective history of the law to eachjudicial5 decision about sexual harassment. 
Bracton said: "Women differ from men in many respects, for their position is inferior to that 
of men. "6 The decisions and commentaries of the great common lawyers, Coke, Hale and 
Blackstone, reinforced the social subjugation of women. 7 Those decisions, and the attitudes 
on which they were based, have been used to justify legal oppression of women for centuries. 
The common law made discrimination against women mandatory in many fields: the law of 
property;8 tort;9 contract; 10 family law; 11 criminal law; 12 evidence. 13 The common law, in 
male legal mythology associated with concepts of fundamental right and justice, was "the 
main doctrinal justification for preventing the advancement of ... women of the middle and 
upper classes." 14 The very nature of the common law is, in a sense, male: 15 
5 In this research paper the term "judicial" is used in a broad sense to describe the legal process of 
adjudication on disputes about sexual harassment, whether made in the general courts or in more specialist 
institutions such as tribunals, and by judges as well as other decision makers. 
6 Bracton On the Laws and Customs of England (cited in K O'Donovan Sexual Divisions in Law (Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1985) 31 (hereafter O'Donovan). 
7 Blackstone said that husband and wife were treated as one person; a wife's legal existence was incorporated or 
merged into that of her husband (Halsbury's Laws of England ( 4 ed, para I O 12, p 628). More modem legal 
commentators have relied until recently on the writings of Sir Matthew Hale for the rationale for the marital rape 
exemption, as well as the "easy to allege, hard to refute" doctrine in rape law (M Hale History of the Pleas of the 
Crown (1736) 636 (quoted in O'Donovan, above, I 19): "But the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by 
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up herself 
in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract". The courts which denied women legal status as persons 
last century relied on Coke's "assumption ofpennanent legal subordination of women" to support their views on 
the public disabilities of women: A Sachs and J H Wilson Sexism and the Law. A Study of Male Beliefs and 
Judicial Bias (Martin Robinson, Oxford, 1978) 44 (hereafter Sexism and the Law). 
8 O'Donovan 29 - 30. 
9 K Cooper-Stephenson "Past Inequities and Future Promise : Judicial Neutrality in Charter Constitutional Tort 
Claims" in S L Martin and KE Mahoney (eds) Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Carswell, Toronto, 1987) 226, 
227 (hereafter Equality and Judicial Neutrality); W Parker "The Reasonable Person: A Gendered Concept" in E 
McDonald and G Austin (eds) Claiming the Law. Essays by New Zealand Women in Celebration of the 1993 
Suffrage Centennial (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) and ( 1993) 23 VU WLR Volume I 05 
(hereafter cited to VUWLR). 
lO M J Frug "Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook" (1985) 34 Am ULR I 065. 
11 M D A Freeman "Legal Ideologies, Patriarchal Precedents, and Domestic Violence" in Freeman (ed) State, 
Law and the Family. Critical Perspectives (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1984) 51, 57. 
12 S Estrich Real Rape (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1987) 28. 
13 R Slovenko "Witnesses, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony" (1966) 19 U Fla LR I, 3. 
14 Sexism and the Law 43. P Grimshaw Women's Suffrage in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1972) notes (8 - 9) the effect of property disabilities on married working class women in New Zealand. 
15 Sexism and the Law 45. CA Littleton "Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes" ( 1989) 41 
Stanford LR 751 (hereafter Littleton) describes methods of feminist legal reasoning with reference to sexual 
harassment law. Compare traditional methods of legal reasoning: "The distancing of self from subject. The use 
of only material facts when relevance is result-driven, rather than perception driven. The linear method. The 
tableau of boredom when someone cries context. ... [F]eminist legal theory must begin by taking these rules 
away": E McDonald "The Law of Contract and the Taking of Risks: Feminist Legal Theory and The Way It Is" 
(1993) 23 VUWLR 113, 114. 
3 
This special emphasis on the word rather than the concept, on the fact rather than the sentiment, on the 
cited instance rather than the overarching principle, is usually attributed by defenders of the common 
law to the peculiarly pragmatic character of the English people. 
Changes in the legal status of women usually came because social pressure forced Parliament 
to amend the common law to remove discriminatory provisions. Only rarely did judges 
respond directly to changes in prevailing social attitudes: 16 
The great changes in gender status have come about not through the harmonious unfolding from within 
of legal concepts, but through vigorous attacks against the legal system from outside. Contrary to 
common assertion by lawyers, the law and the judges did not stand on the side of equality and individual 
rights, nor were they even neutral. By and large they acted as a barrier to, rather than a guarantee of, 
equality between men and women. This was for the reason so obvious to outsiders and so invisible to 
lawyers, that the structures of the law were part of wider social structures rather than apart from them. 
While, in New Zealand, the law now makes overt discrimination against women unlawful, 
gender bias in society and the gendered nature of legal reasoning mean that sexism in the law 
remains a problem. What is judicial gender bias? It occurs: 17 
[W]hen judges assess a woman's role in relation to traditional sex-role stereotypes while ignoring her 
personal characteristics and women's changing social role; when they fail to appreciate and act upon the 
real life experience of women; when they rely upon inaccurate, common, ingrained and socialized 
beliefs; and when they fail to recognize or scrutinize their use of sexist stereotypes and untested 
assumptions. Gender bias also occurs when judges analyze concepts from a strictly male perspective 
and therefore fail to measure or measure and underestimate the immediate and long-term consequences 
their decisions have on women. 
Gender bias is able to affect the result of sexual harassment cases through the use of specific 
legal tools which enable decision makers to use their discretion in determining particular legal 
questions and in determining the outcome of cases generally: the allocation of meaning to a 
particular word or phrase; the assessment of the relevance and weight of evidence; the 
assessment of credibility; the allocation of the burden of proof; the setting of the standard of 
proof at a particular level; the awarding of remedies. It is not suggested that in all, or even in 
many cases, decision makers consciously or deliberately use these tools to favour men's 
interests over women's and to give greater weight to men's perspectives than women's. 
Gender bias is often invisible, inadvertent, and unintentional. Yet this should concern rather 
than console us, because "power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes 
preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from discussion or even 
imagination." 18 The use of these tools means that prejudice and bias are less transparent and 
therefore more difficult to eradicate. If gender bias is sufficiently pervasive, and sufficiently 
16 Sexism and the Law 42. 
17 S L Martin "Persisting Equality Implications of the 'Bliss' Case" in Equality and Judicial Neutrality I 95, 196. 
18 M Minow "The Supreme Court 1986 Term. Foreword: Justice Engendered" (1987) 101 Harv LR 10, 68 
(hereafter Minow). 
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hidden, it can not only affect the outcome of individual cases, but also undermine the 
effectiveness of legislation which is intended to promote the interests of women. 
Feminist legal analysis enables us to see how gender bias affects judicial decision making. 
The tools of feminist legal reasoning also enable decision makers to make decisions which are 
based on a fairer, more just foundation than the traditional tools of legal reasoning. Feminist 
legal analysis reveals how the unspoken assumptions of decision makers influence their 
decisions: by adopting an "unstated point of reference" when assessing others; 19 by treating 
the decision maker's perspective as objective, not subjective, and ignoring that the decision 
maker has a perspective; by ignoring the perspectives of those being judged, or assuming that 
the decision maker can and does take those into account; and by assuming that existing social 
and economic arrangements are "natural, uncoerced, and good. 112° Feminist legal reasoning 
challenges these unspoken assumptions and argues for a perspective in which lawyers see one 
of the functions of law as being to facilitate positive social change, including the elimination 
of discrimination against women (as well as other unjustified discrimination). For centuries 
the law has conspired with structures and attitudes in society which oppress women. Feminist 
lawyers say that the law can and should be used to promote the interests of women. 
From this feminist perspective the writer describes in this paper her concern that gender bias 
in sexual harassment cases dealt with by the employment institutions is in danger of 
undermining the objects of the sexual harassment provisions of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 ("ECA") and therefore of removing an important part of the legal "basket" of 
measures designed to remove discrimination against women workers. 21 
19 For example, women are different in relation to the unstated male norm; Maori are different in relation to the 
unstated pakeha norm. 
20 Minow 31 - 57. 
21 This "basket" includes the Equal Pay Act 1972; the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (to be replaced 
by the Human Rights Act 1993 with effect from l February 1994); the Parental Leave and Employment 
Protection Act 1987; Part V of the State Sector Act 1988; and the personal grievance provisions contained in 
Part III of the ECA. 
5 
II SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE NATURE OF THE INJURY 
If no one can really know another's pain, who shall decide how to treat pain, and along what calculus? These are 
questions of justice, not science. These are questions of complexity, not justifications for passivity, because 
failing to notice another's pain is an act with significance.22 
Martha Minow 
A How Sexual Harassment Harms Women 
A helpful non-legal definition of sexual harassment is "any sexually oriented practice that 
endangers an individual's continued employment, negatively affects his/her work 
performance, or undermines his/her sense of personal dignity. "23 Sexual harassment can range 
from relatively mild behaviour, such as telling smutty jokes, to sexual assault and rape. The 
overwhelming majority of victims of sexual harassment are women.24 The overwhelming 
majority of harassers25 are male, although there are exceptions.26 Group harassment, by 
several harassers of one or more victims, is also common.27 Sexual harassment is the meeting 
point of at least two inequalities or hierarchies: the inferior position of women in society 
compared to men and the inferior position of workers compared to their employers. 28 At this 
meeting point the two inequalities react with and reinforce each other to produce a workplace 
where the employment of women is sexualised.29 Sexual harassment may also take place in 
the context of discrimination on the grounds of race, sexual orientation or other factors. 30 
The damage caused to women by sexual harassment at work can be severe. Damage often 
takes the form of economic harm. 31 Actual or constructive dismissal, denial of promotion, 
and loss of seniority or other disadvantage, with consequent economic loss, can result from 
the harassment itself or from the retaliatory actions of the harasser. Women who stay away 
from work temporarily or leave work permanently to escape harassment also suffer 
22 Minow 11. 
23 A P Aggarwal Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (2 ed, Butterworths , Toronto, 1992) l (hereafter 
Aggarwal). This paper is about the law of sexual harassment, not sexual harassment itself. New Zealand 
publications about sexual harassment include Human Rights Commission Sexual Harassment in the Workplace 
(GP Print Ltd, Wellington, 1991) and A Colbert Dealing With Sexual Harassment . A New Zealand Handbook 
for Employers/Employees, Students and Educators (GP, Wellington, 1989) . 
24 Colbert 11 - 12. 
25 "Harasser" and "harassment" in this paper refer to sexual harassment. 
26 Colbert 11 - 12. To reflect social reality in this paper the feminine pronoun is used for victims and 
complainants of sexual harassment and the masculine pronoun is used for harassers. 
27 Colbert 57. 
28 CA MacKinnon Sexual Harassment of Working Women. A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1979) 217 (hereafter MacKinnon Sexual Harassment) . 
29 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 217 - 221. 
30 ER Arriola " 'What's The Big Deal?' Women in the New York City Construction Industry and Sexual 
Harassment Law, 1970 - 1985" ( 1990) 22 Col um Human Rights LR 21, 42, 54, 62; MacKinnon Sexual 
Harassment 30 - 31. 
31 N R Lipper "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace : A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United 
States" (1992) 13 Comp Lab U 293, 299 - 300 (hereafter Lipper "Comparative Study") . 
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economically. Sexual harassment also reinforces the economic subordination of women in a 
broader sense, by acting as a barrier to women wishing to enter the many work areas currently 
dominated by men32 or simply by making it harder for women to keep their jobs. 
Damage may also take the form of emotional and physical injury. Psychological and 
emotional stress, as well as loss of self-confidence affecting the victim's ability to perform her 
job, are common reactions to sexual harassment.33 Surveys of the effects of sexual harassment 
show that victims may suffer from severe emotional trauma, anxiety, nervousness, depression, 
and feelings of low self esteem, powerlessness or anger.34 Many women report adverse 
physical reactions to sexual harassment, such as headaches, insomnia, indigestion, exhaustion 
and skin ailments. 35 
B Development of the Law of Sexual Harassment 
1 Recognition of sexual harassment as a legal injury 
Sexual harassment has only recently been recognised as a legal injury, with a consequent right 
on the part of the victim to legal redress. The process of recognition began during the rise of 
the most recent women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s when women in consciousness 
raising groups began to discuss their experiences of oppression, including sexual 
harassment.36 The problem was named,37 surveyed,38 researched39 and analysed. Women 
began to seek legal redress through the courts in the United States in the mid-1970s, arguing 
that sexual harassment at work was sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.40 The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in Williams v Saxbe41 was 
32 Lipper "Comparative Study" 300. EM Blackwood "The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law 
and the Case for Subjectivity" (1992) 16 Vermont LR 1005, 1020 (hereafter Blackwood). 
33 K Gallivan "Sexual Harassment after Janzen v Platy: The Transformative Possiblities" (1991) 49 U Tor 
Fae LR 27, 34 - 35 (hereafter Gallivan). 
34 Lipper "Comparative Study" 299. 
35 Colbert 40. 
36 W Pollack "Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs Legal Definitions" (1990) 13 Harv Women's Ll 
35, 38 - 44 (hereafter Pollack); H B Fechner "Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual 
Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts" (1990) 23 J Law Reform 475, 480 - 487 (hereafter 
Fechner). 
37 C Backhouse "Bell v The Flaming Steer Steak House Tavern: Canada's First Sexual Harassment Decision" 
(1981) 19 UWOntLR 141 (hereafter Backhouse) states that the term sexual harassment was first used in 1975. 
38 Arriola, above n 30, 39. 
39 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 26 - 27; L Farley Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women 
on the Job (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978); D Steele No Laughing Matter. The Ford's Sexual Harassment 
Dispute (Rev ed, Wellington Trade's Council Women's Subcommittee, Wellington, 1983) (hereafter Steele 
No Laughing Matter). 
40 Aggarwal describes (16 - 32) the development of sexual harassment law in the United States. 
41 413 F Supp 654, (DCC 1976). 
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the first United States Court to accept this argument.42 The conceptualisation of sexual 
harassment as unlawful sex discrimination was subsequently accepted in Canada in 1980,43 
Australia in 1984,44 New Zealand in 1985,45 and Great Britain in 1986.46 A small number of 
countries have adopted legislation which deals specifically with sexual harassment in the 
workplace.47 In most countries sexual harassment is still dealt with as part of the law of 
discrimination. MacKinnon concludes that sexual harassment is unique in the law because it 
is a woman-defined legal action:48 
Sexual harassment, the legal claim - the idea that the law should see it the way its victims see it - is 
defmitely a feminist invention. Feminists first took women's experience seriously enough to uncover 
this problem and conceptualise it and pursue it legally .... The legal claim for sexual harassment marks 
the first time in history, to my knowledge, that women have defined women's injuries in a law. 
Judicial extension of the concept of sex discrimination to include sexual harassment is a rare 
example of judicial creativity being used to benefit women.49 The way in which the law of 
sexual harassment develops is therefore of great importance to women seeking to use the law 
to promote gender equity and justice. If the law of sexual harassment fails to develop in a 
way which does promote women's interests, the law's potential as a means of securing justice 
for women in other areas seems doubtful. 
2 Legal myths50 about women, sex and truth 
Recognition of sexual harassment as a legal injury occurred in the same period as substantial 
reform ofrape law occurred in many common law jurisdictions. 51 Feminist legal analysis of 
rape laws, and particularly the special rules of evidence relating to rape cases, revealed that 
42 The US Supreme Court confirmed this approach in Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson 477 US 57 (1986). 
43 Bell v The Flaming Steer Steak House Tavern Inc (Ont 1980), 1 CHRR D/155, 27 LAC (2d) 227 (sub nom 
Re Bell and Korczak) (Shime). 
44 O'Callaghan v Loder & Anor (1984) EOC 92-023 (Equal Opportunity Tribunal, New South Wales). 
45 H v E (1985) 5 NZAR 333. 
46 Porcelli v Strathclyde Regional Council [1986) ICR 564. 
47 R Husbands "Sexual Harassment Law in Employment. An International Perspective" ( 1992) 131 
International Labour Review 535 - 559 (hereafter Husbands). See also International Labour Organisation 
Conditions of Work Digest. Combating Sexual Harassment at Work (Vol 11 No l 1992, ILO, Geneva) 
(hereafter ILO Digest). 
48 CA MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 1987) 103, 105 (hereafter MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified). 
49 Mac Kinnon Sexual Harassment notes ( 158 - 159) that "[ c ]ontract doctrine ... did not have to be changed to 
prohibit sexual harassment in employment; it merely had to be applied. With a little more creativity and a little 
less sexism, sexual harassment might long have been a recognized tort". See also Fechner 485 and Sexism and 
the Law 4 - 40. 
50 "Myth" in this research paper means a popular fiction, not a traditional narrative or legend. 
51 From the preparation of the first cases in the United States in 1974 (see MacKinnon Sexual Harassment, 59 
- 63) until, say, the acceptance of sexual harassment as sex discrimination in the UK in 1986. Obviously the 
law is still developing, but the acceptance of sexual harassment as a legal claim was really complete in the 
major common law jurisdictions by 1986. 
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many of the evidential rules relating to rape were based not on any factual or scientific 
foundation, but on acceptance by the legal system of societal myths about rape.52 These 
myths often reflected public misperception of the nature of the crime of rape: that virtuous 
women do not get raped; that rape is impossible; that men rape women because they are 
overcome by sexual desire; that rape victims are young, attractive women; that victims 
provoke rape by dressing provocatively or placing themselves in dangerous situations; that 
women enjoy rape. 53 In New Zealand the l 983 Rape Study54 listed among the myths about 
rape the assumption that "[w]omen, especially if they are promiscuous or of dubious sexual 
morality, frequently make false complaints of rape", that a woman who has really been raped 
"will have physically resisted, screamed and tried to escape, and she will usually have some 
physical injuries", will complain immediately, and will report it to the police. 55 
These propositions are not supported by social reality. The "easy to make, hard to defend" 
view is "directly counter to the available statistics on rape and related offences" and was based 
"primarily upon the anecdotes and personal opinions of various legal authorities". 56 The 
empirical evidence in the Rape Study showed that "rape is not a charge easily to be made, and 
that a complaint to the police is usually made at considerable personal cost to the 
complainant". 57 Rather than there being large numbers of false complaints, rape is generally 
under-reported and many complaints are withdrawn for compelling reasons, not because they 
are false. 58 
Many of these myths - the provocative victim, the spurned woman out for revenge, the lying 
woman, the perpetrator overcome by sexual desire for an attractive victim - also permeate 
judicial consideration of sexual harassment cases. The development of the law of sexual 
harassment has also revealed some new - or at least hitherto invisible - myths about sexual 
52 Above n 12, 43. TM Massaro "Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome 
Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony" (1985) 69 Minn LR 395, notes (410) that 
"judges are as susceptible to those factually incorrect and legally irrelevant myths as the general population." 
53 Massaro, above n 52, 402 - 410. See also Estrich, above n 12, 42 - 56 and 57 - 79. The "rape myths" are 
summarised by E McDonald "An(other) Explanantion: The Exclusion of Women's Stories in Sexual Offence 
Trials" (Challenging Law and Legal Processes - The Development of a Feminist Legal Analysis, New Zealand 
Law Society Seminar, August 1993) 43, 45. 
54 W Young Rape Study. A Discussion of Law and Practice (Department of Justice and Institute of 
Criminology, 28 February 1983) Vol l (hereafter Rape Study). 
55 Rape Study 8. 
56 Rape Study 9, 139. 
57 Rape Study 139 - 140. 
58 Rape Study. Reform of rape laws in 1985 (Crimes Amendment Act (No 3) 1985 and see n 256 below) 
removed many of the discriminatory legal rules which resulted from judicial and legislative acceptance of these 
myths and resulted in rape laws which were intended to more accurately reflect women's experiences of sexual 
violation. As McDonald notes, above n 53, while the legal rules have been changed, myths about rape 
continue to affect judicial decision making in sexual offence trials. 
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behaviour in the workplace. Some of the myths about sexual harassment in the workplace 
include: 
women who complain about sexual harassment are prudes and overly sensitive;59 
women really enjoy being treated as sexual objects at work. If women really found 
harassment offensive, they would not put up with it;60 
women encourage and benefit from sexual advances at work, because women with 
little ability can get promotions or pay increases by granting sexual favours to their 
male superiors;6t 
women who flirt and engage in sexual banter at work with one person will 
automatically welcome sexual advances from another person;62 
women who swear and talk about sex at work can not find behaviour of a sexual nature 
offensive or unwelcome;63 
women who dress "provocatively" invite and welcome sexual harassment;64 
unless the victim is physically assaulted, sexual harassment does not seriously harm 
her.65 
The reality is that, as with rape, women find it extremely difficult to complain about sexual 
harassment. 66 Women are in an extremely vulnerable position at work. They are vulnerable 
to male economic power, since men occupy most positions of authority in the workplace. 
They are also vulnerable to male sexual power, which stereotypes women's roles as 
submissive partners in sexual relations, and stereotypes women as people who function 
primarily as sex objects, even in the workplace.67 Women are also frequently disadvantaged 
rather than assisted by sexual relationships with a male superior at work. Continuing 
discrimination against women at work, which makes it harder for them to achieve pay rises 
and promotions on merit, makes them particularly vulnerable to claims of having "slept their 
way" into a pay rise or promotion.68 
59 Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co 805 F 2d 611 (1986); 484 F Supp 419 (ED Mich 1984), aff'd , 622. 
Mac Kinnon Sexual Harassment 25. 
60 "Since women 'go along' with sexual harassment, [the assumption is that] they must like it, and it is not 
really harassment at all. This constitutes little more than a simplistic denial of all we know about the ways in 
which socialization and economic dependence foster submissiveness and override free choice ... ": L Wehrli 
"Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: A Feminist Analysis and Strategy for Social Change" (MA Thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976) cited in MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 48. 
61 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 37; BA Gutek Sex and the Workplace (Jossey-Bass Publishers, San 
Francisco, 1985) 95 - 96 (hereafter Gutek). 
62 Aggarwal, 65. 
63 Aggarwal, 66. See also Snowball v Gardner Merchant Ltd [19871 ICR 719, 723 . 
64 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson above n 42; Snowball v Gardner Merchant, above. 
65 Aggarwal, 89 - 90. 
66 Gallivan 32. 
67 Ga1livan31-34. 
68 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 37 - 40 . Gutek notes (96) that similar statements about men are 
comparatively rare. 
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Women are often too intimidated to reject advances unambiguously and their "most common 
response is to attempt to ignore the whole incident, letting the man's ego off the hook skilfully 
by appearing flattered in the hope he will be satisfied and stop."69 In other cases the very 
nature of the harassment makes it hard for women to stop it. The quid pro quo "sleep with me 
or I'll sack you" form of sexual harassment is much less common than harassment which is 
abusive and demeaning, but which falls short of being a specific "advance" to which a definite 
response can be made:70 
[T]here's often no clear point when a woman has to make a decision - a "yes, go ahead and harass 
me" decision. A touch that seems almost accidental is laughed off, an invitation that is made could be 
taken two ways - suddenly you're tolerating it and then when do you make a stand? 
Women are also reluctant to complain because they fear that they will not be believed, or that 
management will be unsupportive, or, worse still, that they will be ridiculed.7 1 
3 Gendered perspectives about sex 
Some of these "myths" may not necessarily be universally "wrong". Rather, they may 
accurately reflect male perceptions of sexual behaviour, while misrepresenting women's 
perceptions, because "men and women experience sexuality in our culture differently." 72 One 
study of the impact of sexual behaviour and harassment in the workplace revealed a "giant 
gender gap" in attitudes to sexual behaviour at work: "Men consistently say they are flattered 
by sexual overtures from women. Women consistently say they are insulted by sexual 
propositions from men." 73 Because the law tends to favour the perceptions and fact 
descriptions of the dominant social group,74 decision makers tend to accept what men say 
about sexual harassment and to discredit what women who are harassed say. Rather than 
conceptualising men's and women's perceptions as "myth" or "reality", it may be more 
69 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 48; Aggarwal 69. 
70 Steele No Laughing Matter 19. 
71 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 49 and 51 - 52. 
72 Blackwood 1018; RD Weiner "Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in 
Rape" (1983) 6 Harv Women's l.J 143, 147. 
73 Gutek xiii. This gender gap and its impact on judicial consideration of sexual harassment is discussed by 
Blackwood, Fechner, and Littleton. MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified describes (90) how this gender gap 
works in the law: 
We criticise the idea that rape comes down to her word against his - but it really is her perspective 
against his perspective and the law has been written from his perspective. If he didn't mean it to be 
sexual, it's not sexual. If he didn't see it as forced, it wasn't forced. Which is to say, only male 
sexual violations, that is, only male ideas of what sexually violates us as women, are illegal. 
74 Fechner 504. 
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appropriate to consider the question in terms of whose perspective - men's or women's - is 
valued more in the law and whose perceptions are more often accepted as "fact" _75 
Blackwood argues for a woman centred analysis76 of sexual harassment "not just because men 
find certain conduct 'fun' while women find it offensive" but also because "sexually harassing 
conduct intimidates and degrades women, and therefore, prevents women from fully 
participating in the workplace. "77 Because the main object of sexual harassment law is to 
promote equality for women at work, sexual harassment law must enable women to define 
what standard of behaviour meets their right to dignity in the workplace.78 A sexual 
harassment law which works for women must value women's perspectives of sexual behaviour 
at work, while questioning male perspectives. A purposive approach to the interpretation of 
sexual harassment law requires that weight be given to women's stories. 
75 V Grainer "Refining the Regulation of Sexual Harassment" (1993) 23 VUWLR 127, 128. 
76 There is no universally true "women's perspective" on sexual harassment. Perceptions are affected by 
race, class, sexual orientation, and other factors and life experiences. However, the writer considers that 
there is a broadly defined "women's perspective" on sexual harassment. "Feminist legal analysis should 
emphasise women's experiences not as windows to a universal or unmediated reality, but as vehicles to 
understanding how law credits certain experiences of reality and denies others": M T McClusky "Privileged 
Violence, Principled Fantasy, and Feminist Method: The Colby Fraternity Case" (1992) 44 Maine LR 261, 
265. 
77 Blackwood 1019 - 1020. 
78 Blackwood l O 13. 
12 
III SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
"All night, he felt up my leg as I brought out their food. I was waiting on another table, in the end, and as I went 
by he pinched my bum. I just up and dumped the whole plate of soup all over him. I felt great at the time but of 
course I got the sack. How do you fight it without losing your job, that's what I'd like to know."79 
A Development of Sexual Harassment Provisions in Employment Law 
Personal grievance provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1973 ("IRA") provided limited 
access80 to compensation for victims of sexual harassment who could establish that the 
harassment had affected their employment to their disadvantage. The IRA procedures were 
unsatisfactory, however. Although in practice personal grievance committees dealt with 
sexual harassment cases, no Arbitration Court ruling ever established that they had 
jurisdiction to do so. This made personal grievances based on sexual harassment vulnerable 
to attack on jurisdictional grounds. The lack of any statutory definition of sexual harassment 
or statutory procedures for dealing with sexual harassment cases placed a premium on the 
skill, or lack of skill, of the mediator dealing with the case, and this often worked against 
complainants. There was a lack of clarity and consistency of decisions, particularly in the 
absence of precedents from the Equal Opportunities Tribunal ("EOT") established under the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 ("HRCA"). Women invoking personal grievance 
procedures were also unable to gain protection from employers who brought evidence of their 
previous sexual history and this acted as a disincentive to the bringing of cases.81 
The call for a specific industrially based procedure to deal with complaints of sexual 
harassment in the workplace was based on union concern that the HRC procedures were 
ineffective82 and on the fact that unions lost control over sexual harassment complaints once 
they were referred to the Human Rights Commission ("HRC"). 83 On top of union lack of 
79 One woman's experience of sexual harassment, quoted in Steele No Laughing Matter 27. 
80 Through s 117( l)(a)(ii) of the IRA. 
81 M Coleman "A Trade Union Perspective on Sexual Harassment" (I 988) NZJIR 295 (hereafter Coleman 
"Trade Union Perspective"). 
82 J Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1989) para 4.465 p 2401. 
83 Grainer, above n 75, notes (127) that in H v E the EOT "virtually apologised to a defendant for finding 
him guilty of sexual harassment." Steele No Laughing Matter criticises the HRC's handling of a 1982 
industrial dispute over sexual harassment of women workers by a foreman at the Ford Motor Company plant in 
Petone. The HRC found that the foreman and Fords were in breach of the HRCA. When the women's union 
requested that the foreman be shifted away from the area where they were working, the women were shocked 
when the HRC responded that he had "been punished enough" (14). They felt that they were being pressured into 
dropping their complaint when the Commissioner described the difficulties of having to appear before the EOT 
(14). The HRC also advised that "questions of penalty were not appropriate" (15). The eventual settlement 
prevented the foreman from supervising any of the women who had complained. There was a strong feeling that 
the HRC was toothless and that "[t]he investigation and decision of the Commission would have been so much 
hot air if we hadn't used a bit of force" ( 16). 
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confidence in the way in which the HRC handled sexual harassment complaints,84 there was 
concern that the sex discrimination provisions of the HRCA, even following the EQT decision 
in H v E, 85 may not cover "hostile environment" sexual harassment, including behaviour such 
as displaying pornographic material in the workplace. 
The view that a parallel "industrial" procedure for dealing with sexual harassment would 
benefit women was also a corollary of the union movement's more collective approach to 
human rights issues rather than the individualised processes followed by the HRC.86 Taking 
cases of harassment through the personal grievance procedure could provide a platform for 
unions to pressure for change to attitudes to sexual behaviour in the workplace generally, thus 
preventing sexual harassment, rather than simply dealing with individual complaints. The 
more private, individualised approach of the HRC was seen as a potential brake on changing 
workplace attitudes although it might assist individual complainants.87 Unions lobbied for an 
effective law to make sexual harassment unlawful. The opportunity to have such a procedure 
included in labour legislation was presented by the Labour Government's review of the 
industrial relations system in 1985 and 1986. 88 As a result, sexual harassment provisions were 
included in the Labour Relations Act 1987 ("LRA"). These provisions were reproduced with 
minor amendments in the ECA. 89 
B Advantages and Disadvantages of the ECA Provisions on Sexual Harassment 
1 Advantages of the ECA provisions 
The objects of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA are: 90 
84 The HRC' s more pro-active approach to sexual harassment following the H v £ decision ( 1985) 5 NZAR 
333) made unions more confident about handing cases over to the HRC: Annual Report of the HRC for the 
year ending 31 March 1988, 20. 
85 Above n 45. 
86 The provision for class actions in s 38(2) of the HRCA is rarely used. The emphasis on individual cases 
may have been a product more of the HRC's policies and practices in the first years of the HRC's existence, 
than of the actual provisions of the HRCA. 
87 New Zealand Federation of Labour Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Wellington, June 1982) 5 - l l 
and Steele No Laughing Matter 1 and 3 - 16. 
88 A Green Paper ("Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review") was released on 17 December 1985. A 
Supplement to the Green Paper (Volume 2) specifically requested comment on the problem of sexual 
harassment. See, eg, the submissions of the NZ Woollen Workers' Union para 8.3. l. l - 8.3. l.8 (held by the 
Department of Labour, Industrial Relations Service). 
89 The only provision not re-enacted in the ECA was s 221 of the LRA, which enabled a personal grievance 
committee to carry out an investigation into the grounds of the grievance where sexual harassment was 
alleged. This provision was criticised by some mediators: C Hicks "Does the Sexual Harassment Procedure 
Work?" (1988) NZJIR 291. 
90 These objects represent the writer's understanding of the policy reasons behind sexual harassment 
legislation. The ECA does not set out the objects of the sexual harassment provisions. The advantages of the 
ECA sexual harassment provisions are summarised, rather than discussed in depth, in this part of the paper. 
14 
to establish that sexual harassment is unlawful behaviour which causes harm to 
women; 
to recognise the right of women to equality, job security and dignity at work; 
to make available adequate procedures through which women who are being 
sexually harassed can have such harassment stopped; 
to provide a procedure to settle disputes about sexual harassment; 
to provide real remedies for women who have been sexually harassed; 
to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. 
In this section the positive aspects of the ECA provisions are summarised with reference to 
the objects of sexual harassment law, the law of sexual harassment in some other jurisdictions, 
and the HRCA provisions on sexual harassment. The writer concludes that the ECA 
provisions are, on paper, the best in the world. They recognise sexual harassment as an 
expression of gender inequality in the workplace, define sexual harassment in terms which 
reflect women's experiences of sexual coercion at work, acknowledge the real nature of the 
harm which sexual harassment causes women, and provide effective procedures through 
which sexually harassing behaviour can be challenged. 
(a) The ECA definition of sexual harassment prohibits a broad range of sexually 
harassing behaviour 
Section 29(1) of the ECA provides that sexual harassment occurs in employment if the 
employee's employer or a representative of that employer: 
(a) Makes a request of that employee for sexual intercourse, sexual contact, or other form of sexual 
activity which contains -
(i) An implied or overt promise of preferential treatment in that employee's employment; or 
(ii) An implied or overt threat of detrimental treatment in that employee's employment; or 
(iii) An implied or overt threat about the present or future employment status of that employee; or 
(b) By -
(i) The use of words (whether written or spoken) of a sexual nature; or 
(ii) Physical behaviour of a sexual nature -
subjects the employee to behaviour which is unwelcome or offensive to that employee (whether or not 
that is conveyed to the employer or representative) and which is either repeated or of such a significant 
nature that it has a detrimental effect on that employee's employment, job performance, or job 
satisfaction. 
The definition makes a broad range of behaviour unlawful. Section 29(1)(a) defines "quid pro 
quo" harassment, where the harasser demands compliance with sexual activity in return for 
either advancement at work or as the price of protection from detrimental treatment, including 
dismissal. Section 29(l)(b) covers verbal or physical sexual behaviour which is unwelcome 
or offensive to the victim, and which is either repeated or results in detriment. This includes 
"hostile work environment" or "poisoned workplace" harassment, where the harasser does not 
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make a specific demand for sexual activity, but creates an intimidating or offensive work 
environment through his behaviour.91 Such sexual harassment may be targeted at a particular 
woman or be untargeted, but nevertheless offensive.92 Although the definition does not 
specifically mention harassment such as display of pornographic material, it is submitted that, 
depending on the circumstances, this type of behaviour would usually fall into the categories 
of "words (whether written or spoken) of a sexual nature" or "physical behaviour of a sexual 
nature" ie the placing of the pornographic material in the workplace. There have been no 
decisions based on complaints of untargeted "hostile environment" sexual harassment in New 
Zealand, although some cases have involved a specific instance of targeted harassment against 
a background of generally offensive behaviour.93 The ECA provisions also provide a "safety 
net" in the unlikely event that sexual harassment occurs which does not fall within the section 
29 definition but which may nevertheless constitute sex discrimination. Under section 34 of 
the ECA a personal grievance committee, Tribunal or Court may find that "a personal 
grievance is of a type other than that alleged." Since discrimination on the grounds of sex is 
also a type of personal grievance,94 any sexually harassing behaviour which is also sex 
discrimination is covered by the ECA provisions. 
The breadth of the ECA provisions may be contrasted with the narrowness of definitions in 
some other jurisdictions. In its new criminal code, France has made unlawful only quid pro 
quo harassment.95 Several other jurisdictions have unfair dismissal legislation under which 
complainants have successfully argued that refusal of unwanted sexual advances by a 
supervisor is not a valid reason for dismissal.96 Husbands states that a limited number of 
countries recognise both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment.97 Case law in the 
91 The nature of "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" harassment is described by MacKinnon Sexual 
Harassment 32 - 47. Later analyses of sexual harassment have viewed it as a range of behaviour rather than 
necessarily falling into rigid categories: Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd [1989] l SCR 1252 (Supreme Court of 
Canada) per Dickson CJC, 1283. 
92 The ECA definition is discussed by Grainer, above n 75, 129 - 130. 
93 A v Foodstuffs (South Island) limited [1993] l ERNZ 81; C v L D Nathan [1988] NZILR 304. One 
mediator (see above n 89, 292) stated that the LRA provisions did not cover "hostile environment" harassment. 
The mediator reported (292) a case where "a worker who was thought to be a bit 'straight-laced' by her fellow 
male workers suffered behaviour ... of similarly abhorrent nature, but because there was no request for sexual 
favours or any such intent, the definitions as set out did not cover the case." With respect, s 212(l)(b) of the 
LRA, which is in identical terms to s 29(l)(b) of the ECA, clearly covered this type of behaviour. A failure 
to apply the broader definition ins 212(l)(b)of the LRA seems to have resulted in a remedy being incorrectly 
denied to a complainant. 
94 Section 27( l)(c) and s 28( I) of the ECA. 
95 Law No 92-1179, Journal Officiel (Paris) 4 November 1992, noted in (1993) 192 International Labour 
Review (ILO, Geneva) 5. According to this note the definition has been criticised by feminist organisations in 
France because "it fails to take into account other forms of sexual harassment at work ... such as stroking or 
touching, sexist language and insults and the use of pornography, intended to humiliate the person being 
harassed without necessarily trying to obtain sexual relations ... ". 
96 For example Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden: see Husbands 541. 
97 Husbands 541 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States). 
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United States, Canada, Australia and the UK under sex discrimination laws has recognised 
both types of harassment.98 
(b) The ECA recognises sexual harassment as a specific legal claim 
The ECA provisions recognise sexual harassment as a distinct wrongful act. Where the law 
has defined sexual harassment as a specific injury and has provided procedures for women to 
directly challenge sexually harassing behaviour, the result has been more effective protection 
for complainants than where the issue has been dealt with tangentially through tort law, 
criminal law or labour laws dealing with unfair dismissal.99 Although sexual harassment is 
recognised as sex discrimination under equal employment opportunity laws in the United 
States, 100 the United Kingdom, 101 and Australia, 102 the lack of specificity in general anti-
discrimination statutes has led to the development of sexual harassment law on a case-by-case 
basis. This has resulted in inconsistencies in sexual harassment jurisprudence, particularly 
regarding the type of behaviour which constitutes sexual harassment, whether the standard of 
offensiveness is objective or subjective, and employer liability for the actions of co-workers, 
customers and clients. 103 Where sexual harassment has been defined by the policy of agencies 
responsible for enforcing anti-discrmination legislation, rather than by the legislation itself, 
the definition of sexual harassment also becomes vulnerable to the changing policies of those 
enforcement agencies. 
98 Lipper "Comparative Study"; M Einfeld "Sexual Harassment"(l989) 21 Aust J Forensic Sciences 43; and 
Aggarwal. The European Community Commission Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of men 
and women at work, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1991, defines sexual harassment as 
"any form of verbal, non-verbal or physical behaviour of a sexual nature, which the perpetrator knows, or 
ought to know, offends the dignity of women and men at the workplace": (Official Journal L 49/92 (Brussels) 
24 February 1992) (noted in International Labour Review, above n 95, 4 - 5). 
99 Husbands 558. The ILO Digest survey of 23 industrialised countries found that only 9 have statutes which 
specifically define or mention sexual harassment. In some cases, sexual harassment is mentioned in the 
context of equal employment opportunity laws, particularly in European countries. Only 5 countries have 
labour laws which explicitly prohibit sexual harassment (Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand and Spain). 
Trish Mullins, Legal Officer, New Zealand Nurses Organisation, also advised the writer that having a "stand 
alone" legal provision making sexual harassment unlawful has facilitated the process of educating people about 
sexual harassment. It has made it easier to change workplace attitudes (explaining that sexual harassment is 
unacceptable behaviour) and has encouraged women to be more assertive in speaking out about unacceptable 
behaviour. 
lOO Civil Rights Act 1964 Title VII (US). 
IOl Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK). 
102 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Federal) (Aust). Some individual states and provinces also have more 
specific laws eg Fair Employment Practices and Housing Act, California Government Code, Section 12940 
(West 1987 & Supp 1990) makes harassment on grounds of sex unlawful. 
103 Einfeld, above n 98, 43; Lipper "Comparative Study" 293. Even where the appropriate enforcement 
agency (eg the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) issues guidelines on these matters, those 
guidelines have not always been accepted by the courts or interpreted consistently: Aggarwal 25 - 27. 
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Several commentators have also noted that same sex harassment or harassment by a bisexual 
harasser do not fit easily into a framework in which sexual harassment is categorised only as 
sex discrimination. 104 To establish sex discrimination, complainants must show that "but for" 
the fact that the victim is of a particular sex, the behaviour would not have occurred. 105 Same 
sex harassment may not involve "discrimination" in the sense that the perpetrator of the 
discrimination and the victim are part of unequal groups in society .106 Sexual harassment of a 
man by a man may involve a hierarchy, but a worker/employer or class hierarchy, or other 
more subtle and complex social hierarchies, rather than a gender hierarchy. Conceptualising 
harassment by a bisexual harasser as sex discrimination is even more difficult. The law 
should make all sexual harassment an actionable wrong. The ECA provisions apply to all 
sexual harassment, not just to male perpetrators and female complainants, 107 thus removing 
theoretical difficulties in conceptualising same sex harassment or harassment by a bisexual 
harasser as sex discrimination. Making sexual harassment a "stand alone" legal claim also 
creates more certainty and consistency in the law, provides the opportunity to establish more 
appropriate procedures for dealing with the problem, and ensures that the categorisation of 
behaviour as sexual harassment is not affected by the changing policies of enforcement 
agencies. 
(c) The ECA defines the harm in subjective terms 
Sexual harassment law usually requires the adoption of an objective or subjective test in 
relation to 2 issues: firstly, whether the behaviour complained of was unwelcome or 
offensive; and secondly, whether the behaviour constitutes a sufficient detriment to the 
complainant's employment to warrant the intervention of the law. 108 Under section 29(1) of 
I04 E F Paul "Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm" (1990) 8 Yale Land Policy 
R 333, 352 - 353. The HRC states that around 98 percent of complaints of sexual harassment received by it 
are from women, with the other 2 percent largely males complaining about other men: The Evening Post, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 3 August 1993, 13. 
105 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 107 - 108. 
I06 Backhouse ( 141) states that "all sexual harassment except bisexual attention directed equally at both male 
and female employees is sex discrimination. This illustrates the problem of using the concept of discrimination 
to deal with the phenomenon of sexual harassment. Society should not tolerate bisexual harassment any more 
than it tolerates heterosexual or homosexual sexual harassment" ( 143). Same sex harassment may be sex 
discrimination if one subscribes to the "differences" approach to sex discrimination, that discrimination is about 
ensuring that differences between men and women do not lead to disadvantage to one sex or the other. However, 
if one sees gender as a hierarchy, and sex discrimination as being primarily about inequality between men and 
women, as the writer does, same sex harassment is not sex discrimination. The writer considers that the 
inequality analysis is a more useful analysis for looking at sex discrimination and sexual harassment generally, 
notwithstanding that the result of this may be that sex discrimination (analysed in terms of gender inequality) 
does not cover same sex harassment. The most effective way of preventing same sex harassment is a provision 
such as section 29 of the ECA, in which the injury of sexual harassment is defined in non-gendered terms. 
107 Section 62 of the Human Rights Act 1993 contains a similar definition: seen 126 below. 
108 The question whether the behaviour was behaviour "of a sexual nature" is an objective one: NID 
Distribution Workers /UOWv AB Ltd [1988] NZILR 761 (Labour Court) (hereafter, AB Ltd); A v Z 
(Unreported, 29 September 1992, Wellington Employment Tribunal, WT 69/92) (D Hurley). 
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the ECA the test for offensiveness or unwelcomeness is subjective: is the behaviour offensive 
or unwelcome to the particular complainant? The ECA also measures detriment subjectively. 
Under section 29(1) the relevant question is whether the behaviour had a detrimental effect on 
the employment, job performance, or job satisfaction of the complainant, not whether the 
behaviour would have resulted in detriment to a mythical reasonable person or reasonable 
woman. 109 Many other jurisdictions require an objective test of offensiveness. For example 
the Canada Labour Code defines sexual harassment as: 110 
[ A ]ny conduct, comment, gesture or contact of a sexual nature 
(a) that is likely to cause offence or humiliation to any employee; 
(b) that might, on reasonable grounds , be perceived by that employee as placing a condition of a sexual 
nature on employment or on any opportunity for training or promotion" . 
United States courts have adopted differing standards of objectivity. 111 In Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v Vinson 112 the US Supreme Court assumed that the test of "unwelcome-ness" in 
the context of a Title VII complaint was subjective. 113 However, the Court did not determine 
if the assessment whether the harassment affected the complainant's employment (ie whether 
it "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environrnent" 114) was to be based on 
the complainant's subjective view or on some objective standard. In a much criticised 
decision, Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, 115 the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
refused to find that sexual harassment had occurred because the behaviour complained of was 
not "unreasonably offensive", using the standard of a "reasonable person". 
In Ellison v Brady116 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a "reasonable 
woman" standard for assessing offensiveness. The Court specifically acknowledged that 
adopting a "reasonable person" standard would reinforce the status quo and the prevailing 
109 Grainer, above n 75, 130, describes this part of the ECA definition as "a subjective test qualified by an 
objectively ascertainable requirement that the behaviour be repeated or be of such a significant nature that it 
has the prescribed detrimental effect". 
l10 Section 247 .1, as noted in ILO Digest 82 (emphasis added). The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991 imports the "reasonable person" standard or, alternatively, requires proof of intent. Sexual harassment 
occurs where the harassing conduct is done "with the intention of offending, humiliating or intimidating the 
other person; or in circumstances where a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the 
other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct" (noted in the ILO Digest 68 
(emphasis added)). 
111 The US cases are summarised in S L Bass "The 'Reasonable Woman' Standard: The Ninth Circuit 
Decrees Sexes Perceive Differently" (1992) Lab LJ 449, 452 - 453. 
112 Above n 42. 
11 3 See Blackwood 1007. 
114 Above, noted in GM Dodier "Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson: Sexual Harassment at Work" (1987) 10 
Harv Women's LJ 205, 216. 
115 Above n 59 . 
116 924 F. 2d 872 (1991). 
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level of discrimination 117• The Court stated that "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends 
to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women" 118. However, 
the reasonable woman test is still an objective, not a subjective test. In Andrews v City of 
Philadelphia, 119 for example, the Court said that the test had to be objective to protect the 
employer from the "hypersensitive employee" 120• And in State v Town of Milton a Vermont 
Court directed a jury that the test "is designed so as not to punish a worldly Plaintiff on one 
hand, and to protect an employer who has a very fragile, overly sensitive employee on the 
other hand." 121 
From a feminist perspective the "reasonable woman" test is defective on at least 2 grounds. 
Firstly in a judicial system where the decision makers are overwhelmingly male, the adoption 
of a reasonable woman standard has an air of unreality and artificiality about it: "[G]iven that 
men and women experience sexuality differently, how then can decision makers determine 
how a reasonable woman would have reacted without resorting to male defined culturally 
biased perspectives?" 122 Secondly, because the purpose of sexual harassment law "is to 
change prevailing attitudes to women in the workplace, requiring it to meet a prevailing 
consensus negates its purpose." 123 An objective test also obscures the relevant line of 
reasoning: 124 
If a woman suffers insult, indignity, and job discrimination because of her supervisor's or co-worker's 
harassment of her as a woman, she should be compensated and the behaviour should be stopped. It does 
not matter whether she is particularly sensitive or insensitive. She has been discriminated against, and 
the law should protect her. 
In establishing that the tests of offensiveness and of detriment are to be measured subjectively 
with reference to the particular complainant, the New Zealand Legislature recognised that, for 
sexual harassment law to be effective, the law must give priority to women's perceptions of 
whether sexual behaviour is sexual harassment. This recognition appears to be unique in 
common law jurisdictions. 
117 Above, 878. 
118 Above, 879. 
119 895 F 2d 1469 (1990), 1483. 
120 Above. 
121 No S1149-87 CnC (Vt Super Ct Chittenden County 4 November 1991). 
122 Blackwood 1021. 
123 Above, 1022. Problems with the application of the reasonable person concept are discussed by B B 
Westman "The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace" (1992) 18 
William Mitchell LR 795 and by N S Ehrenreich "Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of 
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law" (1990) 99 Yale U 1177 (both advocating the adoption of the 
reasonable women standard). 
124 Blackwood 1024. Blackwood also notes (1025) that subjectivity is recognised in tort law, where 
tortfeasors take their plaintiffs as they find them (the "eggshell skull" cases). 
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(d) Repeated harassment and sole instances of "serious" harassment 
The ECA definition of sexual harassment covers harassing behaviour which is repeated, even 
if such behaviour cannot be shown to have affected the complainant to her detriment. 125 The 
policy appears to be that unwelcome or offensive sexual behaviour, if repeated, is ipso facto 
detrimental. This provision also appears to be unique. 126 The United States Supreme Court in 
Vinson, 127 for example, held that hostile environment sexual harassment, even if repeated, 
must also be shown to have unreasonably interfered with the complainant's work or have 
created an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 128 Under the ECA a single 
instance of sexually harassing behaviour may also be sufficient for the complainant to 
establish a personal grievance if the behaviour was of such a significant nature that it had a 
detrimental effect on that employee's employment, job performance or job satisfaction. 129 
Decisions in other jurisdictions are inconsistent about whether a single incident may constitute 
harassment. 130 In Canada, for example, decision makers have required a "combination of 
frequency and offensiveness (gravity of offence)" before they will infer "that exposure to such 
conduct was a discriminatory condition of employment." 131 The advantage of the ECA 
definition, in which sexual harassment is established if the behaviour is either repeated or 
sufficiently detrimental, is that the law allows women a greater opportunity to define 
acceptable standards of workplace behaviour and thus to eliminate harassment. 
Another postive aspect of the ECA definition is that, to make out a claim of sexual 
harassment, the victim is not obliged to first convey to the harasser the fact that she is 
offended or that the behaviour is unwelcome. This is important because, as noted in Part II B 
2 above, many women find it difficult to directly confront an harasser about his behaviour. 
( e) The ECA prevents account being taken of the complainant's prior sexual history 
Section 35 of the ECA provides : 
Where a personal grievance involves allegations of sexual harassment, no account shall be taken of any evidence 
of the employee's sexual experience or reputation. 
125 AB Ltd 767 . 
126 Section 62 of the Human Rights Act 1993 appears to require that detriment be established even if the 
behaviour is repeated, thus differing from the ECA definition. The writer considers that s 62 as drafted is 
grammatically defective and may create rather than remove confusion . 
127 Above n 42 . 
128 Above n 114, 206. 
129 AB Ltd 767. 
130 Aggarwal 115. 
131 Aggarwal 115. In the UK it was not settled until 1990 that a single incident may constitute sexual 
harassment within the meaning of section 6(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 : Bracebridge 
Engineering Ltd v Darby [1990] IRLR 3. The word "harassment" usually connotes continued or repeated 
behaviour: Husbands 542. 
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This provision applies not only to complaints of sexual harassment, but also to personal 
grievances where the harasser alleges that he has been unjustifiably dismissed or that other 
unjustified disciplinary action has been taken against him. This prohibition is important in 
enabling a woman to complain of sexual harassment to her employer without fearing that her 
previous sexual history will become a major issue in any subsequent investigation. Section 35 
does not prohibit absolutely the introduction of evidence about the complainant's sexual 
experience or reputation. It states only that "no account shall be taken" of such evidence. 
Nevertheless, the provision appears to have been effective in excluding the worst of this type 
of evidence. Before the introduction of a similar provision in the LRA in 1987, 132 cross-
examination of a complainant on her prior sexual history was a major problem in personal 
grievance hearings under the IRA. 133 In its submissions on the Labour Relations Bill in 1987, 
the NZ Clerical Workers Association commented that this was "a key provision in ensuring 
that the [grievance] committee focuses on the offence and not the victim." 134 Previous lack of 
protection from such cross examination of complainants meant that the union had to "choose 
between pursuing justice for the worker as against preventing her from being subject to further 
humiliation and personal attack by such allegations being made in open court." 135 
Legislation making such evidence irrelevant is rare in overseas jurisdictions. In most 
jurisdictions the decision maker may in his or her discretion admit evidence of a complainant's 
prior sexual history, including evidence designed to show that the complainant was likely to 
welcome sexual advances or was not likely to be offended by them, or was prudish and 
therefore "oversensitive" to particular conduct. 136 For example the US Supreme Court in 
Vinson held ( overruling the Court of Appeals decision that such evidence was irrelevant and 
inadmissible) that evidence of the complainant Vinson's "sexually provocative speech or 
dress" was relevant to the question of whether the conduct was unwelcome.137 In a UK 
decision, Wileman v Minilec Engineering Ltd, 138 the complainant alleged that over a period of 
4 years she had suffered physical and verbal harassment by a director of the company (but, 
significantly, not by anybody on the shop floor) and was awarded 50ll compensation. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal said: 139 
132 Section 22l(c). 
133 Coleman "Trade Union Perspective" 296. 
134 NZ Federated Clerical, Administrative and Related Workers Industrial Association of Workers, submission 
to the Labour Select Committee, para 271. 
135 Above, para 275. 
136 Although many jurisdictions now prohibit evidence of a rape complainant's prior sexual history only 
California in the United States has enacted a similar shield in sexual harassment cases: CA O'Neill "Sexual 
Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence: A Proposed Rule" (1989) U Chi Legal Forum 219, 219 - 220 
and 236. 
137 Above n 36, 56. 
138 [ 1988] ICR 318 . See also Snowball v Gardner Merchant above n 63, 723 . 
l39 Wileman v Minilec Engineering Ltd, above n 138, 325 . 
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[I]f a woman on the shop floor goes around wearing provocative clothes and flaunting herself, it is not 
unlikely that other work people - particularly the men - will make remarks about it; it is an inevitable 
part of working life on the shop floor. If she then complains that she suffered a detriment, the tribunal is 
entitled to look at the circumstances in which the remarks are made which are said to constitute that 
detriment. 
Section 35 recognises that the rationale for admitting such evidence, that sexually experienced 
women cannot be offended or harmed by sexual harassment, and that women who engage in 
sexual banter with one person welcome sexual advances from anyone, is based on myth. The 
ECA removed this matter from the discretion of decision makers in New Zealand, perhaps 
wisely in view of the attitudes of decision makers in other jurisdictions. 
(e) Process 
Sexual harassment is a type of personal grievance. 140 A complainant alleging that she has 
been sexually harassed by her employer or an employer's representative141 may invoke the 
personal grievance procedure 142 immediately. Where harassment by a fellow employee or a 
customer or client of the employer is alleged, section 36 of the ECA applies. Under section 
36 a complainant must submit a written complaint to the employer (or employer's 
representative). The employer, on receiving such a complaint, must investigate it. If the 
employer concludes that sexual harassment has taken place, that employer is obliged to take 
"whatever steps are practicable" to prevent any repetition of the harassment. With co-worker, 
client or customer harassment, it is only if the harasser repeats the harassment and the 
employer has not taken all practicable steps to stop the behaviour that a personal grievance of 
sexual harassment can be established. 
Joychild stresses that "[p ]rocess is all important to whether there is a real remedy in law for 
sexual harassment." 143 The processes available to the Tribunal in sexual harassment cases are 
flexible. Under section 78(4) of the ECA the parties may seek "informal" mediation 
140 "Personal grievance" is defined ins 27(1) of the ECA to include unjustifiable dismissal; unjustifiable 
action affecting an employee to her disadvantage; discrimination (on grounds set out ins 28(1)); and duress 
in relation to membership or non-membership of an employees' organisation. For a general discussion of the 
law relating to personal grievances see J R P Horn (ed) Employment Contracts (Brooker and Friend Ltd, 
Wellington, 1991) section lC paras 26.01 - 42.05 pp IC-1 - IC-64. See also G Anderson "The Origins and 
Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New Zealand" ( 1988) NZJIR 257. 
141 Defined ins 27(1) of the ECA as an employee who either "has authority over the employee alleging the 
grievance" or "is in a position of authority over other employees in the workplace of the employee alleging the 
grievance." 
142 This paper is about judicial gender bias in sexual harassment decisions ie at Tribunal level or higher. A 
more general discussion of the adequacy of the personal grievance procedures at workplace level is beyond the 
scope of this paper. A standard personal grievance procedure is set out in the First Schedule to the ECA. 
Other procedures may be (but are rarely) included in employment contracts, provided they are not inconsistent 
with the requirements of the First Schedule: s 32(1) and (2) of the ECA. Under s 39 of the ECA a 
complainant may invoke either the ECA procedures or the HRCA procedures but not both. 
143 Joychild 31. 
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assistance even for matters not within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal. The 
parties may also apply to the Tribunal for "formal" mediation to settle disputes within its 
jurisdiction. 144 Mediation is relatively "complainant friendly" and a complainant need not 
enter an adversarial hearing unless mediation has failed to resolve the matter. The process of 
mediation and any settlement of a mediated matter is private and treated as confidential to the 
parties. The Tribunal Member acting as mediator has a great deal of flexibility in assisting the 
parties to reach agreement. Grievant and alleged harasser need not even sit in the same room 
while mediation takes place. Mediation also enables the complainant to "[c]onfront the 
harasser in a way that provides an opportunity to relate directly what she feels and to explain 
why he is responsible, so as to educate rather than to punish, and to preserve their future 
working relationship should that continue." 145 The differing perspectives of men and women 
about sexual behaviour were noted in Part II B 3. Stamato notes: 146 
[o]ften, however, the question is not a difference in perception, but denial or intentional 
misrepresentation of what occurred. In either case mediation affords each party an opportunity to see 
the other's perspective without having to agree with it, and presumably to reach an agreement that 
satisfies future needs and interests, again without having to share the same view of what took place . 
Where a matter is not settled by "formal" mediation, or in cases where mediation is not 
appropriate, for example where a harasser simply refuses to admit that obvious sexual 
harassment is unlawful and blameworthy, the complainant may seek to have the matter 
determined in the more formal, public, and adversarial adjudication jurisdiction. 147 The ECA 
process also provides some protection for complainants from attempts by an alleged harasser 
to stop a complaint from going ahead by filing or threatening to file defamation proceedings. 
Such threats are common. 148 Section 37 of the Act provides: 
Any statements made or information given in the course of submitting a personal grievance in 
accordance with the procedure applicable under [any] employment contract or in the course of any 
proceedings in respect of a personal grievance shall be absolutely privileged. 
144 Employment Tribunal member D E Hurley discusses current issues in mediation in "Accessible Remedies 
- Access to the Law. A Review of Alternative Dispute Resolution including Mediation and Arbitration" (1993 
New Zealand Law Conference Papers Vo! 2) 38. 
145 L Stamato "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Is Mediation an Appropriate Forum?" (1992) 10 
Mediation Quarterly 167, 169. Stamato also notes (169) that "[b)lame and punishment are se ldom high on the 
list of outcomes sought by the harassed person. Why then use a system, litigation or variations on the fact-
finding or arbitration themes, that seek to find fault and levy costs or impose sanction?" 
146 Above. 
l47 Part VI of the ECA (Institutions) sets out the mediation and adjudication functions of the Tribunal . How 
mediation and adjudication work in practice are described in detail in 2 articles by Tribunal Member W R 
Grills: "Dispute Resolution in the Employment Tribunal . Part One: Mediation" (1992) NZJIR 333 and 
"Dispute Resolution in the Employment Tribunal. Part Two: Adjudication" (1993) NZJIR 84. See also Chief 
Judge T G Goddard "Mediation - Past Endeavours, Future Trends" [1993] ELB 47. 
148 Colbert 48 - 49. The HRC has also noted this problem: above n 23, 33 - 34, and seen 213, below. 
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In terms of process, the HRC as an enforcement agency in discrimination matters has wide 
powers of investigation not available to the Tribunal. 149 Nevertheless the processes available 
to the Tribunal are adequate to enable parties who wish complaints of workplace harassment 
to be dealt with in an "industrial relations" environment to have their problems dealt with 
effectively and sensitively. 150 The Tribunal also has the advantage of being seen as an 
"independent" third party, rather than the agency responsible for enforcing particular 
legislation. This may, for some parties, make the ECA procedures a more attractive process 
for disputes resolution. 151 The employment institutions and the HRC have different statutory 
functions and different procedural powers to deal with cases of sexual harassment. Their roles 
are complementary rather than conflicting. 
(g) Liability 
Section 29 of the ECA makes sexual harassment a personal grievance if the behaviour 
complained of is carried out by the employee's employer or "a representative of that 
employer" .152 "Representative" is defined in 27(2)(b) of the ECA as a person who is 
employed by the employer and who either: 
(i) Has authority over the employee alleging the grievance; or 
(ii) Is in a position of authority over other employees in the workplace of the employee 
alleging the grievance. 
Section 36 also provides that an employer is liable for harassment by that employer's 
customers or clients or by co-workers. This provision was sharply criticised by employer 
groups and others when the Labour Relations Bill was before the Labour Select Committee. 
Dr R E Harrison commented: 153 
The whole procedure is unworkable and potentially productive of serious injustice. Is Farmers Trading 
Company really to be liable for sexual harassment of a female employee merely because the same 
customer twice in a row makes an indecent proposal to that employee? 
149 See Part VII of the HRCA (Proceedings of Commission). 
150 The writer considers that mediation under the ECA provisions can be used in women's interests to resolve 
sexual harassment cases. In practice, mediation and other alternative methods of dispute resolution do not 
always protect women's interests: above n 75, 134 - 135. A discussion of this question is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
151 Treatment of sexual harassment cases in an industrial relations environment is discussed by S A 
Fitzgibbon "Sexual Harassment and Labor Arbitration" ( 1990) 20 Georgia J Int Comp L 71. 
152 Section 33 of HRCA also makes employers liable for acts done by a person "as the employee of another 
person" (s 33(1)) or "as the agent of another person" (s 33(2)). 
153 Submissions to Labour Select Committee dated 2 March 1987 (General Assembly Library Collection) 
(emphasis added) . Similar objections by the Hotel Association of New Zealand, the New Zealand Bankers 
Association, and Air New Zealand did not result in the provision being changed: (Submissions to the Labour 
Select Committee (General Assembly Library Collection)) 
25 
Although no complaints of customer or client harassment have been adjudicated on by the 
employment institutions, 154 section 36 may in practice have been effective in enabling women 
to require their employers to take action to prevent such harassment in the workplace. Under 
section 36 legal responsibility for sexual harassment committed by co-workers of the 
complainant (but not representatives of the employer), or customers or clients of the 
employer, may be avoided only if the employer has fulfilled its duty to take "whatever steps 
are practicable" to prevent a repetition of the behaviour. 155 In overseas jurisdictions the 
question of employer liability for the actions of other employees or clients or customers is still 
unsettled or has been resolved unsatisfactorily for women. In Vinson, for example, the US 
Supreme Court confirmed that employers were strictly liable for the actions of supervisors in 
"quid pro quo" cases, where the harassment more clearly relates to the receipt or denial of 
tangible job benefits. 156 In "hostile environment" cases, however, employers are not strictly 
liable. In many countries, the issue simply has not been addressed. 157 Because the ECA 
spells out that employers are legally responsible for sexually harassing behaviour in the 
workplace, the employer has an incentive to ensure that sexual harassment does not occur in 
the workplace. Complaints of sexual harassment in New Zealand are also protected from 
challenge on the grounds that the employer is not legally responsible for the harassment. 158 
(h) Remedies 
If the Tribunal (or Court) determines that sexual harassment has occurred, it may award, 
pursuant to section 40( 1 )( d) of the ECA, the following remedies to the complainant: 
(a) The reimbursement to the employee ofa sum equal to the whole or any part of the wages or 
other money lost by the employee as a result of the grievance: 
(b) Reinstatement ... in the employee's former position or .. . in a position no less advantageous to 
the employee: 
154 One complaint of co-worker harassment has been made: Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo [1992] 2 ERNZ 38. 
The unjustified dismissal cases discussed in Part IV are also the result of complaints of co-worker harassment. 
155 The word "practicable" was substituted for the word "necessary" (contained in the Labour Relations Bill as 
introduced) on the basis that it was not fair to impose strict liability on an employer except in relation to the 
employer's representatives. This was because an employer has less control over the actions of clients, customers, 
and co-workers: Report of the Department of Labour on the Labour Relations Bill to the Labour Select 
Committee 27 April I 987. "Practicability" is discussed in Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd 46 - 47. 
156 Above n 114, 222. See also M M Carillo "Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor 
Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991" (1992/93) 24 
Colum Human Rights LR 41. 
157 Husbands 550 - 553. Lipper "Comparative Study" 326 and 333 - 334 notes that the Jaw relating to 
employer liability in the UK is in a state of flux. In Canada, the Supreme Court confirmed in Robichaud v R 
(Can 1987) 8 CHRR D/4326 (SCC) "in no uncertain terms that an employer is absolutely liable for the 
discriminatory acts of its employees": Aggarwal 198. Ontario is an exception. The Ontario Human Rights 
Code specifically exempts employers from liability in relation to acts of sexual harassment committed by 
employees or agents. 
!58 Under the ECA women cannot take legal action directly against the harasser unless the harasser is the 
employer. Under the HRCA action can be taken against both harasser and employer (s 33). 
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(c) The payment to the employee of compensation by the ... employer, including compensation for-
(i) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the employee; and 
(ii) Loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which the worker might 
reasonably have been expected to obtain if the personal grievance had not arisen. 
In sexual harassment cases the employment institutions also have a special power to make 
(non-binding) recommendations to the employer "concerning the action the employer should 
take in respect of the [harasser], which action may include the transfer of that person, the 
taking of disciplinary action against that person, or the taking of rehabilitative action in 
respect of that person" .159 The range of remedies available to the EOT160 where civil 
proceedings under the HRCA are successfully taken is far wider than those provided for in 
section 40 of the ECA, although until 1992 awards of compensation made by the EOT were 
subject to a limit of $2000. 161 Compensation under the LRA and ECA has never been subject 
to a statutory limit. 162 While compensation is not the only measure of how well statutory 
procedures for dealing with sexual harassment work, it is an important measure of how 
seriously the courts view the harm to women that sexual harassment constitutes. Section 40 
provides for adequate remedies to be granted to women who have been sexually harassed. 
2 Disadvantages of the ECA provisions 
The sexual harassment provisions in the ECA are not perfect. Firstly it would be desirable for 
the definition of sexual harassment to explicitly include harassment such as the display of 
pornography. Secondly the requirement for complaints of co-worker, client and customer 
harassment to be put in writing before an employer is obliged to take action to prevent a 
recurrence of the harassment is an onerous one for some women and may dissuade women 
from pursuing complaints. 163 Thirdly section 36 defines co-worker harassment narrowly. A 
159 Section 40(1)(d) of the ECA. Mediated settlements (as opposed to adjudicated decisions) may include a 
broader range of remedies eg an apology or an agreement that the harasser attend an education programme. 
160 See ss 38(6) and 40 of the HRCA and ss 86 and 88 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
161 The limit was imposed bys 40(1) of the HRCA and removed bys 15(1) of the HRC Amendment Act 
1992. 
162 The Court of Appeal in Post Office Union v Telecom South Ltd (1992] 1 ERNZ 711, 716, however, stated 
that awards of compensation in excess of $50,000 were exceptional and that awards over this level would in all 
but exceptional cases not be "fair and reasonable between the parties as a matter of good industrial practice in 
the current economic climate" (per Cooke P, 717). See Minister of Education v Bailey (Unreported, 9 August 
1993 , Court of Appeal, CA 236/92) for an example of an exceptional case in which compensation of $123,000 
was awarded. 
163 Above n 89, 292. Under s 36 employers are required to request complainants to put complaints in writing 
before they can investigate. Such requests have been used by some judges to imply that the complaint is 
employer driven rather than complainant driven, and is therefore somehow less worthy for that reason: Parlane v 
NZ Police [ I 99 I] 3 ERNZ 72 I, 723, 725; C v L D Nathan [ I 988] NZILR 306, 307. This implication is unfair. 
The reality is that women who are unfamiliar with the procedures are likely to first make a verbal complaint. The 
employer, having checked the procedures, will then ask for the complaint to be put in writing so that it can 
proceed to deal with the complaint in accordance with the ECA provisions. This indicates not that the complaint 
is employer driven , but rather that the employer is attempting to ensure compliance with the ECA provisions. 
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personal grievance can only be taken where, following a complaint to an employer, the same 
harasser repeats sexually harassing behaviour and the employer has not taken whatever steps 
are practicable to prevent the repetition of the behaviour. Fourthly the Employment Tribunal 
and Court cannot investigate complaints and the range of remedies available, although 
adequate, is limited. The power to make recommendations to the employer concerning 
possible disciplinary or rehabilitative action is of no use where the harasser is the actual 
employer, particularly in a small enterprise. Nevertheless, the ECA provisions appear to 
provide an effective means of settling sexual harassment complaints in the interests of 
complainants. 
C How Effective Are the ECA Procedures in Practice? 
On paper the ECA provisions are the best in the world. In practice they have been largely 
ineffective, firstly because they have been rarely used by women and secondly because 
decision makers applying the provisions have failed to treat sexual harassment as a serious 
problem for women workers. 
Although sexual harassment is widespread and perhaps increasing, 164 very few women have 
sought to use the LRA and ECA procedures.165 Only one sexual harassment appeal was dealt 
with by the Labour Court under the LRA provisions. 166 Under the ECA provisions only 4 
complaints of sexual harassment have been dealt with by the Tribunal in its adjudication 
jurisdiction. The mediation jurisdiction of the Tribunal appears to be virtually unused in the 
settlement of sexual harassment cases, despite its apparent suitability. 167 Since 1982 the 
employment institutions have also dealt with least 7 personal grievance cases brought by men 
alleged to have sexually harassed women. 168 In 6 of these cases, the Court or Tribunal found 
The disadvantages of the personal grievance procedures generally, eg the 90-day rule contained in s 33(2) of the 
ECA, are not discussed in this paper. 
164 "Sexual Harassment Cases Increase" (The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 August 1993, 13). 
l65 From l April 1989 until 30 June 1993 only 21 cases of sexual harassment were filed with either the 
Mediation Service (prior to 15 May 1991) or the Employment Tribunal out of a total of 5127 personal grievances 
dealt with. Only 5 sexual harassment cases have been adjudicated on. In each of the years ending 30 June 1992 
and 30 June 1993, only 2 complaints of sexual harassment were disposed of by the Tribunal out of a total of 929 
and 1242 personal grievances respectively. Figures are not available for any period prior to I April 1989. See 
Appendix I for a more detailed breakdown of these figures . 
166 AB Ltd. The LRA was in force from I August 1987 until 14 May 1991. Details of cases dealt with by the 
Mediation Service under the LRA are confidential to the parties and cannot be analysed. Cases which were not 
resolved at Mediation were sent to the Labour Court for resolution. 
167 The Tribunal dealt with no sexual harassment cases in its mediation jurisdiction in the 2 years ending 30 
June 1992 and 1993: see Appendix I. 
l68 There have been at least 3 other personal grievance cases in which sexual harassment has been a factor : 
Verboeket v du Pont Peroxide Ltd (1993) 1 ERNZ 124 (and see Appendix 2 for related decisions) . In this case 
there was no sexual harassment but "only a massive breakdown of a former close relationship fueled by both 
participants and supporters" (7). V's dismissal was procedurally unfair. He was awarded 3 months lost wages 
and $16,000 compensation. 
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that the man's dismissal was unjustified. There appears to have been no research conducted 
into the reasons why the ECA sexual harassment provisions are used so rarely. 169 What is 
clear is that sexual harassment as a problem has not disappeared. Sexual harassment 
complaints to the HRC have increased dramatically over the period since the LRA and ECA 
provisions have been in force. Since l April 1989 229 formal complaints of sexual harassment 
have been made to the HRC. The vast majority of these are employment-related. 170 Nor has 
legal reform of the labour market apparently affected numbers of personal grievances taken 
generally against employers. These have remained at high levels despite the ECA reforms. 171 
Secondly, as Part IV below illustrates, many of the sexual harassment cases reveal gender bias 
in the application of the law. This gender bias, which is both founded on and promotes 
societal myths about sexual harassment, favours men's versions of events over women's, 
values men's interests over women's, makes the legislation less effective, and undermines its 
objects. Hetei v Feltex Woven Carpets & New Zealand Dairy Food & Textile Workers 
Union, 172 A v Foodstuffs (South Island) Limited173 and P v S174, stand out as exceptions which 
In Lane v Mayuri Trading Co Ltd (Unreported, 27 October 1992, Wellington Employment Tribunal, WT 
70/92 (P Stapp)) the grievant was dismissed for failure to disclose criminal convictions, poor attendance, and 
"conduct towards female staff" (1) for which he had been warned on 2 occasions. On the latter point the 
Tribunal found, without giving the facts, that there was no "particular incident associated with these two 
matters at the time of the dismissal to justify the dismissal" (3). The Tribunal found that the grievant was 
unfairly dismissed. He received 3 months lost wages and compensation of $800 . 
In Williams v Wanganui Area Health Board [ 1989] 1 NZILR 617 the grievant was accused of sexually 
harassing 2 fellow workers and was transferred to another location without loss of salary but with the loss of 
the opportunity to earn overtime. He successfully applied for leave to direct access to the Labour Court on the 
grounds that the employer refused to act or act promptly to deal with his grievance. The employer appealed 
and in Wanganui Area Health Board v Williams [ 1989] 2 NZILR 174 the Court of Appeal reversed the Labour 
Court 's decision. There is no discussion of the substance of the sexual harassment complaint in these 
judgments, but they contain interesting observations about possible conflict of interest where both a 
complainant of sexual harassment and the alleged harasser are members of the same union. 
See also M v Independent Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 ERNZ 202. None of these cases is discussed in this 
research paper. 
169 The ECA provisions may be having an effect on behaviour at workplace level. The writer is not aware of 
any research in this area. Trish Mullins, Legal Officer, New Zealand Nurses Organisation, has suggested to 
the writer the following reasons why the ECA provisions are not used: the HRC procedures are more visible; 
sexual harassment is seen as a human rights, rather than an industrial, issue; unions may be resolving sexual 
harassment cases at workplace level; unions may not be sufficiently sensitive to the problem or may be 
handing sexual harassment cases on to the HRC to deal with; the ECA procedures may be viewed as 
inevitably adversarial; women may have more confidence in the HRC and its investigative approach. 
170 See Appendix 1. At a workshop on sexual harassment at the Women's Law Conference on 22 and 23 May 
1993, Frances Joychild, Legal Officer, HRC, stated that not only were more complaints of sexual harassment 
being made, but also that the harassing behaviour was more serious and was occurring in a wider range of 
situations ( eg job interviews). 
171 1090, 929 and 1242 cases disposed ofin the years ending 30 June 1991, 1992 and 1993 respectively. 
Appendix 1 contains more detailed figures. The decline of union influence, and consequent loss of available 
and affordable advocates for women complainants may have affected the numbers of complaints, but no data is 
available on this point. Under the HRCA no "advocate" is necessary, because the HRC itself is responsible for 
enforcing the Act. 
172 [1990] 3 NZILR 132 (Labour Court). 
173 [1993] l ERNZ 81 (CET, D S Miller). 
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recognise the harm that sexual harassment causes, the right of women to dignity at work and 
as workers, and that women's perspectives on sexual harassment must take precedence if 
sexual harassment law is to be effective. The statements of principle made by Goddard CJ in 
the recent Employment Court decision, Z & Y Ltd v A, 175 should also assist in eliminating 
gender bias from Tribunal and Court consideration of sexual harassment cases. Gender bias 
in sexual harassment cases has nevertheless been so pervasive that it would be tempting to 
advise women complainants to avoid the employment institutions altogether and to seek 
redress in the HRC. The writer considers that this option should not be pursued for two 
reasons. 
Firstly the ECA provisions are capable of providing effective protection for women against 
sexual harassment in the workplace. It is unacceptable that authorities with statutory 
responsibility for applying legislation should, however inadvertently, undermine the 
effectiveness of that legislation through allowing gender bias to influence the outcome of 
decisions. Secondly, the employment institutions will continue to adjudicate on cases where 
men accused of sexual harassment allege that they have been unjustifiably dismissed or 
otherwise unfairly treated. Decisions of the employment institutions in those cases will set 
parameters for and give guidance to employers in assessing the acceptability of their own 
behaviour and the behaviour of their employees, and in determining whose dignity, men's or 
women's, is worth protecting. Procedural fairness in investigating a sexual harassment 
complaint is not always easy to achieve. If the time and money cost of compensating a 
sexually harassed woman is significantly less than the cost of compensating an unfairly 
dismissed harasser, employers may eventually conclude that it would be less expensive (and 
considerably less trouble) to simply ignore complaints of sexual harassment. 
Thus, even if women complainants avoid the employment institutions, gender biased 
decisions in unjustified dismissal cases brought by alleged harassers may make it harder for 
women to have complaints of sexual harassment by co-workers dealt with effectively in the 
workplace. The failure by the employment institutions to treat sexual harassment seriously in 
unjustified dismissal cases may therefore undermine the effectiveness of the ECA provisions 
at the most important level - in the workplace. If women complaining of sexual harassment 
are to get justice and the protection the law says it offers, the gender bias of the employment 
institutions must be confronted and defeated. 
174 Unreported, 22 July 1993, Christchurch Employment Tribunal, CT 87/93 (JM Goldstein). 
175 Unreported, 3 September 1993, Employment Court, Wellington, WEC 21/93 (Goddard CJ), an appeal 
from the Tribunal decision in A v Z. 
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IV THE TOOLS OF GENDER BIAS AND JUDICIAL UNDERMINING OF THE 
OBJECTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
Life becoming law and back again is a process of transformation. Legitimized and sanctioned, the legal concept 
of sexual harassment reenters the society to participate in shaping the social definitions of what may be resisted 
or complained about, said aloud, or even felt. Similarly, when a form of suffering is made a legal wrong, 
especially when its victims lack power, its social dynamics are not directly embodied or reflected in the law. 
Legal prohibitions may arise because of the anguish people feel or the conditions they find insupportable, but the 
legal issues may not tum on the social issues that are the reasons they exist. Distanced from social life, yet part 
of its imperatives, the law becomes a shadow world in which caricatured social conflict is played out, an unreal 
thing with very real consequences. l76 
Catherine MacKinnon 
The contention that the ECA sexual harassment provisions are the best in the world was 
discussed in Part III. In Part IV the writer examines the way in which those provisions have 
been applied in sexual harassment cases determined by the employment institutions. This 
examination reveals gender bias 177 in the cases (both allegations of sexual harassment by 
women, and unjustified dismissal actions by alleged harassers): analysis of concepts from a 
male perspective; failure to appreciate and act upon the real life experience of women; 
underestimation of the effects of decisions on women; reliance on myths about sexual 
harassment; and failure to recognise unstated assumptions or to scrutinise untested 
assumptions. Although one of the objects of sexual harassment law is to challenge existing 
social hierarchies, decision makers tend to accept those hierarchies as "natural, uncoerced, and 
good." 178 Some decision makers appear to neither understand nor, in some cases, even to 
accept the basic premises on which the legislation is founded: that sexual harassment is 
unlawful and can seriously harm women, and that sexually harassed women are entitled to 
real remedies. Ultimately these judicial attitudes have the potential to subvert the objects of 
the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA. 
Gender bias is seldom overt. Rather, it finds its way into the decision making process via the 
use of the tools of legal discretion: the nature and type of remedies granted; application of 
rules of evidence, such as requirements for corroboration and cross-examination, and the 
admission of similar fact evidence; the setting of the standard of proof and the allocation of 
the burden of proof; assessment of credibility of witnesses; and interpretation of statutory 
provisions, including importing irrelevant factors into decision making. The discretionary 
tools of legal decision making, laid on a foundation of socially sanctioned gender bias, give 
legal sanction to gender bias. The process by which that has happened in sexual harassment 
cases, through which the effectiveness of the ECA provisions on sexual harassment has been 
undermined, is analysed below. 
176 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 57. 
177 As defined above n 18 and by Minow 31 - 57 . 
178 Minow 54. 
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A Remedies 
The question seems to be whether a woman is valuable enough to hurt, so that what is done to her is a harm. 179 
Catherine MacKinnon 
Remedies allow decision makers, in their discretion, 180 to decide how much people are worth, 
what sorts of behaviour should be rewarded, and how severely society should punish 
particular behaviour. The types and amounts of remedies granted can indirectly condone or 
discourage particular behaviour. One of the most direct methods of measuring gender bias in 
the application of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA is to analyse the remedies 
granted to women who have succeeded in proving that they were sexually harassed in their 
employment. The following analysis of remedies reveals measurable inequality of treatment 
between, on the one hand, women who are sexually harassed and, on the other, men dismissed 
for sexually harassing behaviour. It also reveals that the employment institutions are failing to 
grant adequate remedies to women who are sexually harassed, thus undermining one of the 
objects of the legislation. 
I Remedies granted to sexually harassed complainants 
(a) The cases 
In A v Z, 181 AB Ltd, 182 Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd, 183 and P v S184 the employment 
institutions recognised that the complainants had been sexually harassed. In each case the 
harassment caused the complainant to leave her job. The economic consequences of sexual 
harassment for these women were therefore severe, yet, with the exception of P v S, the 
amounts of compensation awarded to them were relatively low. 
In A v Z the complainant was employed as a bar person in a tavern for approximately 3 years 
and was allegedly sexually harassed by the owner/manager for approximately half of that 
period. She said that her work became intolerable because of the harassment and she had to 
leave because of it. 185 The Tribunal accepted that A had been sexually harassed and that she 
had a personal grievance. It is not clear from the Tribunal judgment whether A was also 
constructively dismissed, although on appeal the Employment Court judgment makes it clear 
179 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 110. 
180 See Cain v H L Parker Trusts [1992] 3 ERNZ 777, 786 (WEC, Goddard CJ). 
181 Unreported, 29 September 1992, Wellington Employment Tribunal, WT 69/92 (D Hurley). 
182 [1988] NZILR 761 (Labour Court). 
183 [1992] 2 ERNZ 38 (AET, C Hicks). 
184 Unreported, 22 July 1993, Christchurch Employment Tribunal, AT 87 /93 (J M Goldstein). 
185 AV z l. 
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that there was both a claim and a finding of constructive dismissal by the Tribunal. 186 A was 
awarded 2 months loss of wages, compensation of $5000 for loss of dignity, humiliation and 
injury to feelings, 187 and costs of $1800. The Tribunal did not use its power under section 
40(1 )( d) of the ECA to make formal recommendations about rehabilitative action in respect of 
the employer, 188 but it did make "observations" about the desirability of employers liaising 
with the HRC over sexual harassment programmes, providing posters and brochures for staff, 
and establishing a sexual harassment complaints procedure. 
In AB Ltd the complainant worked at the respondent's retail business for only a few days 
before she left because of sexual harassment. The harasser had touched the complainant on 
the breast and buttocks, and had deliberately brushed against her on several occasions, as well 
as verbally harassing her. On two occasions the complainant "was left alone in the shop with 
the manager which terrified her so that she called her mother and her boyfriend to ask them to 
help." 189 She eventually left her job on the advice of her union. The Labour Court was "not 
disposed to hold that what was proved was sexual harassment of a grave order" and awarded 
her compensation of $1500 in respect of the harassment. 190 The Court made a specific finding 
that there was no constructive dismissal, saying that it did not wish to "encourage a view that 
an allegation by a worker of sexual harassment is sufficient ground for abandonment of 
employment." 191 For this reason the Court refused to award any reimbursement of wages lost, 
and no order for costs was made. 
In Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd the complainant had been employed for less than 2 months 
when she was constructively dismissed after complaining of sexual harassment. The Tribunal 
found that the complainant was sexually harassed but did not have a personal grievance on 
that ground because the employer had taken all practicable steps as required under section 36 
of the ECA to stop the harassment by the complainant's co-workers. The complainant was 
186 Z & Y Ltd v A (Unreported, 3 September 1993, Wellington Employment Court, WEC 21/93 (Goddard 
CJ)) 2. The finding of constructive dismissal was set aside on appeal. The Court did not discuss the question 
of remedies in any depth, but set aside the decision and referred it back to the Tribunal for a rehearing. 
187 Pursuant to s 40(l)(c)(i) of the ECA. 
188 The limitations of the power to make recommendations under s 40(l)(d) of the ECA is mentioned in Part 
III B l(h). 
189 ABltd162. 
190 Compensation for humiliation, injury to feelings and loss of dignity in cases dealt with by the HRC has also 
been modest, although since the removal in 1992 of the $2000 limit (see above n 161 ), amounts have been 
increasing. evertheless levels of compensation awarded to sexually harassed women continue to be insultingly 
low. A sexually harassed complainant who was raped and repeatedly sexually assaulted was recently awarded 
$9000 compensation (The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 August 1993, 13). Compare the A$120,000 
damages awarded to a sexually harassed Hobart City Council worker on 10 July 1993 for assault and battery, 
false imprisonment, defamation and negligence (The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 13 July 1993, 6). 
Tasmanian local authorities are not covered by any specific provisions prohibiting sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 
191 AB Ltd 767 - 768. 
33 
awarded compensation of $3000 for stress, humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings 
in respect of the constructive dismissal 192 and costs of $1250. 
In P v S the complainant was a high school student who worked for 7 months as a part time 
shop assistant in the respondent's shop before she "resigned" because of sexual harassment by 
the employer. The harassment consisted of the harasser: 193 
[L]ooking [the complainant] up and down, tapping her on the bottom with his hand as he walked past, 
making unwelcome and inappropriate comments about her appearance and changing his trousers (thus 
being clad in underpants) in front of her and drawing her attention to himself. 
P also gave evidence that: 194 
[S]he felt scared when she was alone in the shop with T [the harasser] at the end of work. So scared 
that she was worried that T would rape her. She gave evidence that she would try and have one of 
the other shop assistants wait for her to leave . She was afraid to be alone in T's company even for a 
few minutes. 
The Tribunal found that sexual harassment had occurred and had caused P to resign. Hence 
she was constructively dismissed. In assessing the amount of compensation the Tribunal took 
into account P's age, the fact that the harassment was "at the lower end of the scale", 195 the 
"apparent quick return of the applicant to her old self', 196 the length of time she was 
employed, and the length of time during which she was harassed. She was awarded 
compensation of $3500, 3 months lost wages ($884), and costs of $1500. 
(b) Constructive dismissal 
The "harassment" decisions are inconsistent in terms of whether constructive dismissal 
occurred. Constructive dismissal takes place where a worker has to leave her employment 
because the employer's conduct or breach of duty "forces" resignation on the worker. 19
7 
Implied in all contracts of employment is a term "that the employer will not, without 
reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and 
192 Pursuant to section 40(l)(c)(i) of the ECA. 
193 p V S 3. 
194 Above. 
195 Above 7. 
196 Above. 
197 Constructive dismissal may also arise in other circumstances: Auckland ere Shop Employees !VOW v 
Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [ 1985] ACJ 963 (CA). See also Wellington etc Clerical etc IUOW v Greenwich [ 1983] 
ACJ 965 (Arb Ct); Hughes, above n 82, para 4.150 pp 1928 - 1930; and Hom, above n 140, para EC 27 .04 
pp IC-3 - IC-4. 
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employee."198 The decisions in Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd and P v S establish that where 
sexual harassment is of a sufficiently serious nature or effect, it may destroy or seriously 
damage that relationship, thus breaching the implied duty and resulting in constructive 
dismissal of the employee. 
Whether constructive dismissal has occurred is essentially a question of fact. 199 In AB Ltd the 
employee was terrified to be alone in the workplace with her employer who had sexually 
assaulted her, yet the Labour Court held that there was no constructive dismissal. If sexual 
assault and other conduct by an employer inducing a reasonable fear on the part of the 
employee for her physical safety is not a sufficient breach of the implied term of confidence 
and trust to cause constructive dismissal, it is difficult to imagine in what circumstances 
constructive dismissal could ever be established. It is submitted that the approach of Finnigan 
Jin AB Ltd is incorrect because it establishes that even sexual harassment of a serious 
nature200 may not be a sufficiently serious breach of the relationship of trust and confidence 
implied in employment contracts to warrant the employee resigning. Although the AB Ltd 
finding is a finding of fact, it is submitted that the decision on this point is effectively 
inconsistent in principle with the finding of the EOT in H v E,201 that sexual harassment by an 
employer may destroy the relationship of trust and confidence so that constructive dismissal 
occurs, and with the approach of the employment institutions in cases of constructive 
dismissal generally.202 Where sexual harassment leads a worker to resign, the worker has 
effectively established two grievances (dismissal and sexual harassment)2°3 and should be 
compensated in respect of both grievances. The Tribunal's decision in P v S supports this 
approach. 
198 Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities Officers IUOW v Auckland Electric Power Board [ 1992] 1 
ERNZ 87, 95 (AEC, Colgan J) . 
199 Auckland etc Shop Employees !OUWv Woolworths (NZ) Ltd, above n 197, 969. 
200 The Labour Court found (768) that the sexual harassment in AB Ltd was "serious" but not "grave" . 201 Above n 45, 336 relying specifically on the Woolworths decision, above n 197. 
202 Seen 197. Finnigan J suggested (768) that "the grievance could have been remedied while the employment 
continued", that "[w]ages could have been payable for any period of absence", and that the union should have 
advised the complainant to "stay away from work until the matter was sorted out." With respect this is 
unrealistic . It took almost 2 months for the grievance to reach a grievance committee and a further 9 months until 
the case was heard by the Labour Court. An employer is highly likely to dismiss a worker who is absent from 
work for that length of time. Moreover, in other cases of constructive dismissal workers are not required to "stay 
away from work" until matters have been sorted out. The Court also stresses that the worker had found it very 
difficult to get another job, and that if she had not "abandoned" her employment she "could have had both 
compensation and her job" (768) . However, the worker did not claim reinstatement, so presumably did not want 
her job back. Nor, it is submitted, did she abandon her employment, since it was the employer who initiated the 
termination by breaching his implied duties under the employment contract. In requiring the worker to remain 
employed in the circumstances, the Court simply failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the harassment in this 
case. This is gender bias. 
203 Z & Y Ltd v A 16 . 
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In the recent Employment Court decision, Z & Y Ltd v A, Goddard CJ makes it clear that an 
employer has an obligation under the employment contract to refrain from sexual harassment. 
To prove constructive dismissal, three things must be shown: "breach of duty by the 
employer, resignation by the employee, and a causal link between the two."204 A complainant 
alleging constructive dismissal because of sexual harassment must show that "but for" the 
harassment, she would not have left her employment.205 The Court found that the Tribunal in 
A v Z had not actually made a determination about the cause of the termination of the 
employment contract and that the Tribunal decision was defective for this reason (although 
the outcome of the case did not turn on this point because the complainant also had a separate 
personal grievance based on the claim of sexual harassment). The Court's approach to 
constructive dismissal in Z & Y Ltd v A is a positive one for women, since it focuses attention 
on the reason for the termination of the employment relationship, rather than requiring, as the 
Labour Court did in AB Ltd, that the harassment reach a certain level of seriousness 
(determined objectively) before a finding of constructive dismissal will be made. 
2 Remedies granted to men dismissed because of allegations of sexual harassment 
While women's jobs have been valued at a low level, the employment institutions have valued 
the right of men to job security extremely highly, to the point of being overly generous in 
some cases. A union commentator has noted:206 
Jn many instances workers who may have been dismissed unfairly on procedural grounds, but who have 
been held to have contributed to their dismissal by their actions, receive no compensation or very little 
compensation. Sexual harassers who are dismissed procedurally unfairly, seem to be awarded large and 
in some cases huge amounts of compensation. 
In Northern Butchers' Union v Peach & Vienna Foods,207 the earliest case in which sexual 
harassment was adjudicated on in the employment institutions, the harasser was found to have 
been unfairly dismissed on procedural grounds (but not on substantive grounds). He was 
awarded compensation of $2000208 and wage arrears of $1800. He was not reinstated. While 
this amount of compensation may appear modest by today's standards, it was the highest 
( equal) amount awarded by the Arbitration Court in any personal grievance in 1982. 209 The 
204 Above, 4. See also H v E above n 45. 
205 Z & Y Ltd v A 16. 
206 Coleman "Trade Union Perspective 297. 
207 [1982] ACJ 379 (Arb Ct). 
208 Section 117(7) of the Industrial Relations Act provided that where a personal grievance was established 
the settlement, decision or award could provide for "the payment to [the grievant] of compensation by his 
employer." No separate heads of compensation were specified, as they were under s 227(c) of the LRA and 
are now under s 40(l)(c) of the ECA. 
209 See New Zealand Merchant Service Guild IUOWv Coastal Shipping Ltd [1982] ACJ 445, in which $2000 
compensation (and $5000 lost wages) was awarded to a ship's captain whose dismissal was found to be 
substantively and procedurally unfair. Compare also Auckland Hotel etc /VOW v Kentucky Fried Chicken Ltd 
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Court commented that the amount of compensation awarded to the alleged harasser, Mr Epps, 
was "heavily discounted" because he was "substantially to blame for his loss". 210 One 
wonders what the level of compensation would have been had it not been discounted. 
In 1988 in C v L D Nathan Ltcfl.11 the Labour Court found that harassment had not occurred. 
The alleged harasser, the manager of a supermarket meat unit, was reinstated and awarded 
compensation of $3000 and reimbursement of all wages lost. In a private arbitration the same 
year212 the arbitrator found that sexual harassment had occurred but that the alleged harasser 
had been unfairly dismissed because he had not been given a proper opportunity to explain. 
He was awarded $10,000 compensation. A report of this arbitration notes that this "sizeable 
sum" of compensation "became rather a reward for misconduct" .213 In Par lane v NZ Police214 
the harasser, who had been employed by the respondent employer for less than 2 years when 
he was dismissed, was awarded 3 months wage arrears and compensation of $4000 in respect 
of both job loss and humiliation. 
In New Zealand Association of Polytechnic Teachers v Nelson Polytechnic215 the level of 
compensation awarded by the Labour Court was outrageously high. Complaints of sexual 
harassment made by students against a Polytechnic tutor were not sustained. The chairperson 
of the personal grievance committee found that the dismissal was unfair and awarded the 
grievant an unspecified amount of wage arrears and compensation of $5000. The grievant 
was employed on a temporary contract which had most of the year to run when he was 
dismissed. He was not a permanent employee, which would have been an indicator for 
relatively higher compensation. On appeal to the Labour Court he was awarded lost wages of 
$30,000, compensation of $25,000 for humiliation, and $40,000 compensation for future 
economic loss.216 
[ 1982] ACJ 379, in which a worker unfairly accused of theft was awarded $1400 compensation and Wellington 
District Hotel etc /UOWv Napier Cosmopolitan Club Inc [1982] ACJ 343, in which a casual and part time 
worker was constructively dismissed following an implication of dishonesty in her behaviour and was awarded 
$250 compensation. 
210 Northern Butchers' Union v Peach & Vienna Foods 388. 
211 [ 1988] ZILR 304 (Labour Court). 
212 T P Co v Staff Union [1987] ILB 53 . Compare Northern Clerical IUOWv Queen City Cabs [1988] NZILR 
I 040, a successful application to the Labour Court to enforce a personal grievance committee decision awarding a 
sexually harassed woman $4000 compensation. No details of the grievance are given. The decision notes ( I 041) 
that the complainant was dismissed "for other reasons." 
213 Coleman "Trade Union Perspective" also notes in relation to this case (296) that "[s]uch an enormous sum 
in compensation by the mediator, led the harasser to the conclusion that he had been badly wronged over the 
incident of harassment. Buoyed up by this feeling he then proceeded to take a defamation case against our 
[union] member. This resulted in our member having to employ legal counsel including a Queen's Counsel to 
defend her. As if this was not bad enough, the harasser appeared back on the worksite in the employ of an 
independent contractor". 
214 [1991] 3 ERNZ 721 (Labour Court). 
215 [ 1991] I ERNZ 662 (Labour Court). 
216 Even though his salary for the whole year was set at only $37,392. 
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In B v Amalgamated Engineering Union217 offensive behaviour of a sexual nature was found 
to have occurred but not detriment. Despite the opposition of the employer and the 
complainant, which is usually a strong contra-indicator for an order of reinstatement,218 the 
Tribunal reinstated B and awarded compensation of $2000 for humiliation, loss of dignity and 
injury to feelings. This level of compensation was awarded despite the Tribunal's finding that 
compensation should be discounted because B himself had not behaved with any dignity, the 
employer had not been guilty of any blatant or outrageous conduct, B himself had 
substantially contributed to his own dismissal, and taking into account the principle that 
damage for "job loss" is compensated for when a grievant is reinstated, so that compensation 
becomes an award solely in respect of humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings.219 
3 Compensation 
(a) Compensation for job loss 
The employment institutions have denied adequate compensation for job loss to women who 
have lost their jobs as a result of sexual harassment. In AB Ltd, Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd 
and A v Z, the complainant received no compensation for the fact that the harassment caused 
her to lose her source of livelihood. Under the ECA, compensation for job loss can be 
awarded under section 40(l)(a) as "reimbursement ... of a sum equal to the whole or part of 
any wages or other money lost ... as a result of the grievance." In general, although not 
necessarily, this remedy is used to compensate an employee for loss which occurred up until 
the date of the hearing. Compensation for job loss may also be awarded under section 
40(l)(c)(ii) for "[l]oss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which the worker 
might reasonably have been expected to obtain if the personal grievance had not arisen". This 
provision has generally been used to assess future loss . However:220 
[I]n the end it is not material whether compensation in respect of loss of remuneration is assessed in two 
bites or one so long as there is no double counting and at some stage the overall position is assessed. 
217 [1992] 2 ERNZ 554 (hereafter B v AEU) . 
218 The test of whether reinstatement is practicable is whether the employee "would be a harmonious and 
effective member of her employer's team if ... reinstated ... ": Northern Hotel etc /VOW v Rotorua RSA (Inc) 
[1989] 3 NZILR 497, 501 (Labour Court) . The same test was recently applied by Travis Jin Du Pont 
Peroxide Ltd v Verboeket [1993] 1 ERNZ 124, 130 - 131 (AEC). 
219 STAMS v Denhard's Bakeries (No 2) [1991] 3 ERNZ 941, 954 (WEC, Goddard CJ) . The AET decision 
on remedies is B v AEU (No 2) (Unreported, 30 June 1992, Auckland Employment Tribunal, AT 79A/92 (A 
Dumbleton)). The relevant findings are at 4 - 5 . 
220 Telecom South v Post Office Union [ 1992] I ERNZ 711 (CA), 720 (per Richardson J) . Double counting 
may have occurred in the Nelson Polytechnic case, since the grievant received a substantial amount for future 
economic loss even though he was a temporary employee only. Amounts awarded in respect of wages lost is 
usually limited under s 41 (I) to a maximum of 3 months. 
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With the exception of P v S (in which one combined amount of compensation for job loss and 
injury to feelings was awarded) the employment institutions have failed to adequately assess 
and compensate the complainant for the economic damage she has suffered because of sexual 
harassment. The employment institutions have effectively placed a zero value on the right of 
women to job security. Yet the protection of women's right to job security is one of the 
objects of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA. The assessment of compensation for 
job loss is based on a variety of factors. 221 Of particular importance are the salary and nature 
of the position held, length of service, and the period for which the employee could 
reasonably have expected to work but for the dismissal. In the sexual harassment cases these 
factors, if applied, would have resulted in relatively higher compensation for the men and 
lower compensation for the women. Yet even these factors cannot explain the zero value 
placed on the value of the complainants' jobs as compared to the generous remedies awarded 
to the men who claimed unjustified dismissal, in particular to those who did engage in 
sexually harassing behaviour but whose dismissals were unfair because of procedural defects 
in the dismissal process.222 What does explain the discrepancy is gender bias. 
There is also an element of inherent gender bias in placing too great an emphasis on type of 
job, rate of pay and length of service as factors to be taken into account in assessing 
compensation for job loss. Women, because of their unequal position in the labour market,223 
start from an unfair position in such assessments. Ms Fulton and the grievant in AB Ltd, for 
example, never even got a chance to build up a substantial period of employment with their 
employers. Using the length of service factor in assessing the value of job loss caused by 
sexual harassment discriminates against women twice; firstly because women usually have 
less service than men; and secondly because it fails to recognise that in these cases the 
harassment itself has made it impossible for women to build up long service. Sexual 
harassment as a cause of economic inequality for women is at its most obvious where 
harassment prevents, or makes it harder for, women to work at all, or to work under the same 
conditions as men. A union commentator poses the question in the following way:224 
[H]ow can one describe the feelings of a woman who maybe went to night school for years to get a 
decent qualification, and then on returning to the workforce finds herself having to try to ignore daily the 
dirty sexual innuendoes of her boss - and still get some joy out of a job she's waited years to get? 
221 Discussed in the 5 separate Court of Appeal judgments in the Telecom South case, above n 220. 
222 Section 40(2) of the ECA obliges the Tribunal or Court, in awarding remedies to an unjustifiably 
dismissed grievant, to "consider the extent to which the actions of the employee contributed towards the 
situation that gave rise to the personal grievance, and ... if those actions so require, reduce the remedies that 
would otherwise have been awarded accordingly." Such reductions have, it is submitted, been minimal in the 
dismissal cases. 
223 Beyond the Barriers. The State, the Economy and Women's Employment 1984 - 1990 (National Advisory 
Council on the Employment of Women, Department of Labour, Wellington, 1990) 87 - 92. 
224 Steele No Laughing Matter 19. 
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It is submitted that in all sexual harassment cases in which sexual harassment has caused job 
loss, the employment institutions are obliged to evaluate the job loss of the complainant and 
compensate her for it, re-examining the traditional factors according to which the value of job 
security is usually assessed, and taking into account the gender bias inherent in the labour 
market and the way in which sexual harassment contributes to this. 
The value of wages lost has also been evaluated in a discriminatory way. The ECA provides 
that the employment institutions must reimburse wages lost by an employee up to a total 
amount equivalent to 3 months ordinary time remuneration.225 The Tribunal or Court may in 
its discretion award a higher amount226 and must reduce the amount "to such extent as it 
thinks just and equitable" where satisfied that "the situation that gave rise to the personal 
grievance resulted in part from the fault of the employee in whose favour the order is to be 
made" .227 The complainant in AB Ltd received no award for lost wages. The complainant in 
A v Z was awarded only 2 months wages because of her "stupidity .. . on one of the more 
minor matters."228 The award of wages in B v AEU was also reduced to an amount equivalent 
to 2 months even though this was said to reflect substantial fault. 229 No reduction was made 
in the wages reimbursed to Mr Parlane, who did sexually harass his workmates, nor to C, 
despite his apparent fault. 
(b) Compensation for loss of dignity, humiliation and injury to feelings 
A wards of compensation for loss of dignity, humiliation and injury to feelings have also been 
unfairly generous to male harassers and unfairly low in the case of complainants of sexual 
harassment. The dignity of A, a permanent employee of 3 years standing, was worth $5000. 
The dignity of the complainant in AB Ltd was worth $1500. The dignity of Ms Fulton was 
worth $3000. None of these complainants had contributed towards the situation which gave 
rise to the personal grievance. 
Nor, according to the Labour Court, had Mr Luckhurst in the Nelson Polytechnic case. His 
dignity was worth $25,000. Mr C was found not to have sexually harassed fellow employees. 
In awarding him $3000 compensation (as well as reinstating him), the Labour Court stated 
225 Section 41(1) of the ECA (and s 229(1) of the LRA). The differences betweens 40(2) (assessment of 
remedies to an unjustifiably dismissed worker whose actions contributed to the situation which gave rise to the 
grievance) and s 41(3)(b) (Court or Tribunal obliged to reduce amount of lost wages where personal grievance 
results in part from the fault of the employee) are discussed in Paykel Ltd v Ahlfeld (1993] 1 ERNZ 334 
(AEC, Travis J) and Macadam v Port Nelson Ltd (1993) 1 ERNZ 300 (WEC, Goddard CJ) . 
226 Section 41 (2) of the ECA; see also s 229(2) of the LRA. 
227 Section 41(3) of the ECA; see also s 229(3) of the LRA. 
228 The view that A was not at fault at all is discussed below, Part IVG l (emphasis added). 
229 B v AEU (No 2) above n 219, 4 . 
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that it was taking into account his "length of service."230 Obviously only a limited 
"reinstatement discount" was made. The Court therefore doubled up on at least part of his 
remedy. The Court also indicated that it discounted the amount of compensation because 
"after the November 1987 complaint he continued or allowed to continue talk of a nature 
which some people could find unpleasant. To some extent he has contributed to his 
problem." 231 Compensation of $3000 was extremely high given the lost wages awarded to C, 
the fact that he was reinstated, and his contributory behaviour. It was equal to the amount 
awarded to Ms Fulton, even though she had done nothing wrong. B, who sexually harassed 
his workmate, had the value of his dignity assessed at $2000, even though he had substantially 
contributed to his owrt dismissal. What level of compensation would he have got if he had not 
contributed to his owrt dismissal? And how can the amount of damage done to the dignity of 
a person wrongly accused of injuring someone else be worth as great as or more than the 
amount of damage done to the dignity of the person to whom that injury is actually done? 
These decisions indicate that, for the employment institutions, the dignity of a "blameless" 
woman who has been harassed is worth considerably less than a man's dignity, even where 
that man has sexually harassed a woman. A man's right to dignity during the dismissal 
process is apparently worth more than a woman's right to freedom from sexual harassment. 
This is gender bias in a very raw form. Is there a deeper inequality still? For many men, the 
value of a woman is her sexuality and women exist for the sexual pleasure of men.232 To 
assess the value of a woman's dignity is to answer the question "whether a woman is valuable 
enough to hurt, so that what is done to her is a harm. "233 Sexual harassment law says that for 
a man to use a woman for sexual pleasure at work is legally wrong. The law says this, but 
harassers do not understand it. Do the decision makers understand it? Or do the minimal 
awards of compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of sexually 
harassed women reflect a social perspective, that women really exist for sex, and cannot be 
injured by it, rather than reflecting the substance of the law? 
One may conjecture whether the high awards of compensation made to male harassers are the 
result of an unconscious desire on the part of decision makers234 to award a sort of "boy's owrt 
top up" to compensate men for having been caught out in a situation where men believe the 
law should not make this behaviour unlawful, but can not say so publicly. And are the 
extraordinarily high awards to those accused of sexual harassment, but found not to have 
230 C v L D Nathan 308. 
231 Above. 
232 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 110. 
233 Above . MacKinnon says that this question is often answered in the negative: "Women being 
compensated in money for sex they had violates male metaphysics because in that system sex is what a woman 
is for . " 
234 No woman has ever adjudicated on a "dismissed harasser" case. 
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harassed, exponentially increased for a similar reason? Not only shouldn't it be unlawful, but 
they didn't even get the pleasure of doing it anyway! The writer is not suggesting that the 
decision makers in these cases are giving effect in any conscious way to the "male 
metaphysic"235 that women exist for sex. Yet the effect of their decisions is to undermine the 
very heart of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA - the principle that sexual 
harassment is an injury, for which those injured deserve real compensation. The writer 
concludes that an analysis of the sexual harassment decisions supports MacKinnon's view on 
how far enforcement of the law of sexual harassment still has to go:236 
[T]he state has never in fact protected women's dignity or bodily integrity. It just says it does .... 
[T]he promise of "equal protection of the laws" [must] be delivered upon for us, as it is when real 
people are violated. It is also part of a larger political struggle to value women more than the male 
pleasure of using us is valued. 
( d) A v Foodstuffs (South Island) Ltd: A cause for optimism 
Some decisions give cause for optimism, however. In Hetei v Feltex Woven Carpets Ltd & 
NZ Dairy Food & Textile Workers Union237 the Tribunal recognised that sexual harassment is 
a serious injury to women and upheld the employer's decision to dismiss the harasser. In A v 
Foodstuffs (South Island) Ltd the Tribunal found that the alleged harasser had been unfairly 
dismissed on procedural grounds. The Tribunal noted that "this is one of those rare cases 
where I think it can be said that if the employer had handled the matter with more care then 
his ultimate conclusion would have been strengthened, rather than weakened. "238 The 
Tribunal came to a conclusion that, in comparison to findings in other sexual harassment 
cases, was both radical and inspired. It held that the extent to which the employee had 
contributed to his own dismissal in terms of section 40(2) and 41 (3) of the ECA was "total". 
The Tribunal ignored the incorrect concession made by the advocate for the respondent 
employer that, if the dismissal was found to be unjustified, reinstatement would be automatic, 
and awarded the grievant "an award of costs, and nothing more. "239 In this case, the Tribunal 
valued the woman more than the male pleasure of using her. 
The $3500 compensation awarded in P v Sis also cause for some optimism that the 
employment institutions may be beginning to place a slightly higher value on the right of 
women to job security and dignity. In that case the Tribunal chose not to discount the award 
it made, although the complainant was a high school student, the job was not her sole source 
of financial support and she worked part time on only 2 days a week. In these decisions the 
235 Above n 233. 
236 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 105. 
237 [ 1990) 3 NZILR 132 (Labour Court). 
238 [1993] 1 ERNZ 81 (CET, D Miller) 102. 
239 Above. The award of costs was set at $1000. 
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Tribunal gives effect to the objects of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA and 
provides real compensation for the victims of sexual harassment. 
B Corroboration and the Recent Complaint Rule 
The unremitting indulgence in the Lying Woman/Innocent Man panic feeds the belief that women's concerns 
are second rate, always trumped by someone else's interests. 240 
1 
Ann Althouse 
1 The rules of evidence 
The rules of evidence are another set of tools which assist in the process of judicial decision 
making. Historically the law of evidence has doubted the competence and reliability of 
women as witnesses. The common law regarded women as incompetent witnesses in criminal 
cases. 241 Women were also unable to testify for or against their husbands, "because in theory 
husband and wife were one, and that one was the husband."242 The pervasive myth that 
women are unreliable and untrustworthy witnesses still influences decision makers. There is a 
"common perception that women are less capable, less rational, and therefore less credible 
than men" .243 An extra dimension to this perception has always been present in cases with a 
sexual content, because of the myth that women, especially sexually experienced women, lie 
about sexual matters. The employment institutions have effectively required corroboration, in 
the sense of independent confirmation, of complainants' stories of sexual harassment, 
reflecting historical gender bias in the rules of evidence. In this section the writer discusses 
the unwarranted emphasis on the need for corroboration of complainants' stories, and 
concludes that this emphasis is based on sexist assumptions, and in particular on the myth that 
women tell lies about sexual matters. 
2 The requirement for corroboration in sexual cases 
"The general rule of modem law is that the Court may act upon the uncorroborated testimony 
of one witness." 244 Traditionally, corroboration was considered necessary or desirable in 
certain types of cases before a Court could convict a defendant or find for an applicant or 
240 A Althouse "Beyond King Solomon's Harlots: Women in Evidence" (1992) 65 S Cal LR 1265, 1277. 
241 Above n 13, 3. In New Zealand women could not be jurors until the Women Jurors Act was passed in 1942. 
Jury service for women was made compulsory by the Juries Amendment Act 1963. 
242 Above n 13, 3. 
243 K Kinports "Evidence Engendered" ( 1991) 2 U Ill LR 413, 435. 
244 D L Mathieson Cross on Evidence ( 4 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1989) para 8.1 p 171 (hereafter Cross 4 
ed). 
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plaintiff.245 Corroboration is independent testimony which implicates the defendant in the 
crime or act in issue:246 
[E]vidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or 
tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that 
is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, 
but also that the prisoner committed it. 
Corroboration is required when the decision maker believes that "the witness has good reason 
to lie. We therefore want some other piece of evidence which tends to convince us that he is 
telling the truth. "247 Corroboration was required until recently as a matter of law in paternity 
cases and as a matter of judicial practice in cases of sexual offences. 248 Judges were required 
to warn juries in rape and other sexual assault cases that it was "not safe to convict on the 
uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, but that they may do so if satisfied of its truth" 
or that it was "really dangerous to convict on the victim's evidence alone" .249 The rationale 
for the corroboration requirement in sexual offences rested on the following propositions: 
(a) That rape (and other sexual offences) were accusations "easily to be made and hard to be 
proved and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent". 25
0 
(b) That false accusations of rape are common: "There is sound reason for ... [ the 
corroboration requirement], because these cases are particularly subject to the danger of 
deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, fantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a 
girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed".
251 
( c) That juries feel particularly sympathetic to wronged women.252 
The "easy to make and hard to refute" assumption was also one of the main reasons for the 
imposition of the corroboration requirement in paternity cases,253 along with the view that the 
245 See generally Cross 4 ed, paras 8.1 - 8.18 pp 171 - 183; Evidence Law Reform Committee Report on 
Corroboration (Department of Justice, November 1984) (hereafter ELRC Report). 
246 R v Baskerville [ 1916] 2 KB 658, 667 (Lord Reading CJ). 
247 R v Ventrovec ( 1982) 67 CCC (2d) 1, 12. 
248 See generally D L Mathieson Cross on Evidence (3 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1979) (hereafter Cross 
3 ed) and Cross 4 ed and ELRC Report. For comment on the continued use of corroboration requirements in 
sexual offence trials, see McDonald, above n 53, 47 - 53. 
249 Cross 3 ed 189 - 190. 
250 M Hale History of the Pleas of the Crown I (Professional Books, London, 1971) 635 (originally published in 
1646), cited in Estrich, above n 12, 6. At a Rape Symposium in Wellington in 1982, over half the men (the vast 
majority of whom worked within the criminal justice system) at the Symposium agreed with the statement that 
"rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be defended": Rape Study 8. 
251 See, eg, Professor Glanville Williams The Proof of Guilt 159, cited by CB Cato "The Need for Reform of 
the Corroboration Rule in Sexual Offences" [1981] NZLJ 339. 
252 J H Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common law (3 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1970) Vol 3A, para 
924a, p 736 - 47. 
253 Cross 3 ed 180. 
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civil consequences of the granting of a paternity order were extremely serious.254 As noted 
above, these propositions were not supported by social reality. The main reason for amending 
the corroboration rule in rape cases was that the rule "encourages the false assumption, which 
is insulting and derogatory to women, that women 'are by nature peculiarly prone to malice 
and mendacity and particularly adept at concealing it.' "255 In 1984 the Evidence Law Reform 
Committee ("ELRC") recommended accordingly that the corroboration rule in sexual cases be 
abrogated by statute.256 The corroboration requirement in paternity cases was abolished for 
similar reasons.257 The ELRC also recommended that the term "corroboration" be used only 
in relation to perjury and treason cases.258 In other cases reference should be "in the course of 
a general summing up on credibility, to evidence which tends to confirm or support other 
evidence or which tends to show that a witness is telling the truth because other evidence 
independently confirms it as the truth. "259 The emphasis has changed from a requirement for 
independent confirmation of evidence to a more general assessment of credibility in all the 
circumstances.260 The law of evidence no longer contains a presumption that women have a 
tendency to lie about sexual matters. 
3 Rules of evidence in the employment institutions 
The employment institutions have had, since the earliest days of a specialised industrial 
jurisdiction in New Zealand, the power to dispense with the application of the formal rules of 
evidence (such as corroboration requirements) and the broad discretion to admit such evidence 
as they think fit. 261 In Winstone Clay Products Limited v Inspector of Awards262 the Court of 
Appeal noted:263 
254 ELRC Report paras 62 - 86 pp 19 - 26, and in particular para 66 p 20. 
255 Rape Study 140, quoting J Temkin "Towards a Modem Law of Rape" ( 1982) 45 MLR 399, 417. The 
supporting reasons are summarised in Cross 4 ed para 8. 10 p 179. 
256 The corroboration requirement in cases involving sexual violation was removed bys 23AB of the Evidence 
Act 1908 (inserted by s 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1985. 
257 See ELRC Report para 66 p 20. The corroboration requirement ins 52(2) of the Family Proceedings Act 
1980 was removed by s 4 of the Family Proceedings Amendment Act 1986. 
258 Independent confirmation from some other source of suspect evidence is still required as a matter of law in 
cases of perjury and treason (Crimes Act 1960 s 75( I) (treason) and s 112 (perjury)). In this paper the writer uses 
the term "corroboration" in a broad sense, because the employment institutions themselves have continued to do 
so despite the ELRC recommendation. 
259 ELRC Report, para 19 p 9. This approach was effectively confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Daniels 
[1986]2 NZLR 106, 112, 113. 
260 Cross 4 ed para 8.10 p 179. 
261 In an early case, Seed v Somerville ( I 904) 7 GLR 199, the Court of Arbitration, in considering a workers' 
compensation claim brought by the widow of a deceased worker, admitted hearsay evidence from a doctor and 
the deceased's father as to the cause of an injury, to assist in determining whether an accident arose out of and in 
the course of the deceased's employment. 
262 [ I 984] 2 NZLR 209. 
263 Above, 211, considerings 48(4) of the IRA, one of the predecessors to s 126(1) of the ECA. 
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... [l]t would be most dangerous to overlook the special nature of the Arbitration Court, its purpose and 
its powers. It is not to be assumed that propositions of law, however prestigious and well established in 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal, will apply with the same clear force in the Arbitration Court. 
That is a specialist Court, designed for a specific field. In the matters directed by the statute to come 
before it, it has exclusive jurisdiction, and, when exercising it, must take into account other 
considerations besides legal issues. It is concerned primarily with fairness ... It is not bound by the rules 
of evidence with which we are most familiar. 
The broad discretion is even more relevant in the Employment Tribunal, which is a "low level, 
informal, specialist" body to provide "speedy, fair, and just resolution of differences between 
parties to employment contracts". 264 The discretion available to the employment institutions 
to admit such evidence as they think fit and the abolition of corroboration rules requiring 
independent confirmation of evidence265 should have, but has not, led to a gradual cessation of 
use of the term "corroboration", along with an increasing use of general assessmt.::nts of 
credibility. Continued reliance by the employment institutions on the need for independent 
confirmation of evidence in sexual harassment cases raises the issue of the extent to which 
decision makers are still influenced by the myth that cases with a sexual element are 
"particularly subject to the danger of deliberately false charges. "266 The emphasis on 
corroboration of the complainant's story carries with it a flavour of mistrust. The question 
whether a woman's word is enough to establish that sexual harassment occurred has, in 
general, been answered in the negative by the employment institutions. 
4 The treatment of corroboration in sexual harassment cases 
In AB Ltd the Labour Court said:267 
Evidence called to corroborate allegations of sexual harassment ... is clearly admissible at law if the 
Court in equity and good conscience sees fit to admit it, and if admitted may be challenged in this Court 
only as to its probative value. Evidence said to be corroborative must be carefully weighed for the 
credibility of the witness, and if the evidence is evidence of an alleged statement or complaint, the 
credibility of that statement or complaint itself. 
The Court said that its jurisdiction to admit such evidence as it thought fit "overrides ... the 
operation of the principles governing the admissibility of corroborative evidence that may 
apply in other Courts. The Court however should and does in such cases consider those 
principles. "268 These comments may be interpreted to mean that the Court considered that 
corroboration requirements in cases involving sexual matters were still current in "other 
264 Section 76(c) of the ECA. The statutory discretion of the Employment Court is now contained ins 126(1) of 
the ECA which provides that the Court may "accept, admit, and call for such evidence as in equity and good 
conscience it thinks fit, whether strict legal evidence or not." Section 96 of the Act confers a similar broad 
discretion on the Employment Tribunal. 
265 Cross 4 ed Chapter 8 (Corroboration) paras 8 .1 - 8. 18 pp 171 - 183. 
266 Above n 251. 
267 AB Ltd 766. 
268 Above, 764. 
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Courts" in 1988. This interpretation is reinforced by the manner in which the Court was 
careful to ensure that each of the complainant's allegations was supported by other 
evidence. 269 
A similar approach was taken in A v Z, in which the Tribunal treated corroboration as a 
discrete issue for consideration. The Tribunal noted that there was "little corroborative 
evidence either way" on the competing contentions of the alleged harasser, who said that 
the complainant flaunted a tattoo near her breast to patrons in the bar where they both 
worked, and the complainant, who said that the harasser pulled her top down so that 
patrons could see the tattoo. 270 In considering the complainant's allegation that the harasser 
had on one occasion held up a chippie box and stated, "I bet you wish you had a box this 
big", within hearing of others in the bar, the Tribunal noted that although this incident was 
not sexual harassment,271 it did occur, having been attested to by a third witness. Because 
the harasser denied that it occurred, "[t]he matter had its relevance ... in issues of 
credibility. "272 The Tribunal also noted that the complainant's evidence was supported in 
other aspects by her mother and her partner. 
Such a heavy emphasis on corroboration is not a feature of most personal grievance cases.273 
The comments in AB Ltd and in A v Z indicate that corroboration in the sense of independent 
confirmation is still being required in sexual harassment cases and that the foundation of that 
requirement, the view that women lie about sexual matters, is still an unstated assumption in 
the decisions. This approach was also taken in Yv X Ltd, in which the "recent complaint rule" 
was discussed. 
5 The recent complaint rule 
In cases of sexual offences, the fact that a complaint was made to another person by the victim 
has long had relevance. In the Middle Ages "it was essential that the victim should have 
raised the hue and cry if an appeal of rape were to succeed" .274 The failure to complain within 
a reasonable period once raised a presumption against the complainant, although this is no 
269 Above, 762 - 764. 
270 A v Z 4. 
271 This finding is discussed in Part IVG l "Surrounding circumstances". 
272 A v Z 8. 
273 Although it is fair to say that in some personal grievance cases credibility and the existence of 
corroboration in the sense of supporting evidence is an important issue: see Honda New Zealand Ltd v New 
Zealand Boilermakers' ere Union (1991] l NZLR 392 (CA). It is also fair to say that in other cases, there is 
much less of an assumption that the inherent weakness of the grievant's evidence needs to be supported by 
other witnesses. This assumption is made in sexual harassment cases. 
274 Cross 4 ed para 9.27 p 204. 
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longer the case.275 In criminal cases complaints, to be admissible, must be made as speedily 
as could reasonably be expected.276 Evidence of recent complaint is not evidence of the truth 
of the complainant's story: "If the jury were to consider that the detail had been proved by the 
narration of the complaint, they would be accepting hearsay as evidence of the truth of that 
which was heard" .277 However, the relevance of a complaint is its support of the consistency 
of the complainant's story, and therefore of her credibility.278 It is not corroboration, in the 
sense of independent confirmation, of the truth of the complainant's evidence. 279 
In Y v X Ltd, the Tribunal noted that following an incident in which the complainant, Y, 
alleged that X had showed her obscene photos of himself, Y asked the waitress in charge if 
she could knock off immediately and left. She then attended a party with her boyfriend who 
gave evidence of her distressed condition. The Tribunal described this evidence in the 
following terms:280 
At that party Ms Y unburdened herself to a friend Candy Smith. Ms Smith who is a final year law 
student gave evidence to the Tribunal. 
I must indicate here that while the Tribunal heard evidence subsequently from Ms Smith and from Ms 
Y's boyfriend as to what Ms Y had told them and the advice they had subsequently given Ms Y, I did not 
rely on this evidence of a complaint being made to people in whom she might naturally have been 
expected to confide as being evidence of corroboration of the facts complained of but only in so far as it 
bears on the credibility of her testimony to the facts alleged in that it shows consistency of conduct, or 
otherwise on her part. 
The same applies to the testimony of three other witnesses who testified that Ms Y had complained to 
them about Mr X's conduct. Those three were the Student Job Search official, the official from the 
Working Women's Resource Centre, and the union official from the Service Workers' Union. 
Having referred to these recent complaints, the Tribunal did not actually proceed to analyse 
the extent to which they confirmed consistency of behaviour or credibility on the part of the 
complainant. The recent complaints were ignored by the Tribunal in assessing the credibility 
of the complainant's story. Nor did the Tribunal take account of the evidence given by the 
complainant's boyfriend of her distressed condition that night. While a recent complaint may 
not amount to technical corroboration, since it is not "independent" evidence, the distressed 
275 Above para 9.35 p 208. 
276 Above para 9.33 p 207. Sees 23AC of the Evidence Act 1908 (as inserted bys 3 of the Evidence 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1985. See also McDonald, above n 53, 49 - 53 regarding the application of the recent 
complaint rule in sexual offence trials. 
277 Cross 4 ed para 9 .27 p 204. See also R v Nazif [ 1987) NZLR 122, 126;. R v O'Dowd [ 1985] 1 NZLR 
388n; R v Aramoana [1985] I NZLR 390n. 
278 Cross 4 ed para 9.28 p 205. 
279 Above para 9.36 p 208. In R v Accused [1993] 2 NZLR 286 the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of 
the judge at trial to admit a complaint of sexual abuse made 4 to 5 years after the alleged indecent conduct. 
The Court of Appeal said (288) that this was not a recent complaint, but was admissible to rebut the 
defendant's allegation of recent fabrication and could be taken into account in assessing consistency and 
credibility. 
280 Yv X Ltd 5. 
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condition of a complainant may be corroboration.281 However, the Tribunal ignored this 
evidence. Given the immediacy and number of complaints made by the complainant in this 
case, the Tribunal should have accepted the evidence of the "recent complaints" as being 
broadly supportive of the facts alleged. It had a statutory discretion to do so pursuant to 
section 96 of the ECA; it had a discretion to admit hearsay evidence "in equity and good 
conscience"; the Tribunal is a "low level, informal" body which may accept such evidence as 
it thinks fit; it was dealing with a civil matter, and even in criminal cases the Court of Appeal 
has taken a more flexible approach282 than the Tribunal did in Y v X Ltd. It should not have 
applied technical rules to the complainant's disadvantage. Also of concern is the Tribunal's 
failure to recognise that the point about corroboration was of little significance:283 
Although a complaint is received because it enhances the reliability of the victim's testimony, it does 
not constitute corroboration of his or her evidence, because corroboration must come from a source 
independent of the witness to be corroborated. But this point, which used to be so important, is now 
without importance because of the abolition of the rule of practice requiring the Judge to warn the jury 
of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant in sex cases. 
So concerned do the employment institutions appear to be that women might lie about sexual 
harassment, and so pervasive is the mistrust of complainants, that the rules which must be met 
before a woman's story of sexual harassment will be believed are effectively as stringent as 
those in pre-reform rape cases. To require independent confirmation of evidence is to require 
a complainant to meet an extra element not required of other grievants. This extra element 
makes it more difficult for the party trying to prove her case, particularly when "women don't 
choose to be sexually harassed in the presence of witnesses" .284 Effectively it prevents 
women who are not harassed in the presence of witnesses from establishing personal 
grievances based on sexual harassment. A woman's word is, apparently, never enough. 
C The Standard of Proof in Sexual Harassment Cases 
Proof is when what you say counts against what someone else says - for which it must first be believed.285 
Catherine MacKinnon 
The standard of proof is an apparently value-free, objective and gender-neutral tool of 
decision making. Yet flexible standards of proof, like rules relating to relevance and 
corroboration, enable a decision maker to manipulate the point at which it can be said that a 
fact or proposition has been proven, and therefore whose story, the plaintiffs or the 
defendant's, is accepted as being legally "true". For this reason, the standard of proof may be 
281 R v Paa [1979] 2 NZLR 378 (CA). 
282 Above n 279. 
283 Cross 4 ed para 9.36 p 208 (emphasis added). 
284 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 113 . 
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used as an instrument through which gender bias can influence the outcome of cases, because 
it enables the decision maker to make it harder for a woman to prove her story, and therefore 
to protect men who harass. In this section the writer discusses the application of the standard 
of proof in sexual harassment cases dealt with by the employment institutions, and in 
particular the lowering of the standard of proof by the Employment Court in Z & Y Ltd v A. 
I Function and operation of the standard of proof 
The function of the standard of proof "is to instruct the factfinder as to the degree of 
confidence that our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for 
a particular type of adjudication. "286 The standard of proof allocates the risk of error between 
the parties and indicates the relative importance attached to the final decision.287 In civil 
cases, the standard of proof which must be reached by the plaintiff is proof on the balance of 
probabilities.288 The balance of probabilities, is, however, a flexible standard.289 In T v M,290 
an application for a paternity order, the appellant argued before the Court of Appeal that the 
Family Court judge had lifted the standard of proof above the ordinary civil standard, by 
requiring that the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities be consistent with "the 
seriousness of the allegation". The Court of Appeal did not agree that a higher standard had 
been imposed:291 
... [I]n any evidential context it is logically right for conclusions in the area of inference and judgment to 
be influenced both by the purpose to which they are directed and the significance of the assessment 
being made. Just as there are shades of possibility so the point at which there is satisfaction as to 
probability will vary depending upon the subject matter . ... 
It is the principle of good common sense that the more serious the issue the greater should be the care 
used in assessing it. 
Although the application of the standard varies according to the seriousness of the matter 
before the Court, the standard is said to be a constant. There are no gradations.292 There is no 
"kind of half-way house between proof on a balance of probabilities and proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. "293 Rather, the seriousness of the subject matter before the court requires 
that a greater degree of care be exercised "in estimating whether or not the inference to be 
286 Addington v Texas 441 US 418, 423 ( 1979). See also C D Browning "The Burden of Proof in a Paternity 
Action" ( I 986) 25 J Fam L 357, 359. 
287 Browning, above. 
288 Cross 4 ed Chapter 5 (Degrees of Proof) paras 5. I - 5. I 2 pp I 31 - 143 . 
289 See, eg, Honda New Zealand Ltd v New Zealand Boilermakers' etc Union, above n 273, 395 ; Khawaja v 
Secretary of State/or the Home Department [1983] I All ER 765, 782 - 784. 
290 (1984) 2 NZFLR 326. 
291 Above, 327, 328 (Woodhouse P). 
292 Above, 327. 
293 New Zealand Shipwrights, Coachworkers etc !UOW v Honda New Zealand Ltd [ 1989] 3 NZILR 82 (Labour 
Court) . See also Loveridge v Adlam [ 1991] NZFLR 267, 273 . 
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drawn is probable rather than merely possible."294 Despite the Court of Appeal's advice that 
there is only one standard of proof in civil cases, some courts have expressed the matter in 
terms of a "higher standard of proof' .295 In a personal grievance case in which the grievant 
claimed he had been dismissed because of union activities and had therefore been 
discriminated against, the Labour Court held that "there is no reason for this Court in this case 
to set a higher standard of proof as did the Court in AB in relation to some of the evidence 
which it heard. "296 In discussing the standard of proof in paternity cases, the ELRC said that 
"it is clear that the standard of proof is something more than that required in ordinary civil 
cases"297 and that the leading case298 "elevates the standard of proof considerably. "299 
Whether the matter is expressed as "the degree of kinetic force the evidence must generate"300 
or a higher standard of proof, the effect is the same. If the standard of proof is higher, or if the 
degree of scrutiny applied to the evidence is closer, an extra hurdle is placed in the way of the 
plaintiff or applicant seeking to prove her case. If a greater "quantum of persuasive energy"301 
is needed, the plaintiff or applicant must use more energy in jumping that extra hurdle and the 
task of proving her case becomes more difficult. 
2 Application of the standard of proof in paternity cases to sexual harassment 
cases 
In NID Distribution Workers JUOW v A B Ltd3°2 the Labour Court stated: 
There was no disagreement between the advocate for the union and counsel for the employer that the 
standard of proof to be adopted by the Court in such cases should be at or about the same level as that 
adopted by the Family Court in contested allegations of paternity. 
The headnote for AB Ltd said that "sexual harassment must be proved on the balance of 
probabilities to a similar standard to that in contested allegations of paternity." The "paternity 
standard" was effectively adopted as the appropriate standard of proof in subsequent sexual 
harassment cases. Boast asks " [ w )hy the test for paternity cases, of all things, was thought of 
as appropriate in this context ... ". 303 The employment institutions do not often adopt family 
294 T v M, above n 290, 328. See also Cook v Gibbons (I 986) 3 FRNZ 257, in which McGechan J, 261, attempts 
to explain the process in scientific terms. Honda New Zealand Ltd v New Zealand Boilermakers' etc Union, 
above n 273, is the leading case on the standard of proof in cases of unjustifed dismissal. 
295 Including Goddard CJ in Z & Y Ltd v A, 6. For the sake of simplicity, the writer refers in this section of the 
paper to a "higher standard of proof'. 
296 Post Office Union (Inc) v Telecom (Wellington) Ltd [ 1989) 3 NZILR 527, 548 (Colgan J). 
297 ELRC Report para 69 p 21. 
298 Hall v Vail [ I 972) NZLR 95. 
299 ELRC Report para 72 p 21 and para 66 p 20. 
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301 Cook v Gibbons, above n 294, 261. 
302 [ 1988] NZILR 761 . 
303 R Boast "The Sexual Harassment Provisions of the Labour Relations Act" ( 1988) NZJIR 285, 288. 
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law analogies to assist in an industrial relations context. The two areas of law are not 
considered to overlap to any significant extent. Commenting that the adoption of this test is 
"odd" and "hard to understand", Boast submits: 304 
In view of the ... subsequent discussion of ... Tv M ... (where Woodhouse J made it very clear that in his 
view 'the gravity of the allegation' component was implicit in the test of the balance of probabilities in 
any event) it might have been better for the Labour Court, with respect, to have said that the appropriate 
standard was the ordinary civil standard and to have left it at that. 
The adoption of this standard is odd, unless one fits the imposition of that standard into a 
historical framework of judicial gender bias in the law of evidence. The paternity standard 
itself is based on the same set of sexist assumptions which provided the rationale for the 
corroboration rule in cases involving sex:305 that an allegation of paternity is easy to make and 
hard to refute;306 that women are unreliable witnesses; that women's evidence is particularly 
suspect in cases involving sex; and that sexually experienced women (as a woman applying 
for a paternity order must inevitably be) are particularly prone to lying and are particularly 
good at hiding this talent. It is submitted that these unstated assumptions were also the hidden 
rationale for the Labour Court's comments on the relevance of the paternity standard of proof. 
Once the unstated assumption, that women are untrustworthy and lie about sexual matters, is 
revealed, the adoption of the paternity standard assumes its own perfect, sexist, logic. In 
elevating the standard of proof above the ordinary "balance of probabilities" standard, the 
Labour Court made it harder for women to prove that sexual harassment had happened and 
therefore used the standard of proof as a tool of gender bias. 
The AB Ltd paternity or "serious matters" standard was applied in two recent Tribunal 
decisions: A v z:io7 and Y v X Ltd. 308 In Y v X Ltd the Tribunal found that harassment had not 
occurred and elevated the standard of proof to an even higher level, accepting the employer's 
submission that the Tribunal had to take care that "the evidence addressed and weighed in the 
inquiry is admissible evidence given in the most persuasive manner." 309 The submission, and, 
with respect, the finding, were incorrect. All relevant evidence may be admitted by the 
Tribunal under section 96 of the ECA. The reference to "admissible evidence" was therefore 
misleading. Secondly, there is no requirement that evidence must be given in a "most 
persuasive manner" and no authorities were cited to support this finding. The Yv X Ltd 
standard of proof was extraordinarily high for a civil case, coming close to a requirement for 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The more recent decision in P v S, however, indicated a 
304 Above. 
305 See W Davis "Serious Matters: The Standard of Proof in Paternity Cases " (unpublished LLM Family 
Law seminar paper, July 1993). 
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less stringent test. The Tribunal referred to the submission on behalf of the applicant that 
the standard was "on the balance of probabilities however this really depended on the 
seriousness of the matters placed before the Tribunal. "310 The Tribunal made no reference 
to the paternity standard of proof. 
3 The Employment Court removes the hurdle,· back to the balance of probabilities 
In Z & Y Ltd v A the Employment Court rejected the notion that a higher standard of proof 
was called for in sexual harassment cases. The Court confirmed that the proper standard in a 
sexual harassment case is the ordinary civil standard of proof: proof on the balance of 
probabilities. Before issuing his judgment, Goddard CJ took the unusual step of enquiring 
from Finnigan J, the presiding judge in AB Ltd, as to his understanding of the effect of that 
case on the standard of proof. Finnigan J's memorandum in response is reproduced in the Z & 
Y Ltd v A decision. Finnigan J advised that the headnote of AB Ltd was incorrect; the 
principle adopted in AB Ltd was not the paternity standard, but the statement of principle laid 
down by Woodhouse Pin Tv M(the "serious matters" principle). Unfortunately the wording 
of the headnote and the references to paternity issues in AB Ltd resulted in the adoption of the 
paternity standard. The view that, in sexual harassment cases, the paternity standard, or at 
least an elevated standard, of proof was required by the AB Ltd decision has been taken by 
academics,3 11 Tribunal members,312 and other judges.313 The extent to which this 
understanding has discouraged women from taking complaints of sexual harassment in the 
intervening 5 years between AB Ltd and Z & Y Ltd v A, and the effect of the application of a 
higher standard in the decisions made in that time, is unclear. It seems likely that the error has 
worked to the disadvantage of women. Goddard CJ noted that: 314 
[R]eference to the standard of proof used by the Family Court in paternity suits might not be an 
accessible, appropriate, helpful, or even meaningful analogy to the parties who appear before the 
Tribunal and many of their advisers. In saying this, I should be understood to be trying to express a real 
concern that the scope for misunderstanding seems unacceptably high. 
In clearly rejecting the paternity standard, Goddard CJ also rejected the myth that women are 
untrustworthy witnesses in cases with a sexual element:315 
There is no reason to place in the way of those who say that they have been victims of sexual harassment 
any barriers which start with the premise that the complaint is more likely to be untrue than true. If 
there has to be any preconception, commonsense indicates that the Tribunal will wish to ask itself how 
3io PvS4. 
311 Above n 303. 
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likely the particular grievant is to have elected to undergo the undoubted and foreseeable ordeal involved 
in prosecuting a personal grievance on this ground if the allegation is untrue. The law against sexual 
harassment is there for the protection of the victim, and its protective shield should not be allowed to be 
deflected by extraneous considerations of the effect of the allegation on other persons. They are 
extraneous because Parliament, in enacting the law, must be taken to have had in mind the possibility of 
collateral damage for others. 
His Honour also disagreed with Finnigan J's comments that the standard of care in assessing 
allegations of sexual harassment increased in proportion to the seriousness of the harassment 
alleged.316 Nor did the Court consider it appropriate in sexual harassment cases to adopt the 
approach of the Court of Appeal in Tv M3 17 and in the Honda318 case, that the more serious 
the nature of the allegations and the gravity of the consequences of a finding, the greater 
should be the care in assessing the issue. Goddard CJ noted that there was a distinction 
between cases where, on the one hand, an employee claims that she has been sexually 
harassed by her employer, and, on the other, cases where an employee complains of having 
been unjustifiably dismissed or disciplined by reason of a false or unproved allegation that he 
has been guilty of sexual harassment: 
In the latter kind of case the allegation of sexual harassment is serious in the Honda sense because its 
acceptance has been allowed to affect a person's livelihood. The consequences of the acceptance of that 
allegation for the person about whom it is made are what render it serious in this sense. An employer 
contemplating disciplinary action on this ground should therefore apply the Honda standard to have any 
real prospect of being held to have carried out a fair inquiry. 
In the former case, however, the allegation that an employer has to meet usually takes the form that one 
of its employees has been sexually harassed in that employee's employment. Such an allegation cannot 
be sa id to be any more serious in its consequences for the employer than the more usual allegation that 
an employer has to answer upon a personal grievance that an employee has been unjustifiably dismissed. 
The ordinary civil standard of proof should be applied, without reference to Honda. 
In assessing the seriousness of the consequences for an employer of a finding that sexual 
harassment had occurred, His Honour accepted that there may be a stigma attached to such an 
allegation, but that this was met by ensuring that the alleged harasser received notice of the 
proceedings and the opportunity to be heard. His Honour might also have mentioned that any 
stigma attached to a finding of sexual harassment is likely to be limited in its effect because 
many people do not necessarily disapprove of sexual harassment, despite the fact that it is 
unlawful: 319 
[T]here are many people, especially men, who believe that a sexual harassment complaints mechanism 
is merely a forum for trivial or vindictive allegations against men in circumstances largely provoked by 
the women complainants, and therefore should be done away with . 
316 Above, 7. 
317 Above n 290. 
318 Above n 273. 
3 I 9 Above n 98, 51 - 52. See also Ehrenreich above n 123, 1226. 
LAW LIBRARY 
~ICTORI A UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
54 
It is also difficult to justify the imposition of the "serious matters" approach in sexual 
harassment cases in the light of the very low awards of compensation made to the victims of 
harassment. Even if those awards were more substantial, the imposition of a higher standard 
of proof would not be justified. As the ELRC pointed out in relation to the issue of whether 
the corroboration warning should be retained in paternity cases, the economic consequences 
of a finding of paternity were not a good reason for imposing that "extra hurdle". If it were, 
then in all cases where large sums of money were at stake, for example defamation cases, a 
corroboration warning or a higher standard of proof would be required. 320 
The Employment Court ruling on the standard of proof in Z & Y Ltd v A, and Goddard CJ's 
statements of principle that complainants of sexual harassment "should not be treated at the 
door with scepticism",321 is a positive step towards the elimination of gender bias in sexual 
harassment cases. Unfortunately, as Part IV E indicates, the outcome of that appeal does not 
give cause for unguarded optimism. 
D Credibility 
Society has historically stereotyped women as emotional, unpredictable, impulsive and irrational. The effect of 
such age old stereotypes may be that a woman is presumptively viewed as incredible when she enters a 
courtroom. 322 
ND Rizzolo 
1 Treatment of credibility in sexual harassment cases 
Because sexual encounters do not usually occur in public or in front of witnesses, credibility 
is crucial in cases where sexual harassment is alleged: 323 
A general survey of sexual harassment cases in Canada reveals that most (almost all) of the cases were 
won or lost on the credibility of the witnesses, particularly that of the complainant(s) or respondent(s), 
rather than on any other ground. 
One of the consequences of this emphasis on credibility is that decisions in sexual harassment 
cases are difficult to appeal because "[a]ppellate courts have traditionally accorded generous 
deference to trial judges' factual findings, particularly where the findings involve 
determinations of the credibility of oral testimony. "324 
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The writer contends that gender bias is the rationale behind much of the emphasis on 
credibility in sexual harassment cases, and in particular the myths and unstated assumptions 
we have already identified as being touchstones for the law's treatment of women in cases 
involving sex: that women are unreliable and untrustworthy witnesses and are particularly 
untrustworthy in matters where sexual behaviour is at issue. This emphasis on credibility 
disadvantages women, since conflicts in evidence are likely to be resolved in favour of the 
alleged harasser. Even where the employment institutions find that sexual harassment has 
occurred, the tendency of decision makers to stress the importance placed on a thorough 
testing of the complainant's evidence through cross examination and the detailed explanations 
(which often have an air of apology about them) for preferring the complainant's evidence to 
the alleged harasser's evidence, betray a mistrust of women which is offensive in its 
pervasiveness. This section of the paper begins with comments about the unreliable nature of 
assessments of credibility of witnesses generally, and then discusses the treatment of 
credibility in Y v X Ltd, in which the complainant's allegations of sexual harassment were not 
believed. 
2 Assessment of credibility 
The assessment of credibility of witnesses is generally a hit and miss exercise.
325 In making a 
decision as to whether a witness is credible, the decision maker is required to assess the 
truthfulness (sincerity) of the witness, as well as the reliability of the witness (accuracy of 
perception, memory, and narration).326 This assessment is usually carried out on no greater 
scientific basis than the decision maker's common sense.327 "Common sense" is shorthand for 
the judgment exercised on the basis of one's life experiences, including education, and one's 
values.328 In assessing credibility, decision makers should make a careful examination of the 
consistency of the witness's story measured against "the preponderance of the probabilities 
which a practical and informed person readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in 
those conditions. "329 Yet research indicates that those who make decisions on credibility 
often lack the experience necessary to assess both the truthfulness of witnesses and the 
reliability of those witnesses. The prejudices, myths and discriminatory attitudes of witnesses 
affect the stories that they tell to the courts, and the prejudices, myths and discriminatory 
attitudes of the decision makers in turn affect the way in which the credibility of those 
325 S I Friedland "On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility" ( I 989/90) 40 Case Western 
Res LR 165. 
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witnesses is assessed.330 The tools of assessment of witness credibility are flawed, because 
they place a premium on the decision maker's own prejudices. 
Some commentators do not consider that a flawed system of assessment of credibility is 
necessarily problematic. Friedland concludes that "[t]he realist exposure of biases and 
prejudices may reveal that common sense is not value-neutral, but not necessarily that its use 
is invalid",331 because part of the function of a judicial decision maker is to represent 
community values in the judicial system. The writer accepts that this approach may be valid 
for a community where decision makers are truly representative of the community. However, 
it is not valid where decision makers are not representative, as in the employment 
institutions,332 or where the law is specifically designed to change the values of the 
community, as in the case of sexual harassment law. Relying on common sense, on prejudice 
and intuition, on myths and on unstated and unsanctioned values to assist in decision making 
where the law is trying to eliminate prejudice and myth, will tend to subvert, not uphold, the 
law. 
In assessing credibility, decision makers often rely on demeanour.
333 Many studies have been 
carried out to assess the ability of people to test whether others are sincere or honest or telling 
the truth. These studies indicate that demeanour is generally an unreliable indicator of 
truthfulness and that:334 
[T]o the extent that the experiments show that ordinary people cannot make effective use of demeanor in 
detecting deception, they probably depict a similar inability on the part of jurors, judges, and hearing 
officers in trials. 
Demeanour is an unreliable indicator of the sincerity or honesty of witnesses and it is an even 
more unreliable indicator of accuracy.335 The confidence with which an assertion is made is a 
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major influence on the fact finder's assessment of witness reliability and sincerity. However, 
confidence is an unreliable indicator of the accuracy of witness perception. 336 People often 
make completely incorrect assertions in a very confident manner. What people say, rather 
than how they say it, is a more accurate indicator of honesty and accuracy.337 Nevertheless, 
Wellborn concludes that the consequences of the unreliability of demeanour as an indicator of 
witness honesty and accuracy do not indicate that oral testimony is of no value:338 
It is probably more important that the results of litigation be accepted than that they be accurate. 
Accuracy is merely a factor, albeit a rather important factor, in acceptability. Live testimony may be 
essential to perceptions of fairness, regardless of the real relation between live testimony and accuracy 
of outcomes. 
The writer does not accept this approach because it fails to ask: "Acceptable to whom?" 
From a feminist perspective, diminishing the importance of the accuracy of decisions may in 
itself contribute to outcomes which favour the interests of men and not women. Prejudice, 
intuition and myth in society generally work against women, not in their favour, because the 
prejudices, intuition and myths which count in society are generally male prejudices, intuition 
and myths. The myths perpetuated inside a court room are likely to be the myths of those 
whose perceptions shape society's attitudes and the law. In the context of a gender hierarchy, 
this is likely to be men rather than women. Forgoing accuracy for acceptability in decision 
making is a recipe for the perpetuation of, rather than a challenge to, gender bias. 
The studies summarised by Friedland and Wellborn indicate that assessment of credibility is 
an extremely efficient channel for gender bias in judicial decision making. The emphasis on 
credibility in sexual harassment cases is consistent with historical gender bias in the rules of 
evidence and imposes yet another burden on complainants. The complainant starts out as a 
witness in a judicial system where her femaleness and the fact that the case involves sex 
immediately marks her out as a less reliable witness. Since men and women view facts , 
particularly facts relating to sexual conduct, differently,339 and since most decision makers in 
the employment area are men, as are most harassers, while most complainants are women, it 
follows that the alleged harasser starts off with a better than even chance of having his story 
believed. The harasser's demeanour is more likely to accord with the fact finder's view of how 
a truthful person behaves, and the fact finder's experiences of life and sex are more likely to 
accord with those of the harasser. Where decision makers are not conscious of the unstated 
assumptions on which their assessments of credibility proceed or the possibility of their own 
336 Above, 1089. See also Friedland, above n 325, 185 - 186. 
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gender bias, the chances of success for women whose stories of harassment can be established 
only if the decision maker accepts their credibility, are reduced. 
3 Assessment of credibility in Y v X Ltd 
In Yv X Ltd, the Tribunal's conclusion that there was no sexual harassment and therefore no 
personal grievance was based on the Tribunal's assessment that the complainant was not a 
credible witness. Y, a university student who worked part-time in a restaurant owned by the 
respondent, X, resigned as a result of alleged sexual harassment. Y alleged that X: repeatedly 
asked her out to lunch with him; touched her whenever he spoke to her, and pressed his body 
up against her on occasion; repeatedly told her she was beautiful and asked her if she loved 
him; told dirty jokes, along with one of the other waitresses; asked her to visit him in a back 
room where she found him looking at sexually explicit photos of a male, which he proceeded 
to talke to her about; and made sexually explicit gestures towards her back during a social 
function at the restaurant. 
The only real issue for the Tribunal was credibility. In assessing credibility, the Tribunal 
placed great weight on apparent discrepancies between the written brief of another waitress, 
Elizabeth, and her replies in cross-examination and re-examination. Elizabeth gave similar 
fact evidence that X had also harassed her and corroborated Y's evidence regarding X's 
behaviour. The discrepancies led the Tribunal to conclude that the behaviour was "of a much 
more minor nature"340 than that stated in the brief. Yet the extracts from the transcript quoted 
in the decision reveal no inconsistencies in Elizabeth's evidence about what X did to Y. Nor 
do the examples given of apparent "discrepancies" in Elizabeth's evidence about X's 
behaviour towards Elizabeth herself indicate a lack of sincerity. They indicate rather a minor 
change in emphasis, not a change in her basic story. But even if the discrepancies were major, 
this should not have had any direct impact on the complainant's credibility. The decision 
reads as if the fact that Elizabeth was not believed meant that Y was automatically an 
unreliable witness also. In relation to the incident at the function, Y stated that she leaned 
over a table to cut a 21 st birthday cake, when she heard a lot of laughter:341 
I turned around to see what the laughter was all about and saw X standing very close behind me with his 
hands held out on both sides of, but not touching, my backside. I got the impression he was thrusting his 
pelvis towards me, just the look on his face and the way of the laughter. 
The parents of the person celebrating his birthday, who were sitting nearby, gave evidence 
that they saw no such behaviour. The Tribunal member visited the functions room and 
340 X v Y Ltd 16. 
341 Above, 6 . 
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concluded that the behaviour "was unlikely to have been missed by those in the room" and 
that:342 
Mr X would have been most unwise to behave in such a fashion. In doing so he would have risked 
offending his guests who struck me as representative of the average New Zealand family and who would 
not have been likely to appreciate such behaviour. 
Several questions arise from the Tribunal's decision on this point. Firstly, eyewitness 
testimony is notoriously unreliable; the prejudices and values of witnesses often affect their 
perceptions of events.343 Secondly, the supposition that X might be worried about what his 
guests thought of him seems inconsistent with the Tribunal's earlier finding that X's European 
origin was part of the ethnic setting of the restaurant and that X "played up to his image with 
customers and also that for him English language and customs might not be perfectly well 
understood. "344 X was also able to call on " [a] number of respected members of the legal 
fraternity, including two Queen's Counsel"345 to attest to his good character. This suggests, 
contrary to the Tribunal's finding, that X was able to be very confident that his style of 
behaviour was appreciated by his customers and that he was unlikely to be concerned about 
their perceptions of his behaviour. Nor is there any evidence to support the Tribunal's finding 
that these people were representative of the average New Zealand family, whatever that might 
be, or that average New Zealanders disapprove of lewd behaviour at functions. Thirdly, the 
Tribunal stated that it found that "Mr X did not behave on that occasion in the way described 
by Ms Y."346 Does this mean that the incident did not occur at all, or just not in precisely the 
way Y described? And does this finding include what Y actually saw (his hands held on 
either side of her backside), or just her impression of the other behaviour she was concerned 
about (the thrusting of the pelvis)? Most importantly, does this finding mean that the Tribunal 
believed that Y was making the whole story up? 
In relation to the photo incident, the Tribunal, having found that the birthday function incident 
did not occur, simply stated that that finding "impacts on how I view her evidence with regard 
to the photograph incident."347 In this way, the Tribunal discounts the most serious complaint 
342 Above, 17. 
343 Friedland, above n 325, notes (fn 94) that "[w)itnesses, due to social pressure or other reasons, tend to fill 
in the gaps of their memory through speculation about or modification of what they remember." Friedland 
notes one experiment in which "a 'semi-dramatic' photograph was shown to subjects of varying backgrounds. 
In the photograph, a black male and a white male were standing and conversing. Despite that fact that only 
the white male was holding a razor, more that half of the subjects reported that the black man had been 
holding the razor, and several described the black man as 'brandishing it wildly' .... The study concluded that 
people's expectations and stereotypes cause them to see and remember what they want to see or remember, 
even if the manipulations are not done consciously or in bad faith." 
344 Xv Y Ltd 2. 
345 Above, 14. 
346 Above, 17. 
347 Above. 
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made by Y without ever discussing the parties' demeanour or consistency on this most 
important point. X's version of his behaviour on that occasion was completely unsupported 
by any independent evidence. Y's version was supported by evidence of several complaints 
made by her to others immediately after the "photo" incident348 and the evidence of the 
complainant's boyfriend as to her distressed condition the same night. The Tribunal gave no 
weight at all to this evidence. It concluded that it had "considered carefully the competing 
versions of events, the credibility of Ms Y and Mr X, and how well their stories stood up, as 
well as the demeanour of the witnesses before the Tribunal"349 and "was unable to find on the 
balance of probabilities sexual harassment did occur. "350 
-I Assessment of credibility in other cases 
Doubting the credibility of women complainants is also a consistent theme in several 
decisions in which alleged harassers have been dismissed by their employers. In NZ 
Polytechnic Teachers v Nelson Polytechnic351 the Labour Court described the evidence of 
sexual harassment of students by a polytechnic tutor as "pitiful and totally unconvincing." 352 
The Court, unfortunately, did not relate the evidence nor give reasons for its finding. The 
facts, so important to an assessment of the reasoning in these cases, are hidden. The Court 
noted that the three witnesses in the Nelson Polytechnic case "showed a degree of animosity 
towards Mr Luckhurst" .353 The implication, that animosity leads to a lack of credibility, is 
unwarranted. A degree of animosity by a complainant towards someone who has harassed her 
is entirely understandable, and is perhaps an indicator for credibility. The Court also noted 
that one of the witnesses "read her evidence from a typewritten brief prepared for her ... ".354 
The implication was that this somehow detracted from the credibility of her evidence, but it is 
standard practice in employment law cases for witnesses to read their evidence in chief from 
prepared briefs. 355 In Z & Y Ltd v A Goddard CJ was critical of the complainant's counsel for 
not preparing written briefs, noting that he felt "confident that the provision for confirming a 
written statement has sexual harassment cases particularly in mind."356 In C v L D Nathan the 
Labour Court indicated a similar distrust of the evidence of one complainant who had 
348 See Part IV B 5. 
349 YvX Ltd 14. 
350 Above, 18. 
351 [1991] ERNZ 662. 
352 Above, 667 . 
353 Above. 
354 Above. 
355 As recognised in regulation 49(b) of the Employment Tribunal Regulations 1991 (SR 1991/227) and the 
Employment Court Regulations 1991 (SR 1991 /226) Second Schedule Form 13: "You may give your evidence 
by reading from a typewritten or written brief and swearing or affirming its contents; but should in that case 
supply 3 copies of that brief to the Registrar of the Employment Court." 
356 Z & Y Ltd v A 20. 
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"developed a distrust of men generally and in the witness box displayed great animosity 
towards Mr C". The Court said that "[o]n considering her evidence and considering her 
bearing in the witness box we find it difficult to accept all the specifics of her allegations 
against Mr C".357 
The decision in P v S contains a different treatment of credibility. The element of mistrust 
present in many of the other decisions is absent from P v S. The Tribunal even commented 
that "P was courageous in the giving of her evidence which undoubtedly raised the upset 
and humiliation she had earlier felt. "358 It is fair to say, however, that P's evidence was 
supported by: similar fact evidence from another worker; uncontested hearsay that another 
senior employee admitted that the employer harassed nearly everyone; evidence of recent 
complaints to several other witnesses, including P's mother; and P's mother's evidence of 
a change in P' s behaviour when she started work for the employer, the change disappearing 
soon after she stopped work. The Employment Court's treatment of credibility in Z & Y 
Ltd v A is discussed in Part IV E 3 below. 
5 Summary 
The common evidential denominators in successful sexual harassment claims ( except in the 
Fulton case, where the behaviour was admitted) are the existence of similar fact evidence, 
other supporting evidence, and evidence of recent complaints. In the only unsuccessful35
9 
sexual harassment claim, Y v X Ltd, the similar fact evidence of another employee was 
discredited, and other supportive evidence and evidence of recent complaints was ignored or 
given no weight by the Tribunal. In dismissal cases where harassment was found to have 
occurred, the behaviour complained of (although not its sexually harassing nature) was 
admitted, to a greater or lesser extent, by the harasser or had been confirmed following 
thorough investigations by the employer. 3w In the dismissal cases where harassment was 
357 C v L D Nathan 307. 
358 p V S 2. 
359 With the exception of A v Z, reversed on appeal in Z & Y Ltd v A . 
3w In Northern Butchers' Union v Peach & Vienna Foods Ltd and B v AEU the behaviour was admitted, 
although not necessarily to the degree of seriousness alleged by the complainant. In A v Foods
tuffs (South 
Island) Ltd the harasser admitted touching the complainant, but effectively denied touching her
 on the breast. 
In Hetei v Feltex Woven Carpets & NZ Dairy Food & Textile Workers Union the harasser had been 
previously 
warned for sexually harassing behaviour and was dismissed following an investigation by the e
mployer. When 
the harasser approached the union for assistance, the union carried out its own investigation an
d also concluded 
that the harassment had occurred. In C v L D Nathan there was limited similar fact evidence i
n the form of a 
written statement by a former employee who was overseas at the time of the hearing and there
fore unable to 
give evidence. The alleged harasser had been given a previous warning. There was no corrob
orative evidence 
and the evidence of recent complaint was weak. In Parlane v NZ Police the behaviour appeare
d to have been 
admitted by the alleged harasser and in the Nelson Polytechnic case the facts relating to the alle
ged harassment 
are not given. 
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found not to have occurred, the supportive evidence was limited in amount and scope, or the 
decisions do not provide sufficient detail to make an assessment of how much supportive 
evidence there was.36 1 The message of these cases is that where the case becomes "her word 
against his" , her word is not accepted. Fearing that they will not be believed acts as a major 
disincentive to women seeking a remedy for sexual harassment. 
E Weighing the Evidence: The Employment Court Decision in Z & Y Ltd v A 
The decision of the Employment Court in Z & Y Ltd v A was the result of an appeal by the 
employer from the earlier decision of the Tribunal in A v Z, that the complainant had been 
sexually harassed, and awarding her compensation of $5000. Although A v Z contained 
elements of gender bias, it was a positive judgment from a feminist perspective for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, the amount of compensation awarded was significantly higher than that 
awarded in any previous case. Secondly, the Tribunal effectively found that the complainant 
was more credible than the alleged harasser. In the light of the Employment Court's positive 
statements of principle rejecting the untrustworthy woman myth362 and clarifying that the 
assumption that complaints of sexual harassment are more likely to be untrue than true is 
unjustified, the Court's decision to set aside these findings and to require the complainant to 
go through the ordeal of a second hearing before the Tribunal requires closer examination. 
I Use of feminist method by the Employment Court 
The Z & Y Ltd v A decision is positive from a feminist perspective because of the 
Employment Court's use of social science research, books, and articles363 to assist it in 
reaching its conclusions that women do not have a tendency to lie about sexual harassment 
and find it difficult to complain about sexual harassment "for the very reason that it involves a 
confrontation with the person who has effectively wielded a reign of terror over [the 
victim]. "364 The tenacity of advocates in presenting, and the willingness of decision makers to 
accept, women's stories of and social science research about sexual harassment enabled the 
legal claim of sexual harassment to be first established and then developed. MacKinnon's 
ground-breaking work Sexual Harassment of Working Women. A Case of Sex Discrimination 
was constructed around women's stories and has been cited extensively by US courts365 as 
361 C v L D Nathan and the Nelson Polytechnic case. 
362 See Part IV C 3 above. 
363 Z & Y Ltd v Z 23. 
364 Above, 15. 
365 Some of these cases are listed in Fechner 485 n38 . See also Blackwood 1012. 
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well as the Supreme Court of Canada in Janzen v Platy Enterprises.366 The approach of the 
Employment Court is consistent with the application of feminist legal method in the law:367 
Feminist legal method starts with the very radical act of taking women seriously, believing that what we 
say about ourselves and our experiences is important and valid ... The reason, MacKinnon asserts, that 
feminism has been able to uncover reality previously hidden from social view is "its methodological 
secret, ... that feminism is built on believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men." 
2 The failure to cross-examine 
The Employment Court's approach is flawed, however, because it failed to apply feminist 
method consistently. The most serious grounds for appeal368 were that the respondent's 
counsel failed to cross-examine several witnesses called for the appellant, that the evidence of 
these witnesses was not contradicted, and that the finding was against the weight of the 
evidence. These witnesses included current and past employees of the appellant company and 
a character witness, the alleged harasser's solicitor. Some of the past and present employees 
gave evidence that they had not seen any incidents of inappropriate behaviour by the 
appellant, with the implication that if there had been, they were likely to have noticed it.369 
Some witnesses also said that they saw no sign of the respondent being bullied or victimised 
by Z, nor had they noticed any tension arising out of such behaviour. At least one of these 
witnesses also gave evidence that Z always behaved in a respectful manner towards women.
370 
The Tribunal found that these witnesses were impressive and that their evidence carried 
significant weight. However, it noted:371 
[F]irst, a fine reputation is not of itself a guarantee there is not another side of a person's character. 
Secondly, the majority of the witnesses called, were employed by the respondent. 
Thirdly, some expressed personal animosity or, at least, were very critical of the applicant. 
Fourthly, none was present to see or witness any incidences, other than the two called by the applicant. 
Fifthly ... there was no evidence that any of the witnesses for the respondent were under emotional 
strain, which is clearly the position for both the applicant and Witness 'T', which could render them more 
vulnerable. 
366 [1989] l SCR 1252. This is discussed by Gallivan 53 fn 135 and also by J Brockman "Social Authority, 
Legal Discourse, and Women's Voices" (1992) 21 Man Ll 213. Brockman explains that LEAF (Legal 
Education and Action Fund), a women's group, filed a factum in the Supreme Court of Canada in the Janzen 
case referring to the work of MacKinnon and Aggarwal. Dickson CJC used and quoted from these sources. 
367 Littleton 764. 
368 This paper does not discuss all the grounds of appeal. It should be noted, however, that the Court 
accepted that the personal grievance had been taken incorrectly against the alleged harasser personally rather 
than the actual employer, a registered company and exercised its discretionary powers under ss 138 and 140 of 
the ECA to join the company as a second respondent and to validate the Tribunal proceedings (18). 
369 Z & Y Ltd v A 22 - 23. 
370 Above, 24 - 25. 
371 A v Z, above, 9. 
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The Court held that the Tribunal's approach was wrong. This was important evidence, 
because it was directed to a negation of the very propositions which the Tribunal accepted. 372 
While the Tribunal was not bound to accept the evidence of the appellant's witnesses, it 
should not have rejected it without good reason373 "because the respondent, by not challenging 
it in the usual way, must be taken to have accepted it or not contradicted it." 374 Goddard CJ 
went on to say: 375 
A witness called by a respondent or defendant may contradict, directly or indirectly, evidence given for 
the applicant or plaintiff. Is it necessary to cross-examine such a witness since it may already be clear 
inferentially that his or her evidence is not accepted? The answer is yes, if it is intended to invite the 
Tribunal to reject that evidence. Without cross-examination, the Tribunal would have no basis for 
rejecting it in the absence of one of the exceptional situations mentioned by Phipson .... 
The Court found that the bases on which the Tribunal rejected the evidence of these 
employees and former employees - that the incidents could have happened without these 
witnesses seeing them, or that the witnesses were untrustworthy because of present or past 
economic dependence on Z or bias against A - were never put to these witnesses. The effect 
of the failure to cross-examine was to leave before the Tribunal two conflicting, but 
apparently credible, stories. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's finding was against the 
weight of the evidence "not in the sense that the evidence was one way, but rather in the sense 
that the unchallenged evidence accepted by the Tribunal could not logically lead to the result 
which emerged. "376 
3 Weighing the Evidence 
Having found defects in the Tribunal's decision, the Court then assessed whether those defects 
were sufficiently serious that the decision could not stand and found that it could not. In 
reaching its decision on this point, the Court does not use feminist legal method, but reverts to 
traditional methods of legal reasoning. As the following analysis shows, the use of these tools 
enabled gender bias to influence the Court's decision firstly, as to what factors were relevant 
to its assessment of the seriousness of the defects, and secondly, what weight should be given 
to those factors. The use of feminist method in weighing the evidence may well have led to a 
different result. Goddard CJ signals the deliberate alteration in method by saying: "I have 
taken into account all the literature on the subject but also have to give weight to conventional 
wisdom about the assessment of evidence. "377 In determining whether the Tribunal's decision 
372 Z & Y Ltd V Z 23. 
373 "Good reason" is discussed in the judgment at 22 . 
374 Above, 21. 
375 Above, 22. 
376 Above, 25 . 
377 Above, 28 (emphasis added). 
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should stand, the Court noted that favouring the respondent was the fact that she proved her 
case even despite the imposition of an unnecessarily high standard of proof, and the strong 
unlikelihood of her making up such a story. The main factors favouring the appellant are 
discussed below. 
(a) Complaint 
A did not mention the alleged harassment to anyone. The Court says that "it seems reasonable 
to expect some mention of this behaviour if it went on unremitting for 18 months or to expect 
someone to have noticed some signs of oppression of this kind even without being told. "378 
When A did finally write it down, after the employment was over, she "gave it no prominence 
at all. "379 Yet women's well-documented reluctance to complain about sexual harassment 
leads to the conclusion that it would not be reasonable,380 from a women's perspective, to 
expect A to have complained (either to the alleged harasser or to anyone else). The Court's 
expectation brings to mind the former presumption in rape cases against the credibility of a 
rape complainant who did not complain within a reasonable time.381 This approach is also 
inconsistent with the Court's own earlier comment, discounting the evidence of some of the 
appellant's witnesses that they were surprised that the respondent never complained about the 
alleged treatment, because it "pref err[ ed] to attach more weight to the well known 
phenomenon that many victims are reluctant to complain."382 In the most well-publicised 
instance of sexual harassment since the problem was named, Anita Hill kept silent about 
sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas for nearly a decade before "mentioning" it:383 
She never filed because Professor Hill is no different from countless others who have been sexually 
harassed; who fear retaliation or fear that they won't be believed and will be further humiliated with no 
remedy for the discrimination they have experienced. 
A consistent feminist analysis would have led to the Court concluding that the failure to 
complain was totally consistent with the existence of sexual harassment, and was therefore not 
a factor which favoured the appellant. 
378 Above. 
379 Above. 
380 See the articles listed inn 123 above regarding the gendered nature of the concept of reasonableness in 
sexual harassment law. 
381 Cross 4 ed para 9.27 p 204. 
382 Z & Y Ltd v A 23. 
383 A J Leibman "Doubting Thomas: Sexual Harassment Truth and Consequences" ( 1992) 65 S Cal LR 
1441, 1443. There is a considerable body of academic writing supporting Anita Hill's story, and disbelieving 
Clarence Thomas's story. See, eg, T Morrison (ed) Race-ing Justice. En-Gendering Power. Essays on Anita 
Hill, Clarence Thomas and the Construction of Social Reality (Chatto and Windus, London, 1993) and the 
articles in ( 1992) 65 S Cal LR. 
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(b) Lack of corroboration 
The Court said that the failure to cross-examine meant that A's counsel accepted the evidence 
that the numerous incidents alleged were unlikely to have taken place without being seen, and 
none were seen. Feminist legal method, on the other hand, would have treated this evidence 
as irrelevant because, as Aggarwal notes, 384 "as a general rule, sexual encounters do not occur 
openly in public." This point is discussed further in (c) and (d) below. 
(c) Similar fact evidence 
The Court found that similar fact evidence regarding other workers was "weak and 
contradictory" 385 and there was little of it. The treatment of similar fact evidence in Z & Y Ltd 
v A effectively puts in place an extra hurdle for complainants. This is unfortunate, since the 
Court was careful to remove the hurdle of the higher standard of proof. The rule relating to 
similar fact evidence is the rule "which prevents a party, usually the prosecutor, from leading 
evidence showing the discreditable disposition of the other, usually the accused, as derived 
from his discreditable acts, record, possessions, or reputation" .386 Similar fact evidence may 
be admitted in exceptional cases, however, when it has a "strong degree of probative force" :387 
This probative force is derived, if at all, from the circumstance that the facts testified to by the several 
witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they must, when judged by experience and 
common sense, either all be true, or have arisen from a cause common to the witnesses or from pure 
coincidence. 
The Employment Court in Z & Y Ltd v A said that the "safe rule for the Tribunal is that in all 
fairness it can rely on evidence of facts said to be similar if there is a real and striking, as 
opposed to a superficial or unimpressive, similarity with the central allegations. "388 The 
employment institutions in sexual harassment cases had previously taken a broad approach to 
the admission of similar fact evidence. A "striking similarity" was not required. In AB Ltd 
the Labour Court allowed similar fact evidence by a former employee that she and another 
worker had been touched on the bottom by the manager and had had offensive things said to 
them.389 The Labour Court referred to its discretion to admit such evidence as it thinks fit and 
noted that this discretion overrode the operation of the principles governing similar fact 
evidence. 390 Similar fact evidence was also admitted in P v S and Y v X Ltd. 
384 Aggarwal 140. 
385 Z & Y Ltd v A 28. 
386 Cross 4 ed para I 3.1 p 347. 
387 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421,444 (HL) per Lord Wilberforce (emphasis added). 388 Z & Y Ltd v A 27. 
389 AB Ltd 764. 
39° Contained at that time in s 303( I) of the Labour Relations Act 1987. 
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In A v Z the Tribunal admitted similar fact evidence of a kitchen hand who said that she had 
been subject to unwanted touching on the buttocks.391 The Tribunal found the evidence of 
this witness impressive and was satisfied that what happened to her was both repeated and 
unwelcome. The Employment Court, on the other hand, said that this evidence was "weak 
and contradictory" and that "it seems more striking in its difference from than its similarity to 
the conduct alleged. "392 Backhouse has criticised the imposition of too onerous a degree of 
similarity before treating evidence in sexual harassment cases as similar fact evidence, noting 
that requiring a "striking similarity" before accepting evidence of sexual behaviour towards 
other employees as similar fact evidence "is likely to eliminate the usefulness of this legal 
doctrine in sexual harassment cases. "393 If assessing whether there is a "striking similarity" 
depends on experience and common sense, as Lord Wilberforce noted, and decision makers 
are male, the experience and common sense which will count are male experience and 
common sense. Gender bias may therefore influence decisions as to whether similar fact 
evidence will be admitted in sexual harassment cases. For this reason the broad approach in 
AB Ltd is preferable to the narrower approach recommended by Goddard CJ in Z & Y Ltd v A. 
( d) Character 
The character of the alleged harasser seemed to be an important factor in the Court's 
determination. The appellant was the manager of a tavern owned by a company of which he 
was the principal shareholder. He is "prominent in his industry's pressure group and in the 
administration of his sport, and belongs to a service organisation. He is, in short, a well-
known popular figure in Wellington and naturally values his good name." A feminist analysis 
would have emphasised facts, not reputation, as being a more reliable indicator of truth: 
"sexual harassers are not dirty old men getting some cheap thrills, they are your 'average 
decent bloke', trying it on."394 In weighing the evidence, the Court makes the extraordinary 
untested assumption that "[i]t is not unreasonable to expect a man of the appellant's age and 
long business career to have left a clearer trail if inclined to act generally towards women in 
an inappropriate way as was suggested. "395 There is no evidential or scientific basis for this 
"reasonable expectation". Fitzgerald describes the atypical case of Richard Berendzen, former 
President of the American University, a "nationally renowned public figure, a noted physics 
professor, and a charismatic leader"396 who was forced to resign and pleaded guilty to making 
391 A vZ8 . 
392 Z & Y Ltd v A 27. 
393 Backhouse 14 7 . 
394 Steele No Laughing Matter 23. 
395 z & Y Ltd v A 9. This comment amalgamates the relevance of evidence of Z's character and of the lack 
of similar fact evidence. 
396 L F Fitzgerald "Science v Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings" (1992) 65 S 
Cal LR 1399, 1406 - 1407 . 
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obscene telephone calls from his university office. Because his victim's husband was a police 
officer, she was able to tape and trace the telephone calls. As Fitzgerald points out, without 
this evidence, the victim would not have been believed and the outcome would have been 
different. Fitzgerald goes on to say:397 
Some harassers are blatant; others are subtle. Some are well-known, whereas others may escape 
detection for years, as victims fear to complain. In many cases, the shame and pain of sexual 
harassment prevents women from sharing their experiences with one another, [which] increases the 
likelihood that a woman may be harassed over a long period of time without the knowledge of 
colleagues and co-workers ... The body of evidence suggests that there is no 'typical' harasser. 
( e) The behaviour of the complainant 
The Court's j udgment focuses on the behaviour of the victim, rather than on the behaviour of 
the alleged harasser. For example A and her partner visited Zin hospital and gave him a card 
and present. The Tribunal found that this behaviour "was consistent with courtesy to a boss 
whom she respected in part, and described as good at times. "398 The Court, on the other hand, 
found that this favoured the alleged harasser. The Court also mentions that A got her friend to 
work there without a word of warning, however indirect. This factor was not mentioned in 
the Tribunal decision. The Court does not state why these factors were relevant or why they 
favoured the appellant. The Tribunal's approach is more consistent with women's 
experiences: 399 
You feel naked. You feel that you (yes, you) have made some ghastly mistake, sent the wrong signals, 
led him along. At first you try to pretend it didn't happen. You may do what I once did and keep lifting 
his hand off your knee as if it were some object that happened to fall there. You may even maintain the 
fiction of friendship for years, because anything is better than being demoted, in your own mind, to a 
deletable four-letter word. 
Section 29( I) of the ECA puts the focus on the harasser's behaviour. What did Z in this case 
allegedly do? First, he allegedly touched A on the breasts and between her legs in his office. 
Secondly, he allegedly made crude statements such as holding up a beer bottle and saying, "I 
bet you wish you had this up your box." Thirdly, when at the bar he allegedly used to say 
quiet things to her which could not be heard by others but were demeaning eg "you useless 
bitch". Fourthly, he allegedly held up an empty chippie box at the bar and said, "I bet you 
wish you had a box this big". 400 
397 Above, 1407. 
398 A v Z, 10. 
399 B Ehrenreich "Women Would Have Known" (Time, 21 October 1991, Time International New Zealand 
Ltd, Auckland, New Zealand) 31. 
400 This incident is discussed with references to the relevance of "surrounding circumstances" in Part IV G l. 
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The fourth incident was independently attested to by a third witness and was effectively 
unchallenged by the appellant's counsel, yet the Employment Court does not mention this 
grossly offensive behaviour, which gives the lie to the assertion that Z always behaved with 
respect toward women. Proof of this incident should also have added strength to the 
respondent's assertions about other similar behaviour. Nor does the Court discuss the 
respondent's claim that the offensive remarks made at the bar by the harasser were made 
quietly. This should have been surely relevant to the Court's concern that other workers did 
not notice the behaviour, since A said that these remarks generally could not be heard by other 
workers. Focussing on the behaviour of the victim rather than the alleged harasser in 
weighing the evidence leaves greater room for gender bias to affect decisions. This is true of 
consideration not only of what the victim says, but how she says it. Discussion of the victim's 
evidence in Z & Y Ltd v A contains a tone of doubt: 401 
The respondent's evidence was quite vague, devoid of particulars as to time and place, and characterised 
by generalities about what the appellant "would" do instead of specifics as to what he actually did do . 
Yet Ross notes that "[a] problem sexual harassment victims face is that many women have a 
'powerless' speaking style that makes them less credible as witnesses than those using a 
'powerful' style. "402 In the Bell case, the complainant's testimony during the hearing differed 
slightly from the details of the complaint when it was first made (like Elizabeth's in Yv X 
Ltd). Backhouse notes that:403 
It is understandable that a board which is forced to choose between the credibility of conflicting 
witnesses will seize on these evidentiary problems as indications of exaggeration and inaccuracy. 
However, there are ... problems with Shime's judgment. Firstly, he seemed to be insensitive to the 
trauma which surrounds sexual harassment ... To disbelieve sexual harassment complainants because 
they do not appear objective, rational and collected may be unfair. 
Goddard CJ recognises that "conventional wisdom about the assessment of evidence .. . 
sometimes penalises diffident witnesses ... ".404 Since judges are "conventionally" men, and 
women are often diffident witnesses, the use of conventional tools to weigh evidence allows 
gender bias to affect the outcome of sexual harassment cases. Even relatively powerful 
women are not believed. Let us consider again Anita Hill, Professor of Law at the University 
of Oklahoma:405 
401 Z&YltdvA25. 
402 S D Ross "Proving Sexual Harassment : The Hurdles" (1992) 65 S Cal LR 1451, 1455. See also JM 
Conley, WM O'Barr & EA Lind "The Power of Language : Presentational Style in the Courtroom" (1978) 
Duke Li 1375, 1380 - 1381 and 1386. 
403 Backhouse 148. 
404 Z & Y Ltd v A 28. 
405 C Sanger "The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man" (1992) 65 S Cal LR 1411. 
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Her testimony was graceful and firm and was supported by a superb panel of four corroborating 
witnesses, 'witnesses to die for' ... But never mind, Thomas denied all of it and was confirmed by the 
Senate 52 votes to 48. 
If Anita Hill was not credible, faced with the denial of a powerful man, what woman ever 
could be? Significantly, the tone of doubt and mistrust present in judicial consideration of 
complainant's stories is largely absent from consideration of the credibility of other women 
employees who give evidence that they were not harassed. In Z & Y Ltd v A the Court gave 
weight to the fact that several of the alleged harasser's supporting witnesses were bank 
officers, "and so [were] presumably reliable and responsible people."406 In C v L D Nathan 
Ltd the evidence of other women working in the area that they "found nothing 
objectionable"407 and that the alleged harasser had not harassed them "seemed to be given less 
weight than the two women witnesses called to support the harasser". 408 In Y v X Ltd the 
Tribunal gave weight to testimony from other employees who denied that they had ever seen 
any such behaviour from X or had been made uncomfortable by his actions" on the basis that 
these young women "worked in the same kind of situation, and in the same kind of power 
relationship" ,409 yet found the evidence of Elizabeth, a supportive witness for the complainant, 
not credible. This tendency to give greater weight to the evidence of women who have not 
been harassed illustrates the way in which the legal system accepts those facts which fit a 
male perspective of events, and discredits women's experiences. The Employment Court's 
approach in Z & Y Ltd v A conforms to this pattern. 
In Z & Y Ltd v A the Court also criticised the Tribunal for holding that the fact that some 
witnesses were employed by the appellant affected the weight which should be given to their 
evidence, along with the fact that they were critical of the respondent, because these 
propositions were not put to those witnesses. 410 Yet Goddard CJ, in reviewing the evidence of 
these witnesses, takes precisely the same approach earlier in the judgment, commenting 
that: 411 
I have avoided mentioning any witness still employed in the premises at the date of the hearing before 
the Tribunal because it is a well known phenomenon that when an allegation of sexual harassment is 
made there is a tendency for polarisation of employee views, depending on personal experiences and 
individual preconceptions, about this highly emotive subject. 
The effect of the Court's approach appears to be that, while the Court can take into account 
women's stories, social science research, and "well known phenomena", the Tribunal can not. 
406 Z &Y Ltd v A 24. This is a classic "untested assumption". 
407 C v L D Nathan 307 . 
408 Coleman "Trade Union Perspective" 298. 
409 X v Y Ltd 17. 
410 Z & Y Ltd v A 23 . 
411 Above, 25. 
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This inconsistency may have resulted from the Court's adoption of both feminist and 
traditional legal reasoning at different points in the judgment. 
4 The Burden of Proof 
Men use their power as employers and as men to sexually harass women. In Xv Y Ltd and A 
v Z, the complainants, a waiter and a bar person, were not powerful people. The alleged 
harassers were powerful, and, because of that, were able to call on witnesses likely to impress 
the Tribunal, who attested to the alleged harassers' good character and good behaviour toward 
young women. Witness after witness gave very similar evidence on behalf of the alleged 
harasser (apparently unchallenged by counsel for the complainant in either case). The 
complainants had supportive evidence, but little of it. Given the inequality of power in these 
situations, it is unfair for decision makers to view credibility as a numbers game. In accepting 
this approach, the employment institutions allow precisely the same hierarchies and power 
constructs which enable men to harass women in the first place, to enable men to win their 
cases in court. By effectively endorsing these tactics, the employment institutions have made 
it very difficult for women workers to win cases of harassment against their employers. 
Is statutory reversal of the burden of proof the answer to this problem? Before Z & Y Ltd v A 
the employment institutions proceeded on the basis that the burden of proof was on the 
applicant throughout, with a heightened standard of proof. By comparison, in an unjustified 
dismissal case the burden is effectively on the employer to show that the dismissal was 
justified on the balance of probabilities:412 
... [A]lthough an initial onus in the legal sense may be said to rest upon a worker ... to put forward a 
prima facie case of grievance that initial responsibility is likely to be sufficiently satisfied once the fact 
of the dismissal has been established together with the surrounding circumstances which are relied upon 
as reason for the complaint of unjustified dismissal. At that stage the evidential burden will properly 
shift to the employer if only for the reason that in the absence of any contrary evidence the complaint 
would usually be accepted. 
In a dismissal case, then, the burden of proof is placed on the party which is in the more 
powerful position in the employment relationship. In attempting to remove some of the 
hurdles for women in sexual harassment cases, the Employment Court in Z & Y Ltd v A 
appeared to recognise this, stating that:41 3 
[I]nstead of having to prove the circumstances pointing to the worker's sense of unfair treatment relevant 
to showing a dismissal to be prima facie unjustifiable, the employee has to give some evidence that the 
behaviour was unwelcome or offensive to the worker and was either repeated or, although not repeated, 
412 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Ltd [ 1982] ACJ 663, 666 (CA). See also the 
cases cited in Horn, above n 197 para 27. I O(b ), p IC I I. 
413 Z & Y Ltd v A 9. 
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so significant as to affect detrimentally the employee's work environment. Once that is done, the 
evidential burden will shift in the way described and for the reasons given by Woodhouse P. 
Thus, with respect to the elements of, firstly, unwelcomeness and offensiveness, and secondly, 
repetition or detriment, once the complainant raises some evidence of these matters, the 
burden will then shift to the respondent to show that the behaviour was not unwelcome or 
offensive to the complainant, and was nor repeated or detrimental to her. This approach is 
helpful to a limited extent, but does not solve the problem that women are not trusted in 
sexual harassment cases. In most dismissal cases, other than constructive dismissal cases, the 
threshold issue, the fact of dismissal, is admitted by the employer. Proof of this fact will not 
be a problem. But the threshold issue in sexual harassment cases is not unwelcomeness, 
offensiveness, repetition, or detriment, but whether the sexual behaviour complained of 
actually happened. This, unlike the fact of dismissal, is unlikely to be admitted and is very 
difficult to prove. Goddard CJ does not say on which party rests the burden of proving 
whether sexual behaviour actually occurred, and whether that burden shifts at any stage. His 
remarks therefore leave room for confusion on this point, particularly in the light of the 
decision in Post Office Union (Inc) v Telecom (Wellington) Ltd. 414 The Labour Court 
determined that the burden of proof in that case, a discrimination case where a failure to act, 
as opposed to a positive act, was alleged, the burden of proof remained with the applicant 
throughout. 
Backhouse notes that "onus of proof rules are critical to the resolution of most [sexual 
harassment] complaints"415 and concludes that the inherent difficulties of proving a sexual 
harassment complaint suggest that reverse onus legislation may be required. The success of 
sexual harassment complaints under the ECA provisions should not depend on whether the 
harasser is confident enough of his position that he concludes he can harass women in public, 
or on whether the complainant is farsighted enough to complain about the harassment at the 
earliest possible opportunity, or is lucky enough to have a witness to the harassment. Unless 
decision makers are prepared to trust women and believe their stories, legislation reversing the 
onus of proof in sexual harassment cases may be necessary. 
5 The Employment Court decision in Z & Y Ltd v A: overall positive, or overall 
negative? 
Despite the Employment Court's failure to acknowledge women's reality consistently 
throughout the decision, the decision in Z & Y Ltd v A contains several positive elements 
414 Above n 296, 546. The Court also noted (546) that the question of onus of proof in sexual harassment cases 
was not authoritatively determined in AB Ltd 
415 Backhouse 149. 
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for women. The Court's acknowledgement of gender bias and the need to remove legal 
hurdles to the victims of sexual harassment, along with its rejection of the untrustworthy 
woman myth, will be influential not only in the Tribunal but also at workplace level. For 
A, however, the judgment requires her to relive her ordeal, or abandon any attempt to get 
justice. This is a dilemma which many victims of sexual harassment will face until gender 
bias in the employment institutions is eliminated. 
F Interpreting the Legislation 
The interpretation of the actual words contained in the sexual harassment provisions in the 
ECA has not always been consistent with the object of the provisions, which is to recognise 
that sexual harassment is an injury to women workers and is unacceptable behaviour. In this 
section the writer discusses the interpretation of "detrimental effect" in B v Amalgamated 
Engineering Union Jnc4 16 and, in Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd,417 the adequacy of an 
employer's response to co-worker harassment with reference to the requirement that an 
employer take "whatever steps are practicable" to prevent a repetition of such harassment. 
The writer considers the way in which those interpretations were used to justify findings that 
sexual harassment did not occur. 
1 Detriment 
Why should we, as women, accept workplace behaviour that actually harms us, simply because it isn't perceived 
as hannful by men?418 
Abby Leibman 
To establish sexual harassment, a complainant must establish that offensive sexual behaviour 
was "either repeated or of such a significant nature that it [had] a detrimental effect on that 
employee's employment, job performance, or job satisfaction." In B v AEU, an unjustified 
dismissal case brought by the alleged harasser, the Tribunal found that although behaviour of 
a sexual nature took place, sexual harassment had not occurred because there was no 
detrimental effect on the complainant's employment. The complainant, K and the alleged 
harasser, B, were both employed as organisers by the respondent union. K and another male 
colleague were walking through the reception area of the office when B commented that the 
two had been walking together arm in arm and flirting madly. K, who gave evidence that she 
had, for a period of months, put up with verbal sexual harassment from B, responded with 
words to the effect "that a man is an appendage of a penis. "419 B then took hold of K around 
416 [1992] 2 ERNZ 554 (AET, A Dumbleton). 
411 [1992) 2 ERNZ 38 (AET, C Hicks). 
418 A J Leibman, above n 383, 1442. 
419 Above, 557. 
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the shoulders, pulled her towards him, and roughly kissed her on the side of the head. After 
considering the matter for 2 days, K made a written complaint. B was eventually dismissed 
by the respondent union for misconduct, being sexual harassment of K as defined in section 
29 of the ECA. The Tribunal followed the employer's approach and confined itself, in 
deciding whether sexual harassment had occurred, to a consideration only of the statutory 
definition.420 
The Tribunal found that the words used by B about Kand her colleague walking arm in arm 
and flirting madly were "not expressly of a sexual nature. They describe the everyday 
conduct of people of the same and opposite sexes and of all ages from the very young to the 
very old carried on in public at all times."421 The Tribunal missed the point that B was making 
a comment, admittedly relatively mild in the writer's opinion, about K's sexual behaviour. 
Making such comments is conduct of a sexual nature. The Tribunal also found that other 
jokes and words used by B were discrimination on the grounds of sex, not sexual 
harassment.422 However, the Tribunal does not indicate what these jokes and words were, so 
it is not possible to assess whether the Tribunal failed to recognise a sexual element in that 
behaviour also. The Tribunal did find that the unwelcome kiss was conduct of a sexual nature 
and that K found it offensive. However, the Tribunal went on to say:423 
In my view of the evidence the conduct of Mr B was significant but it has not been established to my 
satisfaction that it was so to such a degree that it had a detrimental effect on Ms K's employment. Mr 
B's conduct had an immediate effect on Ms K which caused her to be embarrassed, offended, angered, 
and to suffer other emotional distress. It will be a question of degree depending on the circumstances of 
different cases as to how deep-seated or long-lasting such effects may be. Ms K was personally affected 
by the conduct of Mr B but it is the consequential effects of that conduct on her employment that are 
relevant. My assessment from the evidence of this case is, in weighing up the significance of Mr B's 
conduct and the effects of it on Ms K, that she did not suffer such detrimental effect. There is no 
evidence that her job performance or job satisfaction has suffered. 
The Tribunal's treatment of the concept of detriment is confused and tends to trivialise sexual 
harassment. The Tribunal simply failed to see that sexual harassment harms women. Firstly, 
the Tribunal emphasised that, in order to show sexual harassment, there must be some effect 
on K's employment. The Tribunal said that "both complainants were upset by the conduct. 
However, more than upset is required under the definition of sexual harassment. It is the 
consequences of that upset on the performance of the employment that must be 
established. "424 This emphasis is misleading, because it does not make it clear that sexual 
harassment occurs where there is a detrimental effect not just on employment or job 
performance, but also on job satisfaction. The Tribunal mentioned, but failed to give equal 
420 Above, 562. 
421 Above, 564. 
422 Above. 
423 Above, 565 - 566. 
424 Above, 566. 
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prominence to, job satisfaction. It did not discuss what job satisfaction is.425 It saw no link 
between the emotional distress suffered by K and the effects of the behaviour on her job 
satisfaction. Yet the facts that K was "personally affected" and considered the matter for 2 
days before complaining are, in the writer's opinion, clear evidence that K's job satisfaction 
was detrimentally affected by the behaviour. Secondly, the Tribunal displays sexism in 
failing to recognise that "upset" had a legal consequence: damage to K. It appears that men's 
injuries result in "damage", "humiliation", or "injury to feelings". When women suffer an 
injury, however, they are merely "upset". 
Thirdly, the Tribunal found that since B was suspended shortly after the incident, "any more 
harmful effects on her work were fortunately not realised."426 This approach confuses the 
existence of detriment with the degree of detriment. The removal of the harasser does not 
automatically remove the harm suffered. At best it removes the prospect of repetition of the 
harassment. Was K able to switch off the embarrassment, anger and emotional distress as 
soon as B was suspended? Did she never again recall the incident as she walked through the 
reception area? Did she not continue to be embarrassed in front of other staff who witnessed 
the incident? Did the incident never again come into her mind as she prepared to advocate an 
industrial agreement, or to act on behalf of a union member who had been sexually harassed at 
work, or sat with her male colleagues in the tea room? 
Behaviour is "significant" under section 29( l )(b) if it causes detriment to the complainant. 
The "significance" of the behaviour is determined not by reference to any objective standard, 
but by reference to whether it caused detriment to the complainant. Section 29(1 )(b) speaks of 
behaviour "of such a significant nature that it has a detrimental effect ... ". It does not speak of 
behaviour that is significant and has a detrimental effect. Once there is evidence of detriment 
to the complainant's job satisfaction, sexual behaviour is, by that very fact, established as 
significant for the purposes of section 29 and it follows that sexual harassment has occurred. 
If the detriment suffered is minor, this may affect the job consequences for the harasser or the 
remedies awarded to a complainant, but it does not affect the determination as to whether 
sexual harassment occurred. Yet the Tribunal's reasoning,427 and its conclusion, indicate that 
the Tribunal assessed "significance" by reference to some "objective" standard ie the 
425 The writer considers that job satisfaction is the enjoyment and sense of fulfilment a person gets as a result 
of doing their job. In relation to the Tribunal's finding that K was "personally affected" but that her job 
satisfaction did not suffer, compare the description in MacKinnon Sexual Harassment (83 - 87) of findings in 
early US decisions that sexual harassment was not actionable because it was a "personal" matter: "Personal 
... is usually used as if it conclusively renders legal remedies unavailable, as if to the extent an occurrence can 
be described as personal the person has no legal rights"(84) . 
426 B v AEU 566. 
427 Particularly in the passages cited in n 423 and 424 above. 
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perceptions of the Tribunal itself, and not, as the statute requires, with reference to the effects 
of the behaviour on K. 
Fourthly the Tribunal failed to appreciate that detriment also occurs because sexual 
harassment reduces women at work to the status of sexual objects. Being treated as a sex 
object is discrimination on the grounds of sex, which is ipso facto detrimental to a woman's 
job satisfaction:428 
When we leave our homes to go to work, we assume an impersonal role like "teacher", "secretary" or 
"judge." We may even don a special costume (black robes, skirted suit) to get the point across: 
"This is the public me - not the morn.my or the sweetheart or the wife, but the secretary or the judge." 
To be sexually harassed, even verbally, is to have that robe ripped off and the pearls torn from around 
your neck. The message of the harasser is, You're not a secretary, judge, whatever. Not to me you 
aren't. To me, you're a four-lener word that this magazine refuses to print. 
B's actions had the effect of reducing K's standing in her workplace as a professional with 
equal status to him. His actions showed K that her real status - which he ( or any other man) 
had the power to invoke at any time - was that of a sexual object. The Tribunal's adoption of a 
male perspective meant that it missed this point entirely. MacKinnon's analysis that sexuality 
is by its nature coercive in our society may explain why it is so difficult for many men to see 
why and how sexual harassment harms women. Where women see coercive sexual behaviour 
resulting in detriment to the victim, men see normality:429 
[I]f rape is very like normal intercourse, it is, further, no mystery that convictions are so difficult. If 
most men do similar things all the time, on what grounds should this individual man be sent to jail? 
Similarly with sexual harassment: if unwanted sex imposed by a man upon a woman who is in no 
position to refuse only expresses the usual situation in unusually vivid terms, on what grounds should it 
be illegal? 
Several Tribunal decisions state that sexual harassment is about power, not sex, as if the two 
were mutually exclusive concepts. In A v Z, for example, the Tribunal notes that most of the 
behaviour described was "certainly sexual in context, even though I might comment they 
appear to relate more to power issues ... rather than unwelcome, lustful attentions ... ".430 In P 
v S the Tribunal notes the submission of counsel for the applicant that the employer's 
behaviour "although of a sexual nature was perhaps not lustful but part of his exercise of 
power in the workplace."431 The erroneous implication is that, if the harasser did not intend at 
the end of the day to rape the complainant, there was no detriment, or less detriment. Or if the 
harasser did not really want to sleep with the complainant, but only wanted to embarrass and 
humiliate her and reduce her to the status of a sex object, there was no detriment. Or if the 
428 Ehrenreich, above n 399, 31. 
429 MacKinnon Sexual Harassment 220. 
43o A v Z 6. 
431 p V S 4. 
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harasser is a co-worker, and not an employer, the detriment is less because there is no visible 
power relationship. What the "power" paradigm ignores is the reality that "sexuality, as 
socially constructed in our society through gender roles, is itself a power structure." In our 
society, sex is about power and power is often about sex:432 
[W]hen men sexually harass women it expresses male control over sexual access to us . It doesn't mean 
they all want to fuck us, they just want to hurt us, dominate us, and control us, and that is fucking us . 
They want to be able to have that and to be able to say when they can have it, to know that. That is in 
itself erotic. 
A different approach was taken in Hetei v Feltex Woven Carpets Ltd and NZ Dairy Food and 
Textile Workers Union, in which the Labour Court found that the "integrity and dignity [of the 
victims] as women is, in our view, seriously - indeed intolerably - compromised by behaviour 
of a sexually harassing character. "433 The conduct in Hetei included deliberately contrived 
physical contact, often accompanied by sexually connotative remarks and innuendo, but there 
was no particular evidence of detriment. The Court appears to have assumed that women 
being subjected to such treatment would inevitably have suffered detriment. A similar 
approach in B v AEU would have led the Tribunal to assume that treating a woman as a sexual 
object at work inevitably results in detriment to her job satisfaction. A more purposive 
approach to the interpretation of "detrimental effect" would be to establish a rule that, the 
complainant having established unwelcome and offensive behaviour of a sexual nature, a 
presumption of detriment arises. The burden of proving that there was no detriment would 
then fall on the alleged harasser. Application of the Employment Court's directions on burden 
of proof in Z & Y Ltd v A may have a similar effect, and may result in cases such as B v AEU 
being decided differently in future. The Tribunal's inability in B v AEU to recognise and 
understand that sexual harassment harms women also indicates the need for further education 
for Tribunal members on the nature and effects of sexual harassment. 
2 Section 36: "Whatever steps are practicable" 
Section 36(2) of the ECA requires an employer to take "whatever steps are practicable" to 
prevent a repetition of sexually harassing behaviour on the part of a co-worker of the 
complainant or a customer or client of the employer. If a complaint is made and such steps 
are not taken, and the harassment is subsequently repeated, the employee has a personal 
grievance "by virtue of having been sexually harassed in the course of the employee's 
employment as if the request or behaviour were that of the employee's employer ... ".434 The 
complainant in Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo had been harassed by other workers, not directly by 
432 MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified 89 . 
433 [ 1990] 3 NZILR 132, 152. 
434 ECA s 36(3) . 
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the employer. They tricked her into uttering obscenities over the paging system. The 
employer requested the other staff to stop the behaviour, but made it clear to her that he found 
the behaviour amusing. The Tribunal found that the complainant had been constructively 
dismissed and that sexual harassment had occurred, but that the complainant did not have a 
personal grievance because the employer had taken "all practicable steps" to prevent a 
repetition of the behaviour. This finding is important because Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd is 
the only Tribunal decision which deals with section 36 of the ECA in any detail, and therefore 
affects the way in which employers applying the legislation will assess their responsibilities 
under section 36. 
The finding itself is open to question. Although the employer took some steps to ensure that 
the behaviour would not occur again and obtained an undertaking from the employees 
responsible that no further such behaviour would occur,435 he also made it clear that he 
considered the harassment to have been "only a joke" and told the Tribunal that he still found 
the "joke" amusing:436 
By condoning the behaviour even though he had taken steps to see it did not occur again he was telling 
Ms Fulton that she ought to accept such behaviour if she was to "fit in". Couple this to his repeated 
series of questions as to why she would stay in an environment she did not like and Mr Wills' behaviour 
tips over that fine line between asking a person to consider their position and making it clear to them that 
their face does not fit and that they ought to go. 
He also told the complainant that she had "no right to tell my staff to change their attitudes. 
That is my job. "437 The Tribunal found that something of the employer's attitude no doubt 
conveyed itself to the complainant. Although the Tribunal appreciated that the employer was 
in a position to set the standards of behaviour in a workplace in relation to the constructive 
dismissal grievance, it failed to extend this finding to the claim of sexual harassment. Yet by 
continuing to find the harassment amusing, and by letting other staff know this, the employer 
was not only making it impossible for the complainant to continue working in the workplace, 
he was also contributing to the likelihood that the offensive behaviour would reoccur. 
Condoning sexually harassing behaviour is not taking "whatever steps are practicable" to 
prevent repetition of the harassment. A sounder basis for a finding that there was no personal 
grievance in this case would have been that sexual harassment was not repeated after the 
complaint was made (and therefore section 36 did not apply). 
435 [ 1992] 2 ERNZ 38, 46 .. 
436 Above, 47 - 48. Emphasis added. 
437 Above, 44. 
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G According Relevance to Particular Facts 
In determining cases where sexual harassment is alleged, the employment institutions have 
sometimes accorded relevance on the basis of untested or unstated assumptions about the 
culture of the workplace, the personality and behaviour of the complainant, her motives for 
bringing the action, the personality and behaviour of the alleged harasser, and the conduct of 
the relevant union. These factors are discussed below. 
I The surrounding circumstances 
In C v L D Nathan Ltd there were two specific incidents of harassment in the meat unit of a 
supermarket in Kilbimie.438 These incidents resulted in the dismissal of the alleged harasser, 
who brought a personal grievance action claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed. One 
incident, in November 1987, resulted in the transfer of the complainant from the meat unit to a 
different area of the store. That complainant was unable to give evidence as she was overseas. 
The second complaint was "more serious" .439 In February 1988 the manager called a meeting 
of the meat packers in the meat unit at which the other meat packers complained about the 
victim's poor work performance and attitude. The Court noted that "[a]t that meeting the 
young lady made no complaints concerning Mr C of a sexual nature",440 as if it were 
surprising that a complainant would be reluctant to raise such a matter in front of a meeting of 
people who were criticising her work performance. After the meeting the complainant gave a 
week's notice. She was then interviewed by the staff supervisor and complained about 
harassment by C. The Court did not accept the complainant's evidence but found that 
"frequent references of a sexual nature - often jocular and sometimes possibly not"
441 were 
made in the meat unit. The Court went on to conclude:442 
[T]hat there were remarks of a sexual nature, possibly of a rough nature, and also possibly of a jocular 
nature from time to time. In this Mr C was by no means alone. To the contrary, the other female meat 
packers found nothing objectionable and spoke well of Mr C but not so well of the other butcher ... In 
short, the remarks from time to time of at least two of the butchers were below a reasonably acceptable 
standard. We consider, however, that they fell short of sexual harassment so far as Mr C was concerned. 
It is not clear from the decision what relevance the Court considered that the workplace 
culture had to the complaint of sexual harassment. The Court's remarks may have been made 
by way of explanation of its finding that the complainant was not credible. Alternatively it 
may have been indicating that any suggestion that the general atmosphere in the workplace, as 
opposed to the specific incident of which the victim complained, did not constitute harassment 
438 Although the judgment does not say what actually happened. 
439 C v L D Nathan 307. 
440 Above, 306. 
441 Above, 306. 
442 Above, 307. 
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in the nature of a "poisoned workplace". Or the Court may have been saying that whether 
behaviour is acceptable may depend on the surrounding circumstances. It was this latter 
interpretation which was adopted by the Employment Tribunal in A v Z.443 In that case, the 
complainant was a bar employee in a hotel. The alleged harasser was her boss. The Tribunal 
cited C v L D Nathan Ltd as authority for the principle that "in a case such as this, all the 
surrounding circumstances have to be taken into account" :444 
The Labour Court ... observed that the context of the alleged behaviour had to be taken into account and 
this was a situation in which there was evidence of frequent references of a sexual nature, often jocular 
and sometime (sic), possibly not. There was also evidence of a variety of other female employees who 
did not find what occurred to be offensive to them . 
Although in A v Z the Tribunal found that sexual harassment had occurred, it used the 
"surrounding circumstances" factor to find that the "chippie box" incident did not constitute 
harassment. The Tribunal accepted that the incident took place as the applicant described it 
but went on to say:445 
It was, however, in the context of what might be described as ribald banter in a pub, of a nature in which 
the applicant acknowledged she, albeit stupidly, had partaken in a very similar way. In itself that is in 
isolation (sic), I am of the view that that incident does not fall accordingly, within the definition of 
sexual harassment. 
With respect, it is not at all clear that the Labour Court in C v L D Nathan decided that the 
"surrounding circumstances" have to be taken into account in determining whether sexual 
harassment occurred. That is only one of several possible interpretations of the Court's 
comments about the nature of the meat unit in that case. However, even if the Court was 
saying that, it was wrong. The relevant questions under section 29(l)(b) of the ECA are 
whether behaviour "of a sexual nature" occurred (an objective test); whether the behaviour 
was offensive or unwelcome to the complainant (a subjective test); and whether detriment 
occurred (a mixed "subjective/objective" test). By importing an additional requirement that 
the surrounding circumstances must be looked at, the Tribunal indirectly substituted an 
objective test for the subjective test of unwelcomeness or offensiveness established by the 
plain words of the statute. The fact that other employees did not find the behaviour 
unwelcome or offensive is not relevant. The fact that the employee worked in a bar as 
opposed to a law office is not relevant. Indeed, to find that the "surrounding circumstances" 
are relevant is to entrench sexist notions of acceptable behaviour and to undermine the object 
of the legislation, which is to change current standards of workplace behaviour. The 
provisions of section 29 of the ECA are intended to validate the standards of complainants of 
harassment, not to allow harassers to find refuge in the lowest common denominator of 
443 Although in that case the Tribunal found that harassment had occurred. 
444 AvZ7 . 
445 Above, 8. This incident is described in Part IV B 4. 
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behaviour. Blackwood446 identifies the same judicial attitude in Rabidue v
 Osceola Refining 
Co. Judge Keith, dissenting, noted that "the majority suggests ... that a woman
 assumes the 
risk of working in an abusive, anti-female environment":
447 
[T]he evaluation of the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct by adopt
ing the perspective of a 
reasonable person begs the question because ... prevailing attitudes do no
t universally condemn sexually 
harassing behaviour. It leads .. . to the tautology that if society allows the behav
iour, it is not actionable. 
The purpose of sexual harassment law, however, is not to perpetuate exis
ting mores that pennit 
harassment of and discrimination against women but to establish new mo
des of conduct. 
In taking into account the complainant's behaviour on another occasion, wh
en she held up a 
chippie box and said: "What do you think of the size of my box?",
448 the Tribunal in A v Z 
also failed to recognise that women in a hostile work environment often fe
el pressured to 
adopt the "prevailing standards" of behaviour. This may be done, not beca
use women enjoy 
such behaviour or find it acceptable, but as a defence mechanism which en
ables them to cope 
with that hostile environment:449 
Many women joke about sex to try to defuse men's sexual aggression , to 
try to be one of the boys in 
hopes they will be treated like one. This is to discourage sexual advance
s, not to encourage them . 
The Tribunal's decision in A v Foodstuffs (South Island) Limited,
45 0 unlike the A v Z finding, 
recognises the legislative policy that the prevailing climate in the workplac
e does not justify 
women having to put up with offensive behaviour. This finding is consiste
nt with the 
wording of the ECA provisions and promotes the objects of the legislation.
 The Tribunal 
said:451 
Before I conclude this decision I feel I must say something further about 
the general climate in the 
workplace ... While I suspect some of the evidence might have overstated
 somewhat the degree of verbal 
and physical actions with a sexual content that occurred in the warehouse
 from time to time nevertheless 
it is clear that such an element was, and presumably still is, present. 
While it is possible these activities are acceptable to a large number of em
ployees, even a substantial 
majority, at least to Mrs B, and surely a number of others, they were not. 
Because this is seen as being 
the norm in this workplace a number of the company's employees have s
uffered in silence. That is not 
something they should have to do. They should be able to retain their dig
nity while they are engaged in 
their place of work. 
446 Blackwood 1009. 
441 Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co, above n 115, 626. Blackwood summarise
s Judge Keith's conclusion ( I 009). 
448 A v Z 4. The complainant said, in relation to this incident: "I was stupi
d - he was crude." 
449 MacK.innon Feminism Unmodified 112. Gallivan (45) notes the comme
nts of a woman who worked in a 
road gang (Watt v Regional Municipality of Niagara ( 1984) 5 CHRR D/24
53 (OHRC)) who describes this 
phenomenon as follows : "In order to be accepted by them [the male emp
loyees] you have to put yourself at their 
level and then when it comes time to go home, then you go back to yours
elf' : (D/2454). 
45o [1993] 1 ERNZ 81. 
451 Above, 104. 
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2 The behaviour of the complainant: blaming the victim 
Section 35 of the ECA provides: 
Where a personal grievance involves allegations of sexual harassment, no account shall be taken of any 
evidence of the employee's sexual experience or reputation. 
Although section 35 should have largely eliminated cross examination of complainants as to 
their sexual experience or reputation, in several cases the Tribunal discusses the behaviour of 
the complainant in a manner which reinforces sex role stereotypes about acceptable behaviour 
for women and sometimes uses these stereotypes either to find that sexual harassment did not 
occur in a particular situation or to reduce the effectiveness of remedies. In C v L D Nathan 
the fact that the complainant was under considerable stress in her private life and had 
"developed a distrust of men generally" detracted from her credibility as a witness. As 
Coleman points out, these comments indicate a lack of understanding of the nature of sexual 
harassment and its effects and "seem to be barely a step away from 'oh she does not have any 
sense of humour.' "452 
In B v AEU the complainant's position as a union organiser was found to minimise the 
detriment she had suffered. The Tribunal took into account K's "occupation as an organiser 
both with the respondent and with other unions, which is likely to have left her better 
equipped than many to handle the personal effects of dissension and confrontation in dealings 
with others. "453 This extraordinary finding is completely unsupported by any evidence and 
conflicts with earlier findings that K was humiliated and upset by the harassment. The 
Tribunal cites no literature or evidence to show that a person who works in conflict situations 
is better able to deal with being personally sexually harassed than other workers. Indeed, 
someone who is used to being able to exert control over a situation may find the loss of 
control of her personal integrity even more disturbing than others, especially if she is the only 
woman, or one of only a few women, in a predominantly male workplace:454 
A woman struggling to establish credibility in a setting in which she may not be, or may not feel, 
welcome, can be swept off balance by a reminder that she can be raped, fondled, or subjected to repeated 
sexual demands. 
This finding also conveys the attitude:455 
452 Coleman "Trade Union Perspective" 297. 
453 B v AEU 566. 
454 K Abrams "Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms" (1989) 42 Vand LR 
1183, 1208. 
455 Pollack 65. Pollack, discussing the court's assessment that the complainant in Rabidue v Osceola Refining 
Co (above n 115) was "capable, independent, ambitious, aggressive, intractable, and opinionated", notes that the 
complainant in that case was "enough like a man so that her claim of injury cannot be taken seriously." 
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[T]hat sexual harassment is a woman's personal problem and that she must bear the responsibility to 
protect herself. With the focus again on the woman's conduct, her personality as well as her speech and 
dress are subject to scrutiny. 
In Xv Y Ltd the employer was said to have harassed the complainant with persistent requests 
to go out to lunch. The Tribunal's response was that "[t]here may have been requests for 
lunch dates. Ms Y said she was always too busy. An outright rejection might well have 
ended this difficulty."456 This response indicates a "blame the victim" mentality and a lack of 
understanding that sexual harassment is the meeting place of gender inequality and 
employer/employee inequality. In A v Z, the Tribunal noted that the complainant had suffered 
a traumatic attempted rape some months prior to the harassment. The Tribunal noted that she 
was therefore "emotionally vulnerable" and that the respondent was aware of that. The 
Tribunal does not explain the relevance of this evidence, but appears to have used it in the 
complainant's favour, as if it made the actions of the employer in sexually harassing her more 
blameworthy. The Tribunal also admitted evidence from the alleged harasser that the 
complainant had a tattoo on her breast and that she would flaunt it to male patrons of the bar. 
The exact relevance of this evidence is also not explained. However, the Tribunal did note 
that if that evidence "is intended to refer to the employee's reputation and it is by no means 
clear that it was, then s 35 directs me to take no account of it."457 
Section 29(1)(b) provides that sexual harassment occurs where offensive or unwelcome sexual 
behaviour takes place "whether or not that is conveyed to the employer or representative", 
recognising the difficulties which women sometimes experience in stopping sexual 
harassment. In focussing attention on the victim's response instead of the harasser's actions, 
the employment institutions have paid less attention to the wording of the statute and more 
attention to myths and sex stereotypes. This is gender bias. 
3 Character of the alleged harasser 
In Par/ane v NZ Police458 the Labour Court used the personality of the alleged harasser to 
support a finding that he had been constructively dismissed. Mr Parlane was a record/mail 
clerk with the NZ Police. In 1991 a woman police constable complained that on two 
occasions he had sexually harassed her. These incidents followed an earlier complaint by 
another officer in 1990 which had been dealt with informally. The court describes the 1991 
incidents in the following terms: 
456 X v Y Ltd 17. 
457 Above, 9. The evidence on this point is discussed in Z & Y Ltd v A 10. 
458 [1991] 3 ERNZ 721. 
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One of these incidents was alleged to have occurred in the police station and the other outside it, in full 
view of the public. She alleged that there had been some physical contact, but, although it was minimal 
on each occasion, she nevertheless found it offensive. She was not unduly distressed as a result of these 
incidents but spoke to her supervising officer for the purpose of getting something done to put a stop to 
this type of behaviour by Mr Parlane. 
The officer in charge concluded that there was a prima facie case of indecent assault. He 
informed Mr Parlane that no charges would be laid, but that there would be an inquiry into the 
circumstances of the harassment and a consequent dismissal recommendation was likely. Mr 
Parlane then resigned and later claimed that he had been constructively dismissed. The court 
accepted that the two complainants had been offended by the behaviour but found that the 
evidence established that "any degree of sexual harassment on his part was minimal or 
virtually non-existent."459 The court does not indicate exactly what happened. However, 
behaviour which offends two police constables sufficiently for them to complain is, in the 
writer's opinion, unlikely to be "minimal" or "virtually non-existent" sexual harassment. But 
having dismissed the injury as unimportant, the court then use Mr Parlane's personality to 
support its finding that he was constructively dismissed:460 
However, his actions appear to us to be those of a naive and immature young man, with little self 
confidence, who has experienced difficulty in establishing normal social relationships with people 
generally, and not only with members of the opposite sex. Such a person is inherently sensitive and very 
vulnerable to threats, either express or implied. 
Although the Court took into account the feelings of the male harasser, it ignored the effect of 
the harassment on the women complainants. In this decision sexual harassment is treated as 
though it is not a real injury and as though it does not harm women. 
-I Conduct of the union 
Decision makers also seem to have been influenced by the way in which unions acting for 
complainants have taken up cases. The tone of some decisions indicates that, in the opinion 
of the decision maker, the union has pursued complaints of sexual harassment too vigorously. 
In AB Ltd the Labour Court criticised the union's advice to the worker to leave her job as:461 
(!]II-considered and precipitate ... We would not like to encourage a view that an allegation by a worker 
of sexual harassment is sufficient ground for abandonment of employment ... [W]e think that the union's 
reaction to the worker's complaint was headstrong and unnecessarily antagonistic. 
In AB Ltd the employer had sexually assaulted the worker who was so "terrified" at being 
alone in the workplace with her employer that she had asked her boyfriend and mother to 
459 Above 725 . 
460 Above 726. 
461 AB Ltd 768. 
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come and be with her. The union's advice appears to have indicated a healthy concern for the 
welfare of its member. The Labour Court's criticism of this approach makes it difficult for 
unions to advise members as to the appropriate course of action to take where harassment 
occurs. In Y v X Ltd the union threatened to picket the employer's premises, but was 
eventually restrained by a High Court injunction. The Tribunal said that the union's actions 
were inappropriate.462 
In Parlane v New Zealand Police the Labour Court criticised the union for failing to represent 
the harasser and said it was a "bad case"463 of the union failing to act. This case may be 
contrasted with the decision in Hetei, in which the union's comprehensive investigation of the 
background to the alleged harasser's dismissal was described as careful and comprehensive.
464 
Judicial criticism of the appropriateness of the union's behaviour has been visited on the 
complainant, even though the manner of dealing with her complaint was outside her control. 
The implication that unions have overreacted to complaints of sexual harassment also seems 
to trivialise sexual harassment. 
5 The complainant's motives for making a complaint 
A further irrelevant consideration mentioned in A v Z was the complainant's motives for 
bringing her action. The employer alleged that the harassment did not occur, and that the 
employee made the allegations because she was "after money"; "seeking to avoid a stand-
down period with Social Welfare"; "subject to a neurotic fantasy" ; and "trying to save 
face" .465 It is submitted that the Tribunal should simply have ruled that the complainant's 
motives for bringing a claim of sexual harassment were irrelevant. Yet the Tribunal goes on 
to discuss the merits of these submissions on behalf of the respondent. 
The adjudicator found that although the complainant "was stressed with both the aftermath of 
... [an earlier] attempted rape trauma and current personal relationship issues, I did not find 
any evidence of neurosis. "466 This finding appears to have been made in the absence of any 
expert psychological evidence. The Tribunal also found that the complainant was in a 
favourable financial position and was therefore not "after money" or "seeking to avoid a 
stand-down period with Social Welfare." The Tribunal failed to make the point that, even if 
the complainant was "after money" or had mixed motives for bringing the action, this was 
irrelevant. The relevant questions were whether she was sexually harassed and, if she had 
462 Y v X Ltd 11. 
463 Par/ane 726. 
464 Hetei 153. 
465 A v Z 9. 
466 Above 10. 
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been, what was the appropriate level of compensation. Backhouse notes that "[t]o suggest that 
the seeking of compensatory damages is an improper motive seems somewhat absurd. Surely 
every civil litigant is motivated by the desire to obtain compensatory redress for wrongful 
conduct."467 Yet the Tribunal in A v Z used the complainant's motive for bringing the action 
as being "to stop the behaviour, not to make a monetary windfall", as somehow being relevant 
to the amount of compensation which should be awarded.468 "Nice women" are apparently 
more concerned about their reputations than their job and financial security. 
467 Backhouse 149. 
468 A v Z 10. 
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V SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
Until the more powerful own the responsibility for prejudice, it will continue to cripple us alI.4
69 
Gloria Steinem 
Gender bias in the treatment of sexual harassment cases by the employment institutions is 
pervasive, deep-seated and unacceptable. Identification of gender bias does not involve the 
allocation of blame. It does involve a call for change. Some suggestions for change to 
enhance the effectiveness of the sexual harassment provisions in the ECA follow. 
A A Culture Change in the Tribunal 
The sexual harassment provisions in the LRA made sexually offensive behaviour in the 
workplace explicitly unlawful for the first time. The law was designed to enhance women's 
right to job security and dignity at work and to change attitudes about sex and work. As with 
any law which purports to change behaviour, particularly laws which aim to make 
discrimination unlawful, the attitudes of the decision makers responsible for applying the law 
are crucial to its success. The way in which judicial discretion is exercised can "make or 
break" the effectiveness of statutes designed to remove gender inequality in society. An 
earlier example of this in employment law is demonstrated by the respective attitudes of the 
employment institutions firstly, to the implementation of the Equal Pay Act 1972 and 
secondly, to the establishment of the personal grievance jurisdiction in 1973 .
470 
Orr's research indicates that the failure of the Equal Pay Act 1972 to bring about a more 
equitable ratio between men's and women's earnings in New Zealand is partly explained by 
the gender bias of the employment institutions. The Arbitration Court failed to use its 
statutory power471 "to state, for the guidance of parties in negotiations, the general principles 
to be observed for the implementation of equal pay"
472 and insisted on a standard of proof that 
discrimination existed which was "seemingly closer to that used in criminal proceedings than 
the standard normally adopted in civil cases."473 The Court also read down the provisions of 
the Act in reaching a finding that the Act did not provide for the principles of equal pay for 
469 G Steinem quoted in K Reardon "The Memo Every Woman Keeps in Her Desk" (Harvard Bu
siness 
Review, Boston, Massachussets, USA, Vol 71 No 2, March-April 1993) 16, 22 . 
470 Section 117. Under s l l 7(4)(e) the grievance was considered by a grievance committee, but co
uld be 
referred to the Court if not settled. Changes were made to the procedure by amendments to the
 IRA in 1983, 
I 984 and I 985, and by the LRA. The current procedure is found in Part III of and the First Sch
edule to the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 . 
471 Later transferred by the IRA to the Industrial Commission. 
472 Although the Committee on the Progress of Equal Pay in New Zealand commented that such a
 statement of 
principles would have been "extremely helpful in the early stages of implementation" : Progress 
of Equal Pay in 
New Zealand (Report of a Committee Appointed by the Minister of Labour, Wellington, October
 1975) para 
5.196 p 61. 
473 Above, para 8.71 p 49, referring in particular to New Zealand Retail Butchers' Case [ 1974] BA 1
53. 
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work of equal value. Orr notes that the Court, in reaching the conclusion that the Act was not 
intended to apply universally, misquoted the title of the Act and adopted an interpretation 
which ignored the wording and punctuation of section 3(1 ).474 Overseas research indicates 
that in equal pay cases, complaints heard by tribunals which include a woman are more often 
successful than those heard by all male panels.475 The short-lived Employment Equity Act 
1990 wisely provided for an independent Employment Equity Commissioner to oversee the 
implementation of that legislation.476 The effect of the Arbitration Court's refusal to promote 
the objects of the Equal Pay Act has rendered that legislation useless as a means of achieving 
pay justice for women. That need not have happened. 
The court's response to the Equal Pay Act may be contrasted with its response to the new 
personal grievance jurisdiction established by the IRA, which for the first time empowered the 
employment institutions to decide whether dismissals were substantively justified.477 The 
Arbitration Court established several important principles which were not apparent from a 
bare reading of the legislation and which gave effective legally-backed employment security 
to workers for the first time. The reversal of the burden of proof478 was an important 
departure from the normal rule that the burden of proof falls on the party bringing an 
application and recognises the need to reduce the power imbalance between employer and 
employee. The Court also developed the concept of constructive dismissal, where an 
474 E Orr, Submission to the Labour Select Committee considering the Employment Equity Bill 1989. Orr 
summarised ( 13 - 14) the record of the Arbitration Court in equal pay decisions: 
I . The Court failed to provide a set of guidelines or principles under section 9, and gave minimal 
guidance when asked for assistance. 
2. It made a number of awards and registered a number of collective agreements which did not fully 
comply with the Act. 
3. The Court determined only one set of equal pay rates, and that after four hearings and using the 
formula from the 1960 not the 1972 Act. 
4 . When the Labour Department or unions sought the Court's help in amending awards it failed to 
identify and remedy discrimination apart from one case where no less that six unions protested at the 
alleged infringement. 
5. It did not find discrimination in any of the four cases brought on behalfof individual women, three of 
the cases being brought by the Department of Labour. 
6. Even if its decisions relating to alleged breaches of the Act were correct the procedures and reasoning 
by which it reached those decisions are open to question. 
7. It fulfilled its responsibilities of interpreting the Act under Section l 2(d) by reading Section 3( I), one 
of the central sections of the Act, in such a way as to render the Act inoperative with respect to awards 
and collective agreements. 
475 "In equal pay cases [under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) and the Equal Pay Act I 970 (UK)], 
success rates were substantially higher where panels included a woman, both with full-time chairmen ( 40% rather 
than 25%) and with part-time chairmen (25% rather than 8%). In Scotland, where there was a full-time chairman 
and a woman on every panel, the success rate was 42%": A M Leonard Judging Inequality. The Effectiveness of 
the Industrial Tribunal System in Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Cases (The Cobden Trust, London, 1987) 
137. 
476 Section 5. Repealed bys 4 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 1990. 
477 At common law the relevant query was simply whether the correct period of notice had been given: A 
Szakats law of Employment (Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) para 30. l pp 295 - 296. 
478 See Part IV E 4 above. 
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employer's conduct forces a worker to resign
479 and developed a requirement that dismissals 
must be carried out in a procedurally fair manner.
480 The influence of these judicially 
developed principles on the personal grievance procedure was made apparent in a study of 
nearly 600 dismissal appeal cases heard under the LRA. Three quarters of the dismissals were 
found to be unjustified, most of these on the grounds of procedural unfairness. 481 
With respect to sexual harassment cases, one Tribunal member has expressed "grave doubts as 
to whether the grievance procedure .. . is the appropriate place for [sexual harassment] to be 
dealt with" and that the "expertise and counselling" of the HRC may be more appropriate, 
"slow and toothless or not" .482 One is left with the impression that Tribunal members see their 
role as operating in the "real world" of industrial disputes and executive personal grievances 
and should not have to deal with "trivial" complaints about sexual harassment. This attitude 
fails to recognise not just social reality, that sexual harassment has serious consequences for 
the economic and psychological well-being of women, but the legal reality that sexual 
harassment is an actionable injury, that it is unlawful, and that harassed women have the right 
to real remedies. What is required, then, is a culture change in the employment institutions so 
that the decision makers accept their statutory responsibilities and fulfil them, rather than 
hoping they will go away. For women, sexual harassment is the real world, and the legal 
process established by Parliament to enable women to obtain redress for sexual harassment 
must be made accessible to women by those responsible for applying the law. 
Despite the negative aspects of the decision, the comments of the Employment Court in Z & Y 
Ltd v A indicate that such a culture change may be beginning to take place. Along with the 
Court's comments mentioned in Part IV E above, Goddard CJ noted that publicity as to the 
identity of an harasser may advance the public interest48
3 and commented that, where 
harassment is found to have occurred:484 
... [T]he Tribunal should ordinarily recommend to the employer that it arrange rehabilitative co
unselling 
for that person or those persons. To enable this to be done effectively, I have asked the chief e
xecutive 
officer to ascertain and make available to Secretaries of the Tribunal information concerning th
e 
providers of such counselling services in the main centres. 
Taking women and their injuries seriously is an important part of this culture change. 
479 Wellington etc Clerical Workers' IUWv Greenwich [1983] ACJ 965 (Arb Ct). 
480 Auckland City Council v Hennessey [ 1982] ACJ 699 (Arb Ct). The minimum requirements for pro
cedural 
fairness are for notice of a specific allegation of misconduct to be given to a worker, a real opp
ortunity to be 
given to the worker to refute the allegation or explain or mitigate the worker's conduct, and an 
unbiased 
consideration of the worker's explanation, free from pre-determination and uninfluenced by irr
elevant 
considerations: NZ Food Processing etc Union v Unilever NZ Ltd [ 1990] NZILR 35 (Labour Cour
t) . 
481 B Boon "Procedural Fairness and the Unjustified Dismissal Decision" ( 1992) NZJIR 30 I, 312. 
482 Hicks, above n 89, 293. 
483 Z & Y Ltd 31. 
484 Above 32. 
90 
B Training and Education 
The sexual harassment cases indicate that many (but not all) decision makers and advocates 
are ignorant of the nature and effects of sexual harassment. Tribunal Members receive no 
formal training in any aspect of their duties. Joychild suggests485 that judges, Tribunal 
members and advocates receive training about sexual harassment. However, the decisions 
also indicate a more pervasive gender bias than simply ignorance about sexual harassment. 
Decision makers also have a statutory responsibility to deal with cases in which 
discrimination on grounds other than sex is alleged. They currently receive no training to 
assist them in this task. Because the decision makers of the employment institutions are 
exclusively pakeha and overwhelmingly male, they need exposure to perspectives other than 
their own and to consider the possibility of gender bias when making decisions:486 
Court judgments endow some perspectives, rather than others, with power. Judicial power is least 
accountable when judges leave unstated - and treat as a given - the perspective they select. ... Justice is 
engendered when judges admit the limitations of their own viewpoints, when judges reach beyond those 
limits by trying to see from contrasting perspectives, and when people seek to exercise power to nurture 
differences, not to assign and control them. 
Tribunal members are also expected, unrealistically, to come to the job with mediation skills. 
Training in mediation skills is also vital. 487 However mediation can be effective only if 
freedom from harassment is a serious, valued objective.488 The need for a culture change must 
go hand in hand with any training and education programme. 
C Better Advocacy 
The need for advocates to properly prepare for sexual harassment cases also needs emphasis. 
Decisions often (although not invariably) reflect the quality, or lack of quality, of the research 
which precedes the making of submissions to the decision maker:489 
The need for careful and competent counsel in equality cases is at least as great. While judges must be 
educated to the issues of equality, in an adversary system, lawyers must be trained to bring the issues 
forward effectively during the trial process ... all too often, however, the evidence on critical issues of 
this kind is so slender that it is not easy for judges to determine these issues equitably, however fair and 
sensitive they may be. 
485 Above n 2, 79. 
486 Minow 94 - 95. 
487 Stamato, above n 145, 169 - 170, says that "[t]he design of mediation programmes for sexual harassment 
cases requires very careful attention, however. ... [and] advanced, sophisticated training for mediators ... is 
essential. " 
488 Above, 170. 
489 M L Rothman (Judge, Quebec Court of Appeal) "Prospects for Change in Canada: Education for Judges 
and Lawyers" in Equality and Judicial Neutrality 421, 425. 
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D More Representative Decision Makers 
As in other areas of judicial decision making, there is an urgent need for decision makers in 
the employment institutions to be more widely representative of the diverse groups in New 
Zealand society than is the case now. 
E Research Into and Evaluation of the ECA Provisions 
Research is needed into the effectiveness of the ECA sexual harassment provisions at 
workplace level.490 The effectiveness of the employment institutions in administering the 
provisions should also be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. 
F Changes to the Law 
The changes suggested above are more likely to increase the effectiveness of the sexual 
harassment provisions in the ECA in preventing sexual harassment than changes to the law. 
Further consideration needs to be given to whether the onus of proof in sexual harassment 
cases needs to be statutorily reversed. Some desirable changes include legislation: 
1. Providing for a broader range of remedies than is available at present to the 
employment institutions. Joychild suggests491 that the current recommendatory 
powers in section 40(l)(d) of the ECA be amended to empower adjudicators and the 
Court to order, rather than simply recommend, that harassers undergo counselling and 
education programmes, and that employers institute anti-sexual harassment 
programmes in the workplace; 
2. Establishing a rebuttable presumption of detriment where sexual harassment is found 
to have occurred; 
3. Removing the requirement in section 36 that complaints of co-worker, customer and 
client harassment must be put in writing before the employer is obliged to act on those 
complaints;492 
4. Amending section 36 to allow women to take personal grievances where sexually 
harassing behaviour is repeated by any co-worker, customer or client, not just in 
situations where the same co-worker, customer or client repeats the sexually harassing 
behaviour. 
490 The ECA provisions are not used by women who are seriously sexually assaulted by their employers. 
Research into the reasons for this would be helpful. 
491 Joychild 80. 
492 As suggested by Hicks, above n 89, 292 . 
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APPENDIX I 
TABLE 1: SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES DEALT W1TH BY THE MEDIATION SERVICE OR 
EMPLOYMENT TRlBUNAL 1/4/89 - 30/6/92 
Year ended Sexual Discrimina- Other Dismissal Total 
Harassment tion 
30/6/93 2 5 32 1203 1242 
30/6/92 2 3 27 468 929! 
30/6/91 7 13 194 876 1090 
30/6/90 4 7 119 681 811 
1/4 89 - 6 5 71 984 1066 
30/6/89 
(Source : Annual Reports of the Department of Labour for the years ending 30 June 1992; 30 June 1991; 30 
June l 990 ; and for the 15 months ending 30 June 1989 presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to 
section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989. Statistics of numbers of sexual harassment cases are not printed in the 
Annual Reports of the Labour Department prior to 1989). 
TABLE 2: SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES DEALT W1TH BY THE HUMAN RlGHTS COMMISSION 
1/4/89 - 30/6/93 
Year ended Employment Sexual discrimination Sexual harassment Queries 
complaints in employment in employment (not formal 
(Total) complaints) 
30/6/93 68 (74)2 5073 
30/6/92 146 91 50 (61) 382 out of 
2537 total 
30/6/91 114 68 (26) 204 out of 
2799 total 
I /4/89 - 186 124 35 (48) 166 out of 
30/6/90 2537 total 
(Source: Annual Reports of the Human Rights Commission and the Race Relations Conciliator for the years 
ended 30 June 1992; 30 June I 99 I; 30 June 1990, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 
81 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and section 28 of the Race Relations Act 1971. The reports do 
not always give a breakdown of how many sexual harassment complaints are employment related or occur in 
other areas eg provision of goods and services. Numbers of employment related complaints are shown where 
these are contained in the report. Otherwise the total number of sexual harassment complaints are given in 
parentheses. 
1 This figure includes 500 cases dealth with under the ECA provisions and 429 additional applications 
disposed of under the transitional provisions of the ECA in the period l July 1991 - 31 December 1991. 
2 Estimate only provided to the writer by HRC l September 1993. 
3 Figure quoted in the Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 August 1993, p 13. 
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APPENDIX II 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES ADJUDICATED ON BY THE EMPLOYMENT 
INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1973, THE LABOUR 
RELATIONS ACT 1987 AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 
A COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY WOMEN 
• NID Distribution Workers IUOW v AB Ltd [1988] NZILR 761 (Labour Court) 
• Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd [1992] 2 ERNZ 38 (AET, C Hicks) 
• Yv X Ltd (Unreported, 15 July 1992, Auckland Employment Tribunal, AT/126/92) (C 
Hicks) 
• A v Z (Unreported, 29 September 1992, Wellington Employment Tribunal, WT 69/92) 
(D Hurley) 
• P v S (Unreported, 22 July 1993, Christchurch Employment Tribunal, CT 87/93) (JM 
Goldstein) 
• Z & Y Ltd v A (Unreported, 3 September 1993, Wellington Employment Court, WEC 
21/93) (Goddard CJ) 
B CASES INVOLVING A DISMISSED (OR OTHERWISE DISCIPLINED) HARASSER 
• Northern Butchers Union v Peach & Vienna Foods Ltd [1982] ACJ 379 (Arb Ct) 
• TP Co v Staff Union (Unreported, 3 June 1987, private arbitration, [1987] ILB 53) 
• C v L D Nathan Ltd [1988] NZILR 304 (Labour Court) 
• Williams v Wanganui Area Health Board [1989] 1 NZILR 617 (Labour Court) 
• Wanganui Area Health Board v Williams [1989] 2 NZILR 174 (CA) 
• Hetei v Feltex Woven Carpets and NZ Dairy Food & Textile Workers Union [1990] 3 
NZILR 132 (Labour Court) 
• NZ Association of Polytechnic Teachers v Nelson Polytechnic [1991] 1 ERNZ 662 
(Labour Court) 
• Parlane v NZ Police [1991] 3 ERNZ 721 (Labour Court) 
• B v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1992] 2 ERNZ 554 (AET, A Dumbleton) 
• B v Amalgamated Engineering Union (No 2) (Unreported, 30 June 1992, Auckland 
Employment Tribunal, AT 79A/92) (A Dumbleton) 
• Verboeket v Du Pont Peroxide Ltd [1993] 1 ERNZ 124 (AEC, Travis J); (Unreported, 
12 November 1992, Auckland Employment Tribunal, AT 152A/92 (JA Newman)); 
[1992] 3 ERNZ 582 (AEC); (Unreported, 12 August 1992, Auckland Employment 
Tribunal, AT 152/92 (J A Newman)) 
• A v Foodstuffs (South Island) Ltd [1993] 1 ERNZ 81 (CET, D Miller) 
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